United States v. Ricardo Calderon

CLD-283 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-1828
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
RICARDO CALDERON,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 1-08-cr-00735-001)
District Judge: Honorable Joseph E. Irenas
____________________________________
Submitted for Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
September 13, 2012
Before: RENDELL, HARDIMAN and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: October 17, 2012)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Ricardo Calderon, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the District
Court’s dismissal of his motion requesting a reduction in sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2). There being no substantial question presented on appeal, we will grant the
Government’s motion for summary action and affirm the decision of the District Court.
I.
In 2008, Calderon pleaded guilty to a charge of conspiracy to distribute five
grams or more of cocaine base (“crack cocaine”). Both the plea agreement and the
Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) indicated that he was responsible for at least
twenty but less than thirty-five grams of cocaine base. Under the Sentencing Guidelines
then in effect, that drug quantity resulted in a base offense level of 26, subject to a two-
point enhancement for obstruction of justice, for an adjusted offense level of 28.
Calderon, however, agreed that he was a career offender under § 4B1.1 of the Sentencing
Guidelines, resulting in a base offense level of 34. After an adjustment based on
acceptance of responsibility, his total offense level was 31, higher than it would have
been had it been based on drug quantity. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b) (“if the offense level
for a career offender . . . is greater than the offense level otherwise applicable, the offense
level [for a career offender] shall apply”). With a mandatory criminal history category of
VI, Calderon faced a Guidelines range of 188 to 235 months imprisonment. The District
Court sentenced him to a term of eighty-four months imprisonment, followed by five
years of supervised release.
Three years later, Calderon filed a motion for reduction of his sentence, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 3582, in light of Amendment 750 to the Sentencing Guidelines. (Dkt. No.
42.) Relying on United States v. Forman, 553 F.3d 585, 588 (7th Cir. 2009), the District
Court dismissed the motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Calderon’s
sentence was based on the career offender guideline, and not on a sentencing range that
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was subsequently lowered by the Sentencing Commission. (Dkt. No. 43.) Calderon
timely appealed.
II.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a district court’s
interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. United States v. Mateo, 560 F.3d
152, 154 (3d Cir. 2009). We review a district court’s ultimate decision to deny a motion
pursuant to § 3582(c) for abuse of discretion. Id.
To be eligible for a reduction in sentence, a defendant must have “been sentenced
to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been
lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The sentence must
first be “based on” a Guidelines range, and, second, a Guidelines amendment must have
the “effect of lowering” that Guidelines range. United States v. Thompson, 682 F.3d
285, 290 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685, 2700 (2011)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
To conform to the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Amendment 750 lowered the base
offense levels for crack cocaine quantities listed in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. However, as a
career offender, Calderon’s offense level and Guidelines range were based on the
application of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Because Calderon was not sentenced based on a range
that was subsequently lowered by the Commission, he was not eligible for a reduction
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under § 3582(c)(2). See Mateo, 560 F.3d at 154-55. The District Court did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing Calderon’s motion.1
III.
There being no substantial question presented on appeal, we grant the
Government’s motion and will summarily affirm the District Court’s order. 3d Cir. LAR
27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.
1
We have also considered Calderon’s reliance on Freeman, 131 S. Ct. at 2695, in support
of his motion. That case is inapplicable because, while Calderon entered into a plea
agreement, the parties did not agree on a sentence pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11(c)(1)(C).
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