United States v. Gerardo Sandoval

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 10-4032
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
GERARDO SANDOVAL,
Appellant
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Crim. No. 5:08-CR-00055-1)
District Judge: Honorable Mary A. McLaughlin
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 26, 2012
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Before: GREENAWAY, JR., ROTH, and TASHIMA, * Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: May 17, 2012 )
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OPINION
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*
Hon. A. Wallace Tashima, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, sitting by designation.
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.
Appellant Gerardo Sandoval (“Sandoval”) and two co-defendants were indicted on
two charges related to the distribution of marijuana. On the second day of Sandoval’s
trial, after the testimony of two Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) agents
containing prejudicial information, arguably hearsay, Sandoval sought and was granted a
mistrial. Subsequently, on retrial, the jury convicted him on both counts. The District
Court sentenced Sandoval to ninety-seven months of imprisonment and four years of
supervised release. He filed a timely appeal and now argues to this Court that he should
be granted a judgment of acquittal on double jeopardy grounds. He additionally argues
that the evidence was insufficient to convict him and that his sentence is unreasonable.
Because Sandoval himself moved for a mistrial and the prosecution did not intend
to force a mistrial, we find his double jeopardy claim meritless. The evidence was
sufficient to convict and his sentence is both procedurally and substantively reasonable.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment and sentence below.
I. BACKGROUND
Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recount only the
essential facts.
Based on a tip, DEA agents began surveillance of Rafael Jimenez and Gerardo
Sandoval, whom they believed were involved in marijuana distribution. The agents
observed Jimenez and Sandoval drive to Givler’s Auto Clinic, where the two men
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purchased a trailer. Several days later, Sandoval was observed with the trailer, which
was then hooked to a pick-up truck and driven to a mushroom farm. At the farm, the
pick-up truck and a van were parked close to each other. The DEA agent who had trailed
the pick-up truck smelled marijuana, and agents recovered 1,566 pounds of marijuana
from the two vehicles. One of Sandoval’s co-defendants was in the truck and the other
was in the van. Sandoval and Jimenez were stopped nearby while driving away from the
farm in a silver Audi.
Sandoval and his two co-defendants were indicted and charged with conspiring to
possess marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count One),
and with possessing 700 kilograms of marijuana with intent to distribute for
remuneration, and aiding and abetting, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B),
and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 2). While his two co-defendants pled guilty, Sandoval went to
trial.
At Sandoval’s trial, DEA Special Agent Rodgers was the Government’s first
witness. After a question about what Rodgers had told the owner of Givler’s Auto Clinic,
the District Court cautioned Rodgers to refrain from relating hearsay to the jury. At
sidebar, the prosecutor affirmed that she had instructed Rodgers to refrain from invoking
hearsay. Nonetheless, Rodgers subsequently stated, “Surveillance agents informed us
that the trailer was being—” before an objection was lodged. (App. 38-39.) The
remainder of the testimony was uneventful.
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The Government’s second witness was DEA Special Agent Matsko. The District
Court had issued an in limine ruling that Matsko could not mention the existence of a tip
from an informant. Nonetheless, Matsko mentioned that he had instructed other agents to
establish surveillance at a particular location because a large load of marijuana was
expected to arrive there. He also stated that he told the agents that they should “look out
for Rafael Jimenez and Gerardo Sandoval.” (App. 43-44.)
At this point, the District Judge expressed her displeasure at a sidebar and
acknowledged that she “honestly [didn’t] know what to do at this point.” (App. 46.)
After the sidebar, outside the presence of the jury, the Judge had Matsko’s testimony read
back. Sandoval’s counsel indicated that he would move for a mistrial, as he did not
believe striking the testimony could remedy the problem. The Judge then repeated that
she could not think of any way to reverse the damage caused by the hearsay testimony.
After a conversation in chambers with counsel, she granted the mistrial.
Retrial began the following day, and the jury returned a guilty verdict two days
later. The District Court imposed a sentence of ninety-seven months of imprisonment
and four years of supervised release.
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The District Court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.
This Court has jurisdiction over a challenge to the conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
over a challenge to the sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
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We employ three different standards of review for the three issues Sandoval raises.
Our review of double jeopardy challenges is plenary. United States v. Dees, 467 F.3d
847, 853 (3d Cir. 2006). In evaluating a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, we view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government and sustain the verdict where
“any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” United States v. Jones, 566 F.3d 353, 361 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks citation omitted). Finally, we review both the procedural and
substantive reasonableness of a sentence imposed by the District Court for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Double Jeopardy
The double jeopardy clause prohibits any person from being “twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb” based on the same offense. U.S. Const. amend. V. Generally,
though, “where the defendant seeks a mistrial, ‘[n]o interest protected by the Double
Jeopardy Clause is invaded.’” United States v. Rivera, 384 F.3d 49, 54 (3d Cir. 2004)
(quoting United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 100 (1978)). In such a case, a subsequent
prosecution usually does not offend the Constitution. Id.However, there is a “narrow exception” to the rule that a mistrial sought by the
defendant cannot violate the double jeopardy clause. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667,
673 (1982). The Government may not bring a second prosecution where, in the first trial,
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“the prosecutor’s actions giving rise to the motion for mistrial were done ‘in order to
goad the [defendant] into requesting a mistrial.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Dinitz, 424
U.S. 600, 611 (1976)). The test here is one of prosecutorial intent; “[o]nly where the
governmental conduct in question is intended to ‘goad’ the defendant into moving for a
mistrial may a defendant raise the bar of double jeopardy.” Id. at 676.
In United States v. Williams, we noted that post-Kennedy case law “has
consistently emphasized that application of the double jeopardy bar is dependent on a
showing of the prosecutor’s subjective intent to cause a mistrial in order to retry the
case.” 472 F.3d 81, 85-86 (3d Cir. 2007) (emphasis added). In that case, the
Government argued that the prosecutor had mistakenly, and not intentionally, triggered a
mistrial with his questioning. Id. at 86. We concluded that evidence in the record did not
show that the prosecutor intended to provoke the defendant into seeking a mistrial. Id. at
87. In so doing, we adopted the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion that a prosecutor’s knowledge
of the “natural and probable” causes of his actions did not supply the intent required for
the double jeopardy exception to apply. Id. at 88; see also United States v. Powell, 982
F.2d 1422, 1429 (10th Cir. 1992) (“Carelessness or mistake on the part of the
prosecution, as opposed to a calculated move aimed at forcing the defendant to request a
mistrial, is not sufficient to bar retrial under the Double Jeopardy Clause.”).
Sandoval argues that, although “the Prosecutor might not have set out to cause a
mistrial,” the Government should be “charged with the knowledge that a mistrial might or
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would, in fact, occur” when its witness introduced hearsay testimony that the Judge had
already made clear would not be admissible. (Appellant’s Br. 12.) Sandoval’s
concession, though, ends the inquiry. Given our decision in Williams, we are foreclosed
from considering the argument that a prosecutor’s knowledge that her actions might lead
the defendant to seek a mistrial supplies the requisite level of intent required for the
defendant to invoke double jeopardy after moving for a mistrial.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
In order to prevail on his sufficiency of the evidence challenge, Sandoval must
demonstrate that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, no
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime to have been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jones, 566 F.3d at 361.
Sandoval contends that the evidence was insufficient to connect him to the
conspiracy, but he acknowledges testimony that Sandoval had offered to pay his co-
conspirator $2,000 to transport marijuana and that Sandoval was present at the scene of
the crime. (Appellant’s Br. 19-20.) There was also testimony at trial that Sandoval
purchased the trailer used in the crime and that he stayed in constant phone
communication with a co-conspirator while the marijuana was being transported. This
evidence disproves the argument that no rational juror could find that Sandoval was
involved in the conspiracy.
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C. Reasonableness of the Sentence
Finally, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Sandoval. The
burden rests with the defendant to demonstrate that the sentence was not reasonable.
United States v. King, 454 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 2006). The sentence was procedurally
and substantively reasonable, because the District Court considered the 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a) factors and imposed a sentence within the Guidelines range. The transcript of
the sentencing hearing shows that the Court understood the breadth of its discretion.
After taking into account Sandoval’s actions and background, it nonetheless specifically
chose not to vary downward. The sentence is reasonable. Accordingly, Sandoval has not
met his burden here.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the conviction and sentence issued
by the District Court.
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