Terrell Brown v. Donna Zickefoose

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 11-3431
___________
TERRELL BROWN,
Appellant
v.
DONNA ZICKEFOOSE, WARDEN
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-11-cv-03330)
District Judge: Honorable Robert B. Kugler
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 18, 2013
Before: AMBRO, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 19, 2013)
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OPINION
_________________
PER CURIAM
Terrell Brown, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of his
application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the reasons that
follow, we will affirm.
I.
Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and
complex procedural history of this case, we will recite them only as necessary to our
analysis. Terrell Brown has an extensive criminal history; three of his convictions are
presently relevant. In 1993, Brown pleaded guilty in Oklahoma to possession of a
dangerous substance—crack cocaine—with intent to distribute, and was sentenced to five
years imprisonment. The following year Brown pleaded guilty in Wisconsin to second-
degree reckless homicide in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.06(1). That conviction related
to a 1992 incident during which Brown approached a car in front of his home and shot at
it multiple times, killing its occupant. While he was on parole for that offense, he was
arrested in Chicago, Illinois, for attempting to deliver approximately half of a kilogram of
crack cocaine to a dealer from Gary, Indiana. He was charged in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Indiana with attempting to distribute more than
50 grams of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. In
light of his Oklahoma and Wisconsin convictions, Brown was sentenced as a career
offender to 360 months‘ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. United States v.
Howard, 341 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2003).1 In June 2004, the District Court denied Brown‘s
motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Howard v. United States, No.
3:03-cv-651 (N.D. Ind. 2004), and the Seventh Circuit denied his request for a certificate
of appealability, Brown v. United States, No. 04-3114 (7th Cir. 2005).
1
In his initial proceedings in Indiana, Brown used the assumed name of Marcus Howard.
2
In April 2011, Brown filed in the Seventh Circuit an application to file a second or
successive § 2255 motion in which he sought to claim that his prior conviction for
reckless homicide should not have been considered a crime of violence in light of Begay
v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008), and United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400 (7th
Cir. 2009), and that his sentence as a career offender was therefore in error. The Seventh
Circuit denied Brown‘s application, concluding that Begay does not constitute a new rule
of constitutional law. However, the Court dismissed the application ―without prejudice to
any attempt by Brown to obtain relief under Begay in an action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241.‖ Brown v. United States, No. 11-1893 (7th Cir. 2011). Brown, who was at that
time incarcerated at FCI Fort Dix, thereafter filed an application for a writ of habeas
corpus under § 2241 in the District Court for the District of New Jersey. The District
Court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review Brown‘s application and dismissed
it on that basis. Brown v. Zickefoose, No. 11-3330 (D.N.J. 2011). Brown timely
appealed.2
2
After Brown filed his notice of appeal, he filed in the District Court a ―Memorandum in
Opposition to Summary Disposition.‖ As the District Court noted, Brown‘s filing of a
notice of appeal immediately divested the Court of jurisdiction. Venen v. Sweet, 758
F.2d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 1985). Nevertheless, ―recognizing [Brown‘s] interest[] in a
speedy resolution of his challenges, as well as being mindful of the Court of Appeals‘
interest in processing appellate cases in an expedited fashion,‖ the District Court
construed his filing as a motion for reconsideration and expounded on the reasoning
behind its prior dismissal of his application. Any error in doing so was harmless.
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II.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. United States
v. Cepero, 224 F.3d 256, 264–65 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (certificate of appealability not
required to appeal from denial of § 2241 petition), abrogated on other grounds by
Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 649 (2012). We ―may affirm the District Court‘s
judgment on any basis supported by the record.‖ Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247
(3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
III.
The Government presently seeks to enforce the appellate waiver contained in
Brown‘s guilty plea agreement, under which he agreed ―not to contest [his] sentence or
the manner in which it was determined in any post-conviction proceeding, including, but
not limited to, a proceeding under Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255.‖ Amended
Pet‘n to Enter a Change of Plea at 4.3 We will enforce waivers of constitutional and
statutory rights ―provided that they are entered into knowingly and voluntarily and their
enforcement does not work a miscarriage of justice.‖ United States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d
231, 237 (3d Cir. 2008).
First, Brown‘s plea was knowing and voluntary. As the District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana explained, he was informed of the elements of the charges
against him and the penalties he could face, and he indicated that he had not been coerced
3
The Government‘s motions to file its brief and appendix out of time and to file an
amended brief are granted.
4
into pleading by force or threat. Howard, No. 3:03-cv-651. The Seventh Circuit
similarly concluded in his direct appeal that Brown ―was clearly informed about dire
possibilities‖ and ―it is not possible to say that he was blind-sided‖ by the sentence he
received. Howard, 341 F.3d at 622.
Nor would enforcing the waiver work a miscarriage of justice. The miscarriage of
justice exception applies in only ―unusual circumstance[s]‖ such as where a sentence was
―‗imposed in excess of the maximum penalty provide[d] by law or . . . based on a
constitutionally impermissible factor such as race.‘‖ United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d
557, 562 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Brown, 232 F.3d 399, 403 (4th Cir.
2000)). No such circumstances are present here. See Mabry, 536 F.3d at 243 (finding no
miscarriage of justice where defendant was not misled and challenges to waiver ―d[id]
not implicate fundamental rights or constitutional principles‖).
IV.
We will enforce the waiver and affirm the dismissal of Brown‘s habeas application
on that basis.
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