United States v. Killingsworth

Opinions of the United
2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
12-30-2004
USA v. Killingsworth
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 04-1659
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 04-1659
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Appellant
v.
BENJAMIN KILLINGSWORTH
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 03-cr-00110-2)
District Judge: Hon. Edwin M. Kosik
Argued December 14, 2004
BEFORE: AMBRO, VAN ANTWERPEN and
STAPLETON, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed December 30, 2004 )
Thomas A. Marino
U.S. Attorney
Theodore B. Smith, III (Argued)
Assistant U.S. Attorney
Office of the U.S. Attorney
Federal Building - 228 Walnut Street
P.O. Box 11754
Harrisburg, PA 17108
Attorneys for Appellant
Carl J.B. Poveromo (Argued)
Rinaldi, Roscoe & Poveromo
520 Spruce Street
P.O. Box 826
Scranton, PA 18501
Attorney for Appellee
OPINION OF THE COURT
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:
Because we write only for the parties who are familiar with the facts, we do not
restate them below. The United States (“Appellant”) appeals the suppression of
incriminating statements made by Benjamin Killingsworth (“Appellee”) to law
enforcement officers during an eight minute interaction at Appellee’s home on the
morning of January 23, 2003. The District Court suppressed the statements after
determining that they were the product of custodial interrogation conducted without the
benefit of Miranda warnings. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse.
I.
In reviewing the District Court’s decision to suppress Defendant/Appellee’s
statements, we review findings of fact for clear error, and exercise plenary review “with
respect to the district court’s determination as to whether the [law enforcement] conduct
found to have occurred constitutes custodial interrogation under all the circumstances of
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the case.” United States v. Leese, 176 F.3d 740, 741 (3d Cir. 1999).
II.
Persons subject to custodial interrogation are entitled to receive information
regarding their right to remain silent, their right to speak to an attorney, and their right to
have a lawyer appointed to assist them if they are unable to afford a lawyer prior to any
questioning. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966). Determinations of
whether a person was subject to custodial interrogation are made on a case-by-case basis
looking objectively at the totality of the circumstances. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S.
318, 323 (1994) (noting that “[t]he initial determination of custody depends on the
objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by
either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned”); Leese, 176 F.3d at 743.
A person is in custody where he/she is either formally arrested or where his/her
freedom of movement is restricted to the “‘degree associated with a formal arrest.’”
Leese, 176 F.3d at 743 (citing California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (internal
citation omitted)). Where a person has not been arrested, “something must be said or
done by the authorities, either in their manner of approach or in the tone or extent of their
questioning, which indicates they would not have heeded a request to depart or to allow
the suspect to do so.” Steigler v. Anderson, 496 F.2d 793, 799 (3d Cir. 1974). Thus,
“[p]olice officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom
they question.” Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977). Rather, the obligation
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to administer Miranda warnings exists only “where there has been such a restriction on a
person’s freedom as to render him ‘in custody.’” Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 322.
Courts consider a variety of factors when determining if a person was in custody,
including: (1) whether the officers told the suspect he/she was under arrest or free to
leave; (2) the location or physical surroundings of the interrogation; (3) the length of the
interrogation; (4) whether the officers used coercive tactics such as hostile tones of voice,
the display of weapons, or physical restraint of the suspect’s movement; and (5) whether
the suspect voluntarily submitted to questioning. United States v. Czichray, 378 F.3d 822(8th Cir. 2004); United States v. Hayden, 260 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Crossley, 224 F.3d 847, 861 (6th Cir. 2000).
Here, the District Court erred in determining that Appellee was in custody during
the time the officers were in his home. Examining the totality of the circumstances, the
record does not support a finding that Appellee’s freedom was restrained to the degree
associated with formal arrest. First, the officers made it clear to Appellee that he was not
under arrest. Although the record would provide some support for a finding that, prior to
entering the house, the officers told Appellee they would arrest him if he did not admit
them, once inside and before any questioning, Killingsworth acknowledges that they
explicitly informed him that they had come to solicit his cooperation, not to arrest him.
The fact that the officers informed Appellee that he would be arrested at some future
point for his drug purchases did not transform the conversation into a custodial
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interrogation. “It is appropriate for an investigator to advise a suspect of the potential
course and consequences of a criminal investigation. Suspects frequently confront
difficult decisions about whether to defend against potential criminal charges or to pursue
resolutions that may ameliorate certain unpleasant consequences.” Czichray, 378 F.3d at
829. Although a discussion of future arrest and criminal penalties might indicate a degree
of coercion, “some degree of coercion is part and parcel of the interrogation process and
[] the coercive aspects of a police interview are largely irrelevant to the custody
determination except where a reasonable person would perceive the coercion as
restricting his or her freedom to depart.” Id. Here, a reasonable person would not have
understood this level of coercion as restricting his/her ability to terminate the questioning.
Second, the fact that the incident took place in Appellee’s home undermines a
claim that he was in custody. In United States v. Czichray, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals noted that “[w]hen a person is questioned ‘on his own turf,’ we have observed
repeatedly that the surroundings were ‘not indicative of the type of inherently coercive
setting that normally accompanies a custodial interrogation.’” 378 F.3d at 826. We agree
that “an interrogation in familiar surroundings such as one’s home softens the hard
aspects of police interrogation and moderates a suspect’s sense of being held in custody.”
Id.Third, the length of the conversation does not indicate a custodial situation. The
entire incident took less than ten minutes and included periods of time during which the
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Appellee left the room to make a phone call, asked the officers questions and ultimately
rejected their proposal that he cooperate. Given that courts have found interrogations
lasting anywhere from one and one-half to seven hours to be non-custodial, see Beckwith
v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 342-45 (1976) (three hours); United States v. Wolk, 337
F.3d 997, 1006-07 (8th Cir. 2003) (an hour and twenty minutes); Czichray, 378 F.3d at
825 (seven hours); Leese, 176 F.3d at 744-45 (one hour), we are not persuaded that, in the
absence of the use of physical force, an actual arrest or some other strong indication of
restricted freedom, a reasonably objective person would believe himself to be in custody.
Fourth, the record does not support a finding that the agents used coercive tactics
such as a harsh tone of voice, display of weapons or physical restraint during the
interrogation. The agents did not physically restrain Appellee and permitted him to leave
the room to make a phone call in another area of the house. Although the agents told
Appellee not to make the call and repeatedly asked him to end it, such discouragement is
not probative of whether the Appellee was free to end his interview entirely. Even
assuming that a reasonable person in Appellee’s position would have felt he could not
make a phone call, “he still retained two viable options: conduct an uninterrupted
interview with the agents or terminate the interview. . . . [P]lacing certain ground rules on
an interview does not preclude a reasonable person from foregoing the interview
altogether.” Czichray, 378 F.3d at 828.
Finally, we are satisfied that the Appellee voluntarily engaged in the questioning.
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After the officers entered Appellee’s home, Appellee readily answered questions and
asked many of his own. Appellee continued to speak with the agents while he was on the
phone with another person. Nothing indicates that the incident involved the type of
physical intimidation or psychological coercion which would render Appellee’s
statements involuntary. See Arizona v. Fulminate, 499 U.S. 279 (1999); Schneckloth v.
Bustamente, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1972). Additionally, Appellee admits that he never told
the agents to leave nor asked to leave himself until he terminated the interview by
informing the agents that he did not want to cooperate.1
In short, the incident at issue was an attempt by law enforcement agents to further
their investigation by soliciting Appellee’s aid. As such, the agents suggested to Appellee
that there was a benefit to helping them, tried to keep him from communicating their offer
to others, and explained the consequences of a decision not to help them. However, the
record does not show the use of physical force or restraint, verbal intimidation, the
display of weapons, a lengthy interrogation, or other circumstances indicative of a
custodial interrogation. Therefore, the District Court erred and we will reverse its
decision to suppress Appellee’s statements.
1
The District Court’s opinion states that Appellee asked the agents to leave.
Specifically, the District Court wrote: “we conclude that the agents’ intrusion at 8:30
a.m., knowing the defendant was a target, under threat of eventual arrest – excited and
experiencing reluctance to converse while asking that the agents leave – created a
situation tantamount to custody.” App. at 5. To the extent that this statement is a factual
finding, we find it to be clearly erroneous as it has no record support. See United States v.
Pelullo, 173 F.3d 131, 135 (3d Cir. 1999).
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III.
The District Court’s order granting Appellee’s motion to suppress will be reversed,
and this matter will be remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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