United States v. McCrae

Opinions of the United
2005 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
6-8-2005
USA v. McCrae
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 03-1702
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005
Recommended Citation
"USA v. McCrae" (2005). 2005 Decisions. Paper 1053.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005/1053
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2005 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No: 03-1702
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee
v.
FELTON McCRAE,
Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(Criminal Case No. 01-307-2)
District Judge: Hon. Curtis Joyner
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 8, 2004
Before: NYGAARD, McKEE, RENDELL, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 8, 2005)
OPINION
McKEE, Circuit Judge.
Felton McCrae argues that the district court erred in applying career offender and
supervisory role enhancements to the sentence imposed following acceptance of
McCrae’s guilty plea. McCrae also contends that application of the supervisory role
enhancement constituted a breach of his plea agreement. We reject McCrae’s claims on
their merits. However, for the reasons that follow, we will remand for resentencing
pursuant to the Supreme Court’s recent pronouncements in United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. ___ , 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
I.
Because we write primarily for the parties, it is not necessary to recite the facts or
procedural history of this case except insofar as may be helpful to our brief discussion.
McCrae pled guilty to conspiracy to import more than 500 grams of cocaine and
importation of cocaine. McCrae’s plea agreement included the following stipulations: (1)
the substance possessed was cocaine; and, therefore, Section 2B1.1 of the Sentencing
Guidelines applied to sentencing calculations, and (2) approximately 1,312 grams of
cocaine were imported; and therefore, Section 1B1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines
applied. McCrae and the government also agreed that each was “free to argue the
applicability of any other provision of the sentencing guidelines, including offense
conduct, offense characteristics, criminal history, adjustments and departures.” The
government reserved the right to “[m]ake whatever sentencing recommendation as to
imprisonment, fines, forfeiture, restitution and other matters which the government deems
appropriate, . . . comment on the evidence and circumstances of the case, . . . [and]
address the Court regarding the nature and seriousness of the offense.” The “stipulations
[were] not binding upon either the Probation Office or the Court,” and the district court
could therefore “make [independent] factual and legal determinations that differ from”
2
the stipulations and that may have resulted “in an increase or decrease in the Sentencing
Guidelines range and the sentence . . . imposed.”
McCrae’s base offense level was 26, and the court added three levels for his role
as a manager. McCrae was also a “career offender.” The total offense level calculated in
the PSR was therefore 37. McCrae’s 17 prior criminal history points placed him in
category VI of the guideline grid. That category is also the appropriate category for
career offenders.
McCrae objected to the three-point enhancement for his supervisory role. His
counsel acknowledged, however, that even if the three-point enhancement were not to be
applied, McCrae’s offense level would not change because of his Criminal History
Category. The district court concluded that McCrae’s total offense level was 34 1 and his
Criminal History Category was VI. Accordingly, the court imposed a sentence of 276
months in prison.
II.
After the court accepted McCrae’s guilty plea and imposed sentence, the Supreme
Court decided United States v. Booker. Briefly stated, “[t]he Court held that 18 U.S.C. §
3553(b)(1), the provision of the Sentencing Reform Act that makes the Guidelines
mandatory, was [unconstitutional] and that it must be severed and excised [from the
1
The court found that McCrae was entitled to a three-level credit for acceptance of
responsibility.
3
Guidelines].” United States v. Ordaz, 398 F.3d 236, 239 (3d. Cir. 2005). The Court also
reaffirmed the holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), which stated,
“[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond
a reasonable doubt."
Following that decision, McCrae asked to be resentenced pursuant to Booker.
Since the district court thought the Guidelines were mandatory when it decided upon an
appropriate sentencing range, we will vacate McCrae’s sentence and remand for
resentencing in accordance with Booker and the procedure we recently outlined in United
States v. Davis, 407 F.3d 162 (3d. Cir. 2005).
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate McCrae’s sentence and remand this
matter to the District Court for resentencing pursuant to the Supreme Court’s recent
pronouncements in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. ___ , 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). See
also United States v. Davis, supra.4