United States v. Stanley Narcisse

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 11-2393
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
STANLEY NARCISSE,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(M.D. Pa. No. 10-cr-00043-1)
District Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell
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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
October 1, 2012
Before: FUENTES, FISHER and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: October 18, 2012)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge:
On January 31, 2010, a Pennsylvania State Trooper discovered over 1,000
kilograms of marijuana in a trailer in which Stanley Narcisse was riding as a passenger.
After being indicted together with the driver, Eric Paul Emmanuel, Narcisse moved to
suppress the contraband, arguing that it was discovered in violation of the Fourth
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Amendment. The district court denied Narcisse’s motion after an evidentiary hearing and
Narcisse was subsequently convicted.
Narcisse claims ineffective assistance of counsel and appeals the district court’s
ruling on the motion to suppress. We conclude that Narcisse’s claim of ineffective
assistance is not properly raised on direct appeal and that the district court did not err in
denying Narcisse’s motion to suppress. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment,
without prejudice to Narcisse’s right to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
on collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
I.
A. Factual Background
Because we write primarily for the parties, we set forth only the facts relevant to
our resolution of this appeal.
On January 31, 2010, Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Brian Livingston stopped
Eric Paul Emmanuel on I-81 in Dauphin County, Pennsylvania after a tractor trailer he
was operating failed to stop for a truck weigh station. Defendant-Appellant Narcisse was
a passenger in the tractor. Trooper Livingston asked the defendants for their
documentation, which included the bill of lading and their driver log books, and indicated
he would conduct a “level two” inspection of the trailer as permitted under state law.
According to Trooper Livingston’s testimony, which the district court found
credible, his inspection of the defendants’ documentation revealed certain anomalies and
inconsistencies in both the bill of lading and the driver log books. Trooper Livingston’s
inspection of the trailer itself also revealed a number of violations. The officer issued a
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citation for the bypass of the weigh station, and warnings for the additional violations
found during the inspection. He then returned Emmanuel’s documentation and told the
defendants they were free to leave.
The parties disagree as to what happened next. The district court credited Trooper
Livingston’s testimony that he asked Emmanuel if they could talk further and that
Emmanuel assented. Trooper Livingston testified that during this ensuing conversation
Emmanuel and Narcisse both consented to the search of the trailer. The defendants, by
contrast, agree that Livingston told them they were free to leave, but contend that he
subsequently ordered them to “stay right there.” They also assert that they refused to
consent to the search of the trailer. The district court rejected their testimony.
Over 6,500 kilograms of marijuana were discovered during the search.
B. Proceedings in the District Court
On February 17, 2010, a grand jury returned a two-count indictment charging
Emmanuel and Narcisse with (1) engaging in a conspiracy to distribute and possess with
intent to distribute 1,000 kilograms or more of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846,
and (2) actual distribution and possession with intent to distribute 1,000 kilograms or
more of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The indictment alleged that the
criminal conspiracy occurred primarily within the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
After Narcisse and Emmanuel filed a joint motion to suppress the evidence
obtained during the January 31, 2010 stop, the district court conducted an evidentiary
hearing. Trooper Livingston and the defendants testified as detailed above. The district
court denied the joint motion, finding Trooper Livingston’s account of the events credible
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and rejecting the defendants’ version. Specifically, the district court found that the
coercive nature of the encounter ended when Trooper Livingston returned Emmanuel’s
documentation, and that consent to search the trailer was thereafter voluntarily obtained.
On August 25, 2010, the Government filed a notice seeking to introduce evidence
of other crimes under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Specifically, the Government sought to
introduce evidence that, on May 13, 2009, a tractor trailer operated by Narcisse had been
stopped by law enforcement officials in Arizona and was found to contain approximately
1,000 pounds of marijuana. On September 1, 2010, the grand jury issued a superseding
indictment against Emmanuel and Narcisse adding a new charge for interstate
transportation of stolen property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314, and alleging that the
criminal activity charged also occurred within the State of Arizona. Narcisse’s attorney
did not make any motion on the record with respect to the evidence obtained in Arizona,
or the superseding indictment, and opposed attempts by the government to delay the trial
date in light of the superseding indictment.
Both defendants pled not guilty and were tried jointly. Narcisse took the stand and
repeatedly testified that he was responsible for the offenses charged. Narcisse’s attorney
then waived his closing argument. The jury convicted Narcisse on all counts, and he was
sentenced to 188 months in prison. This appeal followed.
II.
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Narcisse first argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for (a) not moving to
suppress the marijuana seized in the Arizona case, (b) not attacking the superseding
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indictment or seeking a continuance of the trial date, (c) failing to counsel Narcisse to
accept a guilty plea offer that purportedly would have resulted in a lower sentence, (d)
permitting Narcisse to admit that he was guilty, and (e) waiving his closing argument.
Subject to certain narrow exceptions, it is well settled that we do not entertain
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. Gov’t of Virgin Islands v.
Lewis, 620 F.3d 359, 371 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. McLaughlin, 386 F.3d
547, 555 (3d Cir. 2004)). “The rationale underlying this preferred policy is that oft-times
such claims involve allegations and evidence that are either absent from or not readily
apparent on the record.” United States v. Gambino, 788 F.2d 938, 950 (3d Cir. 1986).
We have carefully reviewed the record and conclude that Narcisse’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claims do not fall within any cognizable exception to this rule.
B. Motion to Suppress
Narcisse also argues that the district court erred in denying the motion to suppress
the marijuana. In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district
court’s factual findings for clear error and de novo the application of the law to the facts.
United States v. Lafferty, 503 F.3d 293, 298 (3d Cir. 2007). We will accept the court’s
factual findings so long as “the [trial] court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light
of the record viewed in its entirety.” United States v. Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264, 285 (3d
Cir. 2010) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985)).
We find no error in the district court’s determination that both Emmanuel and
Narcisse actually consented to Trooper Livingston’s search of the trailer. The testimony
that the defendants had cooperated with the officer throughout the encounter and the
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consistency of Trooper Livingston’s testimony more than amply support the district
court’s finding. We reject Narcisse’s contention that it is implausible to believe that
someone would consent to a search knowing that contraband would be found.
Narcisse also argues that the consent was tainted because it was obtained during
an unlawful seizure, namely, during the conversation between the defendants and
Trooper Livingston that occurred after the officer issued the citation, returned
Emmanuel’s documents, and told the defendants they were free to leave.
An officer’s interrogation of a suspect during a stop must be related in scope to the
purposes of the stop itself. The Fourth Amendment requires that questioning cease once
the issue for which the officer initiated the encounter has been resolved. See, e.g., United
States v. Wilson, 413 F.3d 382, 386-87 (3d Cir. 2005). There are two exceptions to this
rule. First, there is no seizure if the conversation is voluntarily extended. See United
States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 458 (3d Cir. 2003). Second, “an officer who develops a
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity may expand the scope of an inquiry
beyond the reason for the stop and detain the vehicle and its occupants for further
investigation.” Id. (citation omitted). Both exceptions are applicable here.
Trooper Livingston testified that he asked Emmanuel if he would answer
additional questions after he returned Emmanuel’s documents, and that Emmanuel said
that he would. The district court found his testimony credible. Accordingly, the court
correctly concluded that the “custodial nature of the stop ended when the trooper returned
the papers to Emmanuel.” Supp. App. 172. We find no clear error in this determination.
Alternatively, Trooper Livingston’s credible testimony more than established that
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he had reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity, aside from the original
traffic violation, was afoot. This includes aspects of the bill of lading that in his
experience Trooper Livingston found unusual, and inconsistencies in Narcisse’s driver
log books. Thus, although the reasons for the original detention ceased to justify
interrogation of Emmanuel and Narcisse once the citations were issued, Trooper
Livingston still had reasonable suspicion to continue the interrogation. See, e.g., Givan,
320 F.3d at 458-59 (reasonable suspicion to extend conversation existed because officer
found suspicious truck driver’s activities as reflected in his documentation).1
Finally, even if Narcisse were correct that the extended interrogation constituted
an unlawful seizure, the taint on the consent that resulted from that conversation would
be removed if such consent was obtained voluntarily under the circumstances. To make
this determination, we consider “the temporal proximity of the illegal detention and the
consent, any intervening circumstances, and, particularly, the purpose of the flagrancy of
the officer’s unlawful conduct.” United States v. McSwain, 29 F.3d 558, 562 (10th Cir.
1994) (citation omitted). Here, the district court’s finding that the consent was obtained
voluntarily supports the conclusion that Trooper Livingston’s conduct was not unlawful.
Indeed, the record amply supports the district court’s conclusion that consent was
voluntary. As discussed, the defendants were told that they were free to leave, they
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Narcisse’s asserts that the facts of United States v. Belcher, 288 F.3d 1068, 1069-
70 (8th Cir. 2002), where the court reversed the district court’s denial of a motion to
suppress, are “similar” to the facts of this case. But, in Belcher the court found that the
trooper’s request for the bill of lading occurred in violation of Arkansas law, which
required reasonable belief that the truck was being operated in violation of regulations
before the bill of lading could be requested. Here, defendants do not contend that
Trooper Livingston was not entitled to request the bill of lading.
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cooperated with Livingston throughout the encounter, and, as the district court noted,
there was no indication from the age, education, or intelligence of the defendants that
they were unable to understand the situation. See Wilson, 413 F.3d at 388.
Therefore, even if we were to conclude that the continued interrogation was
unlawful, we can ascertain no error in the district court’s determination that the consent
was voluntarily obtained, and thus free from the taint of that seizure.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the district court.
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