Saudi v. Acomarit Maritimes Services, S.A.

Opinions of the United
2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
9-17-2004
Saudi v. Acomarit Maritimes
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 03-1609
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 03-1609
SHERIFF SAUDI, CAPTAIN,
Appellant
v.
ACOMARIT MARITIMES SERVICES, S.A.
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
D.C. Civil Action No. 01-cv-04301
(Honorable Michael M. Baylson)
Argued April 22, 2004
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, ROSENN and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Filed: September 17, 2004)
JOE ALFRED IZEN, JR., ESQUIRE (Argued)
5222 Spruce Street
Bellaire, Texas 77401
Attorney for Appellant
THOMAS R. NORK, ESQUIRE (Argued)
Bell, Ryniker, Letourneau & Nork
5847 San Felipe, Suite 4600
Houston, Texas 77057
Attorney for Appellee
OPINION OF THE COURT
SCIRICA, Chief Judge.
In this personal injury suit, petitioner appeals a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal
by the District Court for lack of specific and general personal jurisdiction. We will
affirm.
I.
Plaintiff Sheriff Saudi was employed as a “mooring master” by American Eagle
Tankers, a global maritime services company. As a mooring master, Saudi was assigned
by his employer to moor supertankers or vessels on the high seas for the purpose of on-
loading and off-loading petroleum and other cargo. Supertankers are often unable to
enter American ports in the continental United States because the vessels’ drafts exceed
the depth of domestic ports.
Defendant Acomarit Maritimes Services, S.A. is an international ship management
company. Acomarit is a Swiss company with headquarters in Bermuda. It neither
engaged in business in Pennsylvania nor registered to do business in Pennsylvania. It
does not maintain offices in Pennsylvania or an agent for service of process. It manages
vessels, including supertankers, handling the vessels’ crewing and provisioning, and
ensuring that it arrives at its intended destination. Acomarit managed the Marine
Atlantic, the supertanker involved in plaintiff’s accident.
2
On M ay 17, 1999, Saudi left a vessel managed and operated by his employer,
disembarked on to a tender vessel, and was placed aboard the Marine Atlantic
supertanker. At the time, the Marine Atlantic was at anchor sixty miles southeast of
Galveston, Texas, in international waters. The crane transferring Saudi to the tender
vessel collapsed, causing him to fall fifty feet into the Gulf of Mexico. Saudi alleges he
was lashed by the wire support cable of the crane and suffered extensive injuries
including a broken arm, nerve damage, broken ribs, injured lungs, as well as lost wages
and income.
II.
Saudi filed an admiralty and maritime action in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Texas against the owner of the Marine Atlantic, the manufacturer
and servicer of the allegedly defective crane, the owner of the crude oil being stored on
the M arine Atlantic, and Acomarit. Saudi v. Marine Atlantic, 159 F. Supp. 2d 469 (S.D.
Tex. 2000). He alleged claims of negligence, unseaworthy vessel, breach of warranty of
merchantability, and strict liability in tort. Id. at 472. On February 1, 2000, the federal
court in Texas granted without prejudice Acomarit’s motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction. The court held Saudi failed to demonstrate sufficient minimum
3
contacts to Texas or to the United States to establish specific or general personal
jurisdiction in Texas or general jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2). Id. at 483.1
On May 16, 2001, Saudi filed a complaint in Pennsylvania state court, seeking
actual and punitive damages against Acomarit for negligently failing to properly inspect
and maintain the Marine Atlantic's crane, as well as negligently failing to make the
Marine Atlantic safe for performing the operations for which he was hired. Saudi alleged
jurisdiction was proper in Pennsylvania because Acomarit “employed” Thomas Garrett, a
resident of Nazareth, Pennsylvania, who carried out Acomarit’s business partly from
Pennsylvania. Acomarit timely removed to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and
28 U.S.C. § 1331, as the case involved admiralty and maritime jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1333.
Acomarit filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, which was
denied with leave to refile by July 30, 2002. After a limited period of discovery,
Acomarit filed a renewed motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, which the
District Court granted on January 31, 2003. 245 F. Supp. 2d at 667. The court found it
1
Saudi has also filed actions in connection with his accident against various defendants
in at least five federal jurisdictions, as well as in Texas and Wisconsin state courts. See
Saudi v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 273 F. Supp. 2d 101 (D.D.C. 2003) (products liability
action); Saudi v. S/T Marine Atlantic, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15155, 2001 WL 893871(S.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2001) (maritime negligence action); Saudi v. Valmet-Appleton, Inc.,
219 F.R.D. 128 (E.D. Wis. 2003) (products liability action); Saudi v. V. Ship Switzerland,
S.A., 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 5923 (Mar. 31, 2004). The record indicates he has not been
able to establish personal jurisdiction in any of the federal courts against Acomarit.
4
lacked general jurisdiction because Acomarit’s contacts with Pennsylvania were sporadic
at best, rather than continuous and systematic, id. at 669, 675; and that it lacked specific
jurisdiction because Saudi did not allege that Acomarit purposefully directed its activities
at the forum. The court found the Southern District of Texas’s ruling on Fed. R. Civ. P.
4(k)(2) jurisdiction did not amount to claim preclusion, since a final adjudication on the
merits (one of the requirements for claim preclusion) cannot result from a dismissal
without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction. But the court rejected Rule 4(k)(2)
jurisdiction on its merits, holding there was no nexus to the United States since the
accident took place outside the territorial waters of the United States and had no effect
inside the Untied States. Id. at 679-80. The court also rejected Saudi’s motion to compel
discovery, finding that Acomarit properly complied with Saudi’s discovery requests. Id.
at 681.
Saudi filed this timely appeal.
III.
We review de novo the District Court’s dismissal of a party for lack of personal
jurisdiction, Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd, 292 F.3d 361, 368 (3d Cir. 2002), but we
review factual findings for clear error. Pennzoil Products Co. v. Colelli & Assoc., Inc.,
149 F.3d 197, 200 (3d Cir. 1998). We review for abuse of discretion the District Court’s
discovery rulings. Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Companie Des Bauxites De Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
707 (1982). We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
5
IV.
A. Personal Jurisdiction in Pennsylvania
Saudi claims that the District Court erred in dismissing his suit for lack of personal
jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e) allows a district court to assert personal jurisdiction over
a non-resident to the extent allowed by the law of the forum state. Time Share Vacation
Club v. Atlantic Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 63 (3d Cir. 1984). Pennsylvania’s long-arm
statute provides that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over non-residents “to the
fullest extent allowed under the Constitution of the United States.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. § 5322(b).
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees in personam
jurisdiction may only be asserted over a nonresident defendant corporation if that
defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of
the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quotation omitted). In
assessing personal jurisdiction, the court must resolve the question based on the
circumstances that the particular case presents. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
485 (1985).
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant if the defendant has
specific or general contacts with the forum. Specific jurisdiction is appropriate only if the
cause of action is related to or arises out of the defendant’s forum-related activities, so
6
that it should reasonably expect to be haled into court. Vetrotex Certainteed Corp. v.
Consol. Fiber Glass Prod. Co., 75 F.3d 147, 151 (3d Cir. 1996); Helicopteros Nacionales
de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8. The defendant must have “purposefully
directed his activities at residents of the forum” and the litigation must have resulted from
alleged injuries that “‘arise out of or relate[] to those activities.’” BP Chem. Ltd. v.
Formosa Chem. & Fibre Corp., 229 F.3d 254, 259 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Burger King,
471 U.S. at 472). This determination is both claim-specific and defendant-specific. See
Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 255-56 (3d Cir. 2001); Rusk v. Savchuk, 444 U.S.
320, 332 (1980).
If the cause of action does not “arise out of” the defendant foreign corporation’s
activities, a court may assert general jurisdiction if the corporation has “continuous and
systematic” contacts with the forum state. 466 U.S. at 414-15. The standard for
evaluating whether minimum contacts satisfy the test for general jurisdiction is more
stringent than the test applied to questions of specific jurisdiction. See Noonan v.
Winston Co., 135 F.3d 85, 93 (1st Cir. 1998).
1. Specific Jurisdiction
The District Court found no basis to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over
Acomarit, as Saudi presented no evidence demonstrating the underlying accident arose
out of or related to Acomarit’s contacts with or activities in Pennsylvania, such that
Acomarit “should reasonably expect being haled into court” in Pennsylvania. 245 F.
7
Supp. 2d at 669 (quoting Vetrotex, 75 F.3d at 151). Saudi’s claims against Acomarit
relate only to an accident which occurred in the Gulf of M exico, not in Pennsylvania or its
territorial waters, and Saudi’s alleged injury did not arise from any activities Acomarit
“purposefully directed” at Pennsylvania. Id. We find no error.
2. General Jurisdiction
Saudi contends Acomarit had sufficient continuous and substantial contacts with
Pennsylvania to establish general jurisdiction over Acomarit through its alleged employee
Thomas Garrett. He claims that Osprey-Acomarit Ship Management employee Thomas
Garrett was actually a “hidden” employee of Acomarit. According to Saudi, Acomarit
hired Garrett as its port captain and entered into a joint venture with American Automar
to form a company called Osprey-Acomarit Ship Management (“Osprey-Acomarit”),
placed Garrett on that company’s payroll, and hid the fact that Acomarit used a resident
agent in the United States to carry out its business.
Even if Garrett was employed by Acomarit, Saudi has not shown sufficient
contacts with Pennsylvania through Garrett’s employment to warrant general jurisdiction
over Acomarit. At most, Garrett traveled to and from Pennsylvania to Osprey-Acomarit’s
office in Maryland, where he had an office, sent some reports from his home in
Pennsylvania, and made some telephone calls and some e-mails to and from
Pennsylvania. There is no evidence that Acomarit conducted or solicited any business in
Pennsylvania. With the exception of one vessel that paid a port call after the Saudi
8
accident, no Acomarit-managed vessels entered Pennsylvania waters. As such, these
actions in Pennsylvania are not sufficient to establish “continuous and systematic”
contacts with Pennsylvania. See, e.g., BP Chem. Ltd., 229 F.3d at 262 (finding lack of
continuous and systematic contacts where the defendant corporation has no personnel or
facilities in the forum and has not advertised or solicited business in the forum); Nichols
v. Searle & Co., 991 F.2d 1195, 1200 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding insufficient “continuous
and substantial activities” to justify general jurisdiction despite defendant’s solicitation
activities and employment of representatives in the forum state). The District Court did
not abuse its discretion in finding lack of general personal jurisdiction over Acomarit in
Pennsylvania.
B. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2)
1. Claim Preclusion and Issue Preclusion as Applied to the Rule 4(k)(2) Claim
The federal court in Texas dismissed Saudi’s case without prejudice for lack of
personal jurisdiction. Acomarit contends Saudi already litigated whether jurisdiction lies
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2), so he should have been estopped from litigating the Rule
4(k)(2) claim before the District Court here. See Saudi v. S/T Marine Atlantic, 159 F.
Supp. 2d 469, 479-83 (S.D. Tex. 2000). Two types of estoppel might be applicable: res
judicata (claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion).
Claim preclusion does not apply here. Three elements are required for claim
preclusion to take effect: (1) a final judgment on the merits must have been rendered in a
9
prior suit; (2) the same parties or their privies are involved; and (3) the subsequent suit is
based on the same cause of action as the original. Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp, 929
F.2d 960, 963 (3d Cir. 1991). The first prong has not been satisfied here. The federal
court in Texas dismissed Saudi’s suit for lack of personal jurisdiction, rather than issuing
a judgment “on the merits.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee v. L’Union Atlantique S.A. d’Assurances, 723 F.2d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 1983).
Furthermore, dismissals without prejudice are not considered to be “final judgments” as
required for claim preclusion to take effect. Trevino-Barton v. Pittsburgh Nat’l Bank,
919 F.2d 874, 877-78 (3d Cir. 1990). As the District Court correctly concluded, claim
preclusion does not bar Saudi from bringing the current Rule 4(k)(2) action.
It is possible that issue preclusion, might bar Saudi’s Rule 4(k)(2) action.2 Issue
preclusion may apply to non-merits judgments which are conclusive as to those matters
actually adjudged. See Matosantos Commercial Corp. v. Applebee’s Int’l, Inc., 245 F.3d
1203, 1209 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Although the dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction in
the Puerto Rico district court does not have res judicata effect, it does have collateral
2
While counsel for Acomarit mainly focused its arguments on claim preclusion, their
arguments appear to encompass issue preclusion as well. Counsel wrote in two separate
briefs, “the Court correctly noted that the issue of Rule 4(k)(2) jurisdiction was
‘previously resolved in the Texas litigation,’” App. 496, and “[t]he issue of Fed. R. Civ.
P. 4(k)(2) jurisdiction has already been decided by the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas and serves as res judicata to bar the re-litigation of that claim
in this case” (emphasis added). Furthermore, counsel for Acomarit supported its
contentions by citing to Montana v. Supreme Court of the United States, 440 U.S. 147,
153-55 (1979), a case addressing issue preclusion.
10
estoppel effect, preventing the relitigation of issues decided in the Puerto Rico district
court”); Okoro v. Bohman, 164 F.3d 1059, 1063 (7th Cir. 1999). To establish issue
preclusion, Acomarit must demonstrate: “(1) the issue sought to be precluded is the same
as that involved in the prior action; (2) that issue was actually litigated; (3) it was
determined by a final and valid judgment; and (4) the determination was essential to the
prior judgment.” Burlington N. R.R. v. Hyundai Merchant Marine Co., 63 F.3d 1227,
1232 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting In re Braen, 900 F.2d 621, 628-29 n.5 (3d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1066 (1991)). It appears all four elements may have been met here. The
Southern District of Texas decided the same Rule 4(k)(2) issue that Saudi now raises,
namely whether Acomarit was subject to personal jurisdiction based upon nationwide
contacts. See Saudi, 159 F.Supp.2d at 479-83, and Saudi, 245 F.Supp.2d at 676-681.
This issue was litigated in the Texas action, the Texas court issued a valid judgment
regarding Rule 4(k)(2) jurisdiction, and the issue of Rule 4(k)(2) jurisdiction was
essential to the Texas judgment in determining whether there was personal jurisdiction
over Acomarit. See 159 F.Supp.2d at 479-83. Nonetheless, the able District Court did
not specifically address issue preclusion and so we are reluctant to rule on it here,
especially since we believe plaintiff cannot prevail on the merits.
2. Rule 4(k)(2) Discussion on the Merits
Even if Saudi were permitted to bring a claim of personal jurisdiction under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2), his claim would fail. Rule 4(k)(2) allows a federal court to exert
11
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant where the defendant lacks sufficient contacts in a
single state to bring it within the reach of the state’s long arm statute, yet has enough
contacts with the United States as a whole to make jurisdiction constitutional. Thomas A.
Coyne, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure II-25 (2d ed. 2002). The rule, enacted in
December 1993, provides:
If the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States, serving a summons or filing a waiver of service is also effective,
with respect to claims arising under federal law, to establish personal jurisdiction
over the person of any defendant who is not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts
of general jurisdiction of any state.
Therefore, to establish personal jurisdiction, there must be: (1) a claim arising under
federal law; (2) the defendant must be beyond the jurisdictional reach of any state court of
general jurisdiction; and (3) the defendant must have sufficient contacts with the United
States so that the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant comports
with the due process requirements of the Constitution or other federal law. See BP Chem.
Ltd., 229 F.3d at 262; United States v. Swiss American Bank, Ltd., 191 F.3d 30, 38 (1st
Cir. 1999). The third prong of the test under Rule 4(k)(2)—minimum contacts—is
similar to that of personal jurisdiction for a particular state: “general jurisdiction is
available when the defendant’s contacts unrelated to the litigation are ‘continuous and
systematic.’” BP Chemicals, 229 F.3d at 262 (citing Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416.3
3
In Leasco, 468 F.2d 1326, a case decided before Rule 4(k)(2) was promulgated, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated:
(continued...)
12
Saudi claims he presented sufficient contacts with the United States, described by
the Texas court as a “laundry list” but not elaborated on, see 159 F. Supp. 2d at 483, to
ensure due process has been satisfied. He also argues his injury necessarily has an effect
within the United States.
We do not believe that the “minimum contacts” presented by Saudi are sufficient
to establish personal jurisdiction over Acomarit. As the District Court noted, Saudi
presented even fewer contacts with the United States than the moving party in BP
Chemicals Ltd., 227 F.3d 254. In BP Chemicals, we found that a foreign defendant did
not have sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole to justify the exercise of
Rule 4(k)(2) jurisdiction. Id. at 258. Although the defendant Taiwanese corporation
3
(...continued)
[T]he Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, § 27, lists various bases for the
exercise of judicial jurisdiction over an individual who is not present. Those
relevant here are doing business in the state, § 35; doing an act in the state, § 36;
and causing an effect in the state by an act done elsewhere, § 37.
468 F.2d at 1340. The Second Circuit chose three of the many factors under the
Restatement which apply to the facts of that particular case.
See also, e.g., United States v. Swiss American Bank, Ltd., 191 F.3d 30 (1st Cir.
1999) (performing a Rule 4(k)(2) minimum contacts test but not limiting its analysis to
the three factors described above); Chew v. Dietrich, 143 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 1998) (same);
World Tankers Carriers Corp., 99 F.3d 717 (5th Cir. 1996) (same); Central States v.
Reimer Express World Corp., 230 F.3d 934, 946 (7th Cir. 2000) (ERISA case); Doe v.
Unocal Corp., 27 F. Sup. 2d 1174 (C.D. Ca. 1998); aff’d, 248 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001);
SEC v. Knowles, 87 F.3d 413, 416-19 (10th Cir. 1996) (involving a contract dispute);
Associated Transp. Line, Inc. v. Productos Fitosanitarios Proficol El Carmen, S.A., 197
F.3d 1070, 1074-76 (11th Cir. 1999) (tort case involving communication of
misinformation).
13
exported its products to the United States, held an ownership interest in a Delaware
corporation, and entered into contracts requiring its personnel to travel to the United
States for training, we held the cumulative effects of these contacts did not meet the
requirements for general personal jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2). Id. at 258-59. In this
case, there appear to be fewer jurisdictional connections than in BP Chemicals. Saudi’s
accident occurred outside the United States, and Saudi presents no evidence that
Acomarit solicited or transacted business in the United States. The District Court did not
err in finding lack of sufficient contacts with the United States.
C. Motion to Compel Discovery and Impose Sanctions
Finally, Saudi alleges Acomarit abused the discovery process and blocked
discovery of jurisdictional facts. He alleges Acomarit committed unauthorized
redactions, submitted meritless objections to requests for telephone bills and financial
records showing reimbursements in Pennsylvania, and made unsupported claims that
documents were destroyed and cannot be produced. Saudi claims that he is entitled to a
finding of personal jurisdiction based on this alleged willful obstruction of discovery.
The District Court found no abuse of discovery. It noted, “Despite [Saudi’s] insistence
that Acomarit has not produced documents in its possession, [Saudi] has not produced
any evidence to prove that Acomarit is withholding documents.” Saudi, 245 F. Supp. at
681. We see no abuse of discretion.
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V.
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
15