Williams v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-3903
___________
CLIFTON WILLIAMS,
Appellant
v.
*SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;
ULLI KLEMM;
ROBERT BITNER;
JOHN KERESTES;
EDWARD J. KLEM;
PATRICIA A. RAMER;
MIKE VUKSTA;
RICHARD SPAIDE;
ROBERT YARNELL;
CHERYL STANITIS
*(Pursuant to Rule 43(c), Fed.R.App.P.)
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 08-cv-01915)
District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones III
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 1, 2011
Before: AMBRO, FISHER AND NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: November 3, 2011)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Clifton Williams appeals pro se from the District Court’s order granting
defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denying his motion for leave to file a
supplemental exhibit. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm in part, vacate in part,
and remand to the District Court for further proceedings.
I. Background
Williams, a prisoner incarcerated at State Correctional Institution (“SCI”)
Mahanoy,1 brought this action after he was disciplined for conducting prayer in the diet
room of the prison kitchen.2 Williams has been a practicing Muslim for over twenty
years. His religious faith requires that he engage in prayer five times each day (dawn,
noon, afternoon, sunset, and evening),3 attend Jumu’ah prayer (congregational worship)
every Friday afternoon, fast for Ramadan, and give to charity within his means.
The record reflects that on October 23, 2006, Williams was assigned to work
utility detail in the prison kitchen from 1:00 p.m. to 6:45 p.m.4 Because he did not have
any job assignments at the beginning of his shift, Williams situated himself between a
1
Williams has been incarcerated at SCI Mahanoy since November 2005.
2
Meals for prisoners on special diets are prepared in the diet room.
3
Williams explained that there is some flexibility, approximately forty-five to sixty
minutes, when prayer is due and when prayer may commence.
4
SCI Mahanoy requires new prisoners to work in the Food Services Department for
three months before being considered for job reassignment. A prisoner working utility
detail acts as a floater in the kitchen, performing tasks such as assisting cooks, cleaning,
and serving.
2
wall and hot box in the diet room and commenced noon prayer around 1:30 p.m.5 At
approximately 1:35 p.m., Cheryl Stanitis, a staff member in the Food Services
Department, observed Williams in the diet room and ordered him to stop prayer and leave
the diet room immediately. Williams, however, continued to pray. 6 After he finished
praying, Robert Yarnell, a Food Services Department Supervisor, had Williams escorted
out of the kitchen to his cell block.
The next day Williams was charged with misconduct for refusing to obey an order
and for presence in an unauthorized area. A misconduct hearing was held. Williams
pleaded guilty to the charges, explaining that noon prayer was due, he had commenced
prayer, and once a formal prayer has commenced, it is generally continued until
completion. As a result of his misconduct, Williams lost his Food Services Department
job.
Williams appealed the misconduct hearing to the Program Review Committee
(“PRC”), claiming that the institutional policies, procedures, and practices employed
were unethically repressive to the right to practice the religion of Islam. The PRC,
5
According to the Ramadan calendar attached as an exhibit, noon prayer was due at
12:50 p.m. on October 23, 2006.
Prisoners working in the kitchen are only authorized to pray in the kitchen break area.
Food Services Department policy states that prayer in the kitchen should not involve any
ritual or display, and Williams testified that inmates have disruptive conversations and
track urine in the break area.
6
Williams’ prayer lasted approximately ten minutes.
3
composed of Patti Ramer, Mike Vuksta, and Richard Spaide, denied his appeal because
Williams had admitted that he was guilty for failing to follow regulations. Williams then
submitted an appeal to Superintendent Edward J. Klem, claiming that the PRC’s decision
was based on incomplete review and it failed to address the grounds on which the appeal
was based, the alleged unconstitutional actions of the kitchen staff, not his guilt. Klem
denied the appeal. Williams submitted a final appeal to Robert S. Bitner, Chief Hearing
Examiner, which was denied.
On September 18, 2007, Williams requested administrative intervention from John
Kerestes, the new Superintendent. Kerestes responded stating that these issues had been
grieved and reviewed in the past, and there were no plans to change policies and
procedures. Williams then sent a letter to Jeffrey Beard, Secretary of the Department of
Corrections, seeking remedy for unethical and unlawful institutional practices that
unfairly infringe upon the practice of Islam at SCI Mahanoy. Williams’ letter was
referred to Ulli Klemm, Administrator of Religion and Volunteer Services, who informed
Williams that, due to safety concerns and the orderly running of the institutions, inmates
are afforded freedom to practice religion in the privacy of their cells and chaplaincy
sponsored religious activities.
Williams filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. §
2000cc-1 (the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, or
RLUIPA) in October 2008. He alleged that the institutional policies, practices, and
procedures of the Food Services Department unfairly infringe upon the practice of Islam
at SCI Mahanoy in violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the
4
terms of RLUIPA. He asserted that these allegedly unconstitutional policies, practices,
and procedures resulted in defendants unfairly sanctioning Williams for exercising his
constitutionally protected right to practice his religion, or showing a callous indifference
towards his protected right by failing to take any corrective action.
The parties conducted discovery, and defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment. Williams filed a reply to defendants’ motion. He later filed a motion for leave
to submit a supplement to an exhibit. Williams’ motion was denied, and defendants’
motion for summary judgment was granted. Williams filed a timely appeal.
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review
over an order granting summary judgment. Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 130
& n.6 (3d Cir. 2001). The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We will view the facts in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Whetzel, 256 F.3d at 130 n.6. We review the District
Court’s denial to file a supplemental exhibit for an abuse of discretion. See United States
v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 538 (3d Cir. 2010).
5
III. Discussion
The District Court properly granted defendants summary judgment as to Williams’
Free Exercise Clause claim and properly denied Williams’ motion to submit a
supplement.7 However, the District Court erred in denying Williams’ RLUIPA claim.
A. Free Exercise Clause
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” U.S. Const.
amend. I. Prisoners do not forfeit this right by reason of their conviction and
confinement in prison. See DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 50 (3d Cir. 2000). For a
prisoner, this right, however, is more limited. Id. at 50-51. To establish a violation of the
Free Exercise Clause, Williams must show that defendants prevented him from engaging
in his religion without any justification reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). In determining whether a restriction
is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, courts weigh four factors:
First, there must be a “valid, rational connection” between the
prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put
forward to justify it. . . . Second, a court must consider
whether inmates retain alternative means of exercising the
circumscribed right. Third, a court must take into account the
costs that accommodating the right would impose on other
inmates, guards, and prison resources generally. . . . [F]ourth,
7
The District Court did not err in dismissing defendant Beard from the case, as he had
no personal involvement in the alleged infringement upon Williams’ constitutional rights.
See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (personal involvement
may be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and
acquiescence). A grievance addressed to Beard does not amount to personal involvement
because Beard did not respond to the grievance and the grievance was referred to Klem.
See id. at 1208.
6
a court must consider whether there are alternatives to the
regulation that fully accommodate[ ] the prisoner’s rights at
de minimis cost to valid penological interests.
DeHart, 227 F.3d at 51 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
We agree with the District Court that Williams’ free exercise rights were not
violated. The District Court applied the four factors in determining defendants did not
violate the Free Exercise Clause. The District Court properly found that the prison’s
interest in maintaining institutional order and security is legitimate and that those
interests were rationally connected to the institutional policy that inmates must obey
orders and may not be present in an unauthorized area. Many kitchen utensils and tools
could be used as weapons and the Food Services Department employs 375 to 400 inmates
and only 26 staff members. See id. at 50-51 (institutional security justifies limitations on
the exercise of constitutional rights by inmates). Additionally, the District Court
correctly noted that although Williams may not engage in his five obligatory prayers
while working in the kitchen, he has alternative means of practicing his religion
generally, by offering prayer in his cell and attending Jumu’ah prayer. See id. at 55.
In evaluating the third factor, the District Court considered the costs and
complications of allowing Muslim inmates to return to their cells or choose any area in
the kitchen to offer prayer, designating a permanent space for Muslim inmates to offer
prayer, and exempting Muslim inmates from mandatory employment with the Food
Services Department before being considered for job reassignment. As to the fourth
factor, the District Court could not determine an alternative that could fully accommodate
Williams at de minimis costs. Accordingly, we agree that defendants were entitled to
7
summary judgment on this claim.
B. RLUIPA
RLUIPA heightens the protection from burdens on religious exercise.8 See
Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 277 (3d Cir. 2007). RLUIPA prohibits the
Government from imposing a substantial burden on a prisoner’s practice of his religion
unless the burden “(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is
the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). “[A] substantial burden exists where: 1) a follower is forced to
choose between following the precepts of his religion and forfeiting benefits otherwise
generally available to other inmates versus abandoning one of the precepts of his religion
in order to receive a benefit; OR 2) the government puts substantial pressure on an
adherent to substantially modify his behavior to violate his beliefs.” Washington, 497
F.3d at 280. In determining the least restrictive means, “the Government must consider
and reject other means before it can conclude that the policy chosen is the least restrictive
means.” Id. at 284.
Contrary to defendants’ argument,9 the District Court properly determined that
Williams’ religious exercise was substantially burdened when he was employed in the
Food Services Department. The District Court recognized that Williams’ daily prayers
8
Thus, even if a prison’s actions are allowed under the Free Exercise Clause, they
may not be allowed under RLUIPA. See Van Wyhe v. Reisch, 581 F.3d 639, 651 (8th
Cir. 2009).
9
Defendants argue that Williams was not forced to substantially modify his behavior
because prison policies allowed him to perform his prayers in the break room.
8
required that he prostrate himself on a clean surface in a quiet area. Although prayer was
authorized in the break area, the Food Services Department policy states that prayer in
the kitchen should not involve any ritual or display. Additionally, Williams stated that
inmates have disruptive conversations and track urine from bathrooms in the break area.
Thus, the District Court properly noted that Williams was forced to choose between
offering prayers in the manner consistent with his religious belief and being disciplined
for being in an unauthorized area or for refusing to obey an order.
Williams argued that the Food Services Department policies are not the least
restrictive means of furthering the compelling government interest of maintaining order
and security. He suggested that the Food Services Department implement a “leave and
return” policy or designate a room in the kitchen for prayer. To support the viability of
his suggestions, Williams asserted that the Food Services Department in his former
prison institution implemented a “leave and return” policy, whereby kitchen workers
were permitted to leave the kitchen in between job duties, which allowed Muslim inmates
the ability to find an appropriate place to offer prayer in a timely and proper manner.
Williams also testified that during the month of Ramadan, Food Services staff have
afforded Muslim inmates a designated room in the kitchen to offer evening prayer and
sunset prayer.10
10
In his reply brief, Williams discusses the affidavit of a Muslim prisoner at SCI
Mahanoy that stated that he was permitted to pray in a designated area in the kitchen. We
cannot consider this argument because this affidavit was not included in the record
below. See Webb v. City of Phila., 562 F.3d 256, 261 n.4 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation
omitted).
9
In determining that the burden was the least restrictive means of furthering the
compelling government interest of maintaining order and security, the District Court
dismissed Williams’ suggested “leave and return” policy. The District Court reasoned
that it would not be possible to supervise Muslim inmates if they were permitted to leave
the kitchen or choose areas they deem appropriate to offer their prayers during work
shifts. We agree with this analysis. However, the District Court (and defendants) failed
to acknowledge Williams’ testimony that a designated room had been offered to Muslim
inmates to offer evening prayer and sunset prayer during the month of Ramadan. This
evidence demonstrates that a designated prayer room may be a viable option, as it has
been successful in the past, albeit on a limited basis. Therefore, a reasonable factfinder
could find that a designated prayer room in the kitchen is the least restrictive means of
furthering the compelling government interest of maintaining order and security. Thus,
we conclude there is a genuine issue of material fact, and hold that summary judgment
was inappropriate. Accordingly, we will vacate the judgment as to Williams’ RLUIPA
claims.
C. Motion to Submit Supplement
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Williams’ motion for
leave to file a supplemental exhibit to his brief in support of his opposition to defendants’
motion for summary judgment. The supplement Williams sought to submit is a copy of
his official grievance, appeal, and responses regarding his grievance that defendants are
retaliating against him by having someone contaminate his food, beverage, and oral
hygiene items that are stored in his locker. This proposed supplement is similar to
10
another exhibit in his brief in support of his opposition to defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. Although Williams requested that defendants refrain from
retaliatory acts as a form of injunctive relief in his Complaint, the District Court properly
denied this motion because the supplement is not relevant to the claims raised in his
complaint that defendants have violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
and RLUIPA.
D. Discovery Issues
In his brief, Williams also argues that defendants failed to cooperate in discovery
and therefore summary judgment should have been precluded.11 Williams filed one
discovery-related motion in the District Court, which requested an enlargement of time to
conduct discovery because defendants had failed to provide answers to his
interrogatories.12 Williams did not file any discovery-related motions after defendants
served their responses to his interrogatories. In his response to defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, Williams argued that defendants delayed answers to his
interrogatories, and that the answers to the interrogatories were misleading, evasive,
pretextual, or false. However, Williams did not request any type of relief and did not file
a separate motion raising these claims. Consequently, the District Court did not abuse its
11
We review discovery matters for abuse of discretion. See Anderson v. Wachovia
Mortg. Corp., 621 F.3d 261, 281 (3d Cir. 2010). “[W]e will not upset a district court's
conduct of discovery procedures absent a demonstration that the court's action made it
impossible to obtain crucial evidence.” In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810,
818 (3d Cir. 1982) (quotation marks omitted).
12
The District Court dismissed as moot Williams’ request for an enlargement of time
to conduct his discovery after defendants provided responses to his interrogatories.
11
discretion by dismissing Williams’ request for an enlargement of time to conduct his
discovery and not addressing his allegations regarding defendants’ answers to the
interrogatories.13
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order to the extent
that it granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment on Williams’ Free Exercise
Clause claim and denied Williams’ motion for leave to file a supplemental exhibit. We
will vacate the order to the extent that it granted Appellees’ motion for summary
judgment on Williams’ RLUIPA claims, and we will remand to the District Court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.14
13
Additionally, to the extent that Williams claims that the answers to interrogatories
were misleading and false, we view any conflicting facts in the light most favorable to
Williams. See Whetzel, 256 F.3d at 130 n.6.
14
Williams’ motions for extension of time to file his reply brief are granted, and we
have considered his reply brief in reaching our decision. His motion to reconsider the
Clerk's order of September 16, 2011, denying his request to expand the record on appeal,
however, is denied. The materials Williams wishes to include in the record on appeal are
either not relevant to the issues on appeal or were not included in the record below.
12