Thomas Duffy v. Howard Freed

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 10-4102
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THOMAS B. DUFFY,
Appellant
v.
HOWARD E. FREED;
THE TOWNSHIP OF GALLOWAY;
THE GALLOWAY TOWNSHIP MUNICIPAL COURT;
CITY OF MARGATE; THE NEW JERSEY ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICES OF THE COURTS;
VICINAGE 1 OF SUPERIOR COURT;
STATE OF NEW JERSEY;
J. DOES #1 TO #100
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 1-09-cv-02978)
District Judge: Honorable Jerome B. Simandle
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 18, 2011
Before: RENDELL, AMBRO and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: November 18, 2011)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Thomas Duffy, a lawyer, contends that one of the appellees, Howard
Freed, a municipal prosecutor, refused to offer him a “standard” plea deal to resolve a
speeding ticket as retaliation for two disability discrimination lawsuits Duffy had filed
against New Jersey State courts and judges. Duffy then filed an Americans with
Disabilities Act complaint with the assignment judge for the Superior Court of New
Jersey for Atlantic and Cape May Counties. The assignment judge responded that she
did not supervise Freed, that Duffy failed to copy Freed on his complaint, and that she
was not the ADA Coordinator for the Atlantic and Cape May County Superior Courts.
Duffy then filed this case against (1) Freed; (2) the City of Margate, New Jersey;
(3) the Galloway Township Municipal Court and the Township of Galloway (the
municipal defendants); and (4) the New Jersey Administrative Office of the Courts and
the State of New Jersey (the State defendants) for unlawful retaliation under the ADA,
failure to train employees to deal with ADA complaints, and failure to adopt or follow
appropriate procedures for ADA complaints. The District Court granted defendants’
motions for judgment on the pleadings and denied Duffy’s motions for partial summary
judgment and to amend his complaint. Duffy now appeals. For essentially the reasons
set forth in the District Court’s opinion, we will affirm.
First, the District Court held that prosecutorial immunity bars Duffy’s claim
against Freed because, although the ADA abrogates sovereign immunity in some
respects, it does not abrogate the governmental immunities for claims against government
officials in their personal capacities, and because Freed was performing a prosecutorial
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function when he refused to offer Duffy a plea. We discern no error in the District
Court’s conclusion, and note that Duffy’s case — in which Duffy alleges that Freed
communicated his refusal to enter into a plea agreement to Duffy’s lawyer — bears no
resemblance to the cases he cites involving prosecutors’ assaults on plaintiffs. Instead,
the conduct alleged in Duffy’s complaint falls squarely within the bounds of prosecutorial
immunity. See Davis v. Grusemeyer, 996 F.2d 617, 629 (3d Cir. 1993), overruled on
other grounds by Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 155 F.3d 644 (3d Cir.
1998) (“[A] prosecutor’s decision whether to dispose of a case by plea . . . is protected by
the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity.”).
Second, the Court dismissed Duffy’s claim against the City of Margate because it
could not discern Duffy’s theory of liability. We agree that Duffy’s theory of liability
against Margate was not apparent from his complaint, and that this provided a sufficient
basis for the District Court to grant Margate’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Moreover, to the extent that Duffy contends on appeal that Margate is liable either as
Freed’s employer or for failure to investigate or to implement proper ADA procedures,
his claim fails for the additional reasons described below.
Third, the District Court granted the municipal defendants’ motion to dismiss
Duffy’s claims against them to the extent they were predicated on a respondeat superior
theory of liability because it determined that the municipal defendants are not responsible
for Freed — as a municipal prosecutor, he is an agent of the State, not the township or its
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courts. Its conclusion in this regard appears to be correct as a matter of New Jersey law.1
See Wright v. State, 778 A.2d 442, 462 (N.J. 2001) (holding that “the county prosecutors’
law enforcement function is clearly a State function” for vicarious-liability purposes).
Fourth, the District Court held that Duffy’s claim arising out of the municipal and
State defendants’ alleged failures to follow internal procedures related to ADA
complaints failed on the merits because there is no private right of action to enforce
regulations regarding public entities’ ADA grievance procedures and, even if there were,
Duffy did not allege, and could not allege, any injury arising out of the failure to follow
those procedures: he could have filed (and did file) a lawsuit to obtain directly the relief
he sought through the grievance procedure. Duffy’s arguments on appeal focus mainly
on policy; they do not undermine the District Court’s conclusions.
Finally, the District Court also denied Duffy’s motion for summary judgment and
denied Duffy’s motion to amend his complaint. Duffy argues on appeal that the District
Court improperly denied him an opportunity to amend his complaint, but that is not what
happened. After reviewing Duffy’s proposed amended complaint, the District Court
correctly determined that the proposed amendments would be futile. Duffy’s additional
argument, that the District Court improperly “ignored” his motion for summary judgment
on his request for an injunction against Freed, is meritless. Duffy did not separately
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Duffy argues on appeal that he should be allowed to pursue this theory against the State
defendants. But a review of Duffy’s complaint, his brief in opposition to the motion to
dismiss, and his proposed amended complaint reveals that Duffy only alleged that the
State was responsible for “the discriminatory and retaliatory activities of its
administrative sub-units”; he never pleaded or argued in the District Court that the State
should be held liable for Freed’s actions.
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move for an injunction, and his brief in support of his motion for summary judgment did
not discuss the merits of his request for injunction, let alone establish that he was entitled
to such relief as a matter of law.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. We also will deny
the motion by Freed and the municipal defendants to strike portions of Duffy’s reply
brief.
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