Walters v. Muhlenburg Township Police Department

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 13-2166
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JAMES WALTERS,
Appellant
v.
MUHLENBURG TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 5:11-cv-07453)
District Judge: Honorable Mary A. McLaughlin
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 23, 2013
Before: AMBRO, HARDIMAN and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 27, 2013)
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
James Walters appeals pro se from the District Court’s orders granting summary
judgment in favor of the defendant and denying Walters’s motion to amend the
complaint. For the following reasons, we will affirm.
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I.
In December 2009, James Walters was arrested by Officer Jason Bowen of the
Muhlenburg Township Police Department. During the arrest, according to Walters,
Officer Bowen violently grabbed him by the back of the neck, shoved his face and body
into the pavement, and dragged him along the ground. Walters suffered scrapes, bruises,
and fractures to two of his ribs. Two years later, in December 2011, Walters brought an
excessive-force claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Muhlenburg Township
Police Department.
The Department moved for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that Walters
had failed to show that it violated his civil rights pursuant to a policy, practice, or custom.
In response, Walters requested leave to amend the complaint to add Officer Bowen as a
defendant, explaining that his attorney was at fault for failing to amend the complaint
within the limitations period. The District Court entered summary judgment in favor of
the Department and denied Walters’s request to amend, determining that Officer Bowen
did not have actual or constructive notice within 120 days of the filing of the original
complaint. Walters timely appealed.
II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise plenary review over
the District Court’s entry of summary judgment. See Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d
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228, 231 (3d Cir. 2001). Summary judgment is proper when, viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all inferences in favor of that
party, no genuine issue of material fact exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Saldana, 260
F.3d at 231-32. We review the District Court’s order denying leave to amend the
complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 for abuse of discretion only. Garvin v. City of
Philadelphia, 354 F.3d 215, 219 (3d Cir. 2003).
A. Excessive Force Claim
In the complaint, Walters raised an excessive-force claim based on Officer
Bowen’s conduct in effectuating the arrest. But Walters did not name Officer Bowen
himself as a defendant in the original complaint; he named only the Muhlenburg
Township Police Department. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, liability attaches to a
municipality only where the “government’s policy or custom, whether made by its
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy,
inflicts the injury.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Here,
Walters did not point to any facts suggesting that the Department had a policy or custom
of permitting its officers to use excessive force in making arrests. Rather, as Walters
himself conceded, he sought to hold the defendant liable only “because he thought they
were responsible as the officer’s employer.” (Pl.’s Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J. at 1.) But,
of course, under § 1983 “a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a
tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable . . . on a respondeat
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superior theory.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Therefore, no genuine issue of material fact
existed as to Walters’s claim that the Department was liable for Officer Bowen’s alleged
use of excessive force. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
B. Motion to Amend the Complaint
Acknowledging his error in naming only the Muhlenburg Township Police
Department as a defendant, Walters requested leave to amend his complaint to add
Officer Bowen as a defendant. Walters asked for leave to amend, though, only after the
two-year statute of limitations period had expired (and, indeed, only after the motion for
summary judgment was filed). See Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 206 (3d Cir.
2002) (noting Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations governs § 1983 claims). He
knew, or had reason to know, in December 2009—on the date of the arrest—that his
cause of action had begun to accrue. See Montgomery v. DeSimone, 159 F.3d 120, 126
(3d Cir. 1998). The limitations period thus expired two years later in December 2011.
Walters filed his original complaint in December 2011, just within the limitations period,
but he did not request to add Officer Bowen as a defendant until 2013—over a year too
late.
Accordingly, in order for Walters’s allegation against officer Bowen to come
within the limitations period, he needed to demonstrate that it related back to the date of
the original complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1). The District Court correctly
concluded that Walters failed to make such a showing because Officer Bowen did not
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receive notice within 120 days of the filing of the original complaint, as required by Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C). The record is bereft of any facts suggesting that Officer Bowen
had actual or imputed notice of Walters’s law suit before April 6, 2012 (120 days after
the complaint was filed). See Singletary v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 266 F.3d at 196-97 (3d
Cir. 2001) (explaining that notice may be imputed if the party to be added shares an
attorney with the named party or the two share an identity of interest). Under the “shared
attorney” method of imputing notice to a new defendant, “the applicable test is not
whether new defendants will be represented by the same attorney, but rather whether the
new defendants are being represented by the same attorney.” Garvin, 354 F.3d at 223
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Walters did not point to any facts
suggesting that, during the 120-day period after he had filed the original complaint,
Officer Bowen and the Department were being represented by the same attorney. Nor
can Officer Bowen be deemed to have notice solely by virtue of his employment with the
defendant. See Singletary, 266 F.3d at 199 (finding that a prison psychologist did not
share an identity of interest with the prison because he was a staff-level employee).
Walters argues on appeal that he should have been permitted to add Officer
Bowen as a defendant because it was his attorney, rather than Walters himself, who was
at fault for failing to amend within the limitations period. This excuse, however, does not
relieve Walters from having to satisfy Rule 15(c)’s requirements for relation back. See
Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434 F.3d 196, 203 (3d Cir. 2006) (“There is no allowance in Rule
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15(c) for inquiry into a party’s delay in moving for leave to amend. Such equitable
considerations . . . do not relate to any of the enumerated conditions of Rule 15(c).”).
Therefore, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Walters’s motion to
amend. See Garvin, 354 F.3d at 219.
For the reasons given, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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