James Coppedge v. Deutsche Bank Natl Trust Co

GLD-035 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-3066
___________
JAMES COPPEDGE,
Appellant
v.
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST;
MARTHA E. VON ROSENSTIEL, ESQ.;
JACQUELINE F. MCNALLY, ESQ.
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2:12-cv-03268)
District Judge: Honorable Thomas N. O'Neill, Jr.
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect and for Possible
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
November 8, 2012
Before: FUENTES, FISHER and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 22, 2013 )
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
James Coppedge appeals the denial of his request for a preliminary injunction.
1
We will affirm.
In June 2012, Coppedge filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Basing his action on, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
Coppedge appeared to challenge a mortgage-related proceeding that was currently
ongoing in Pennsylvania state court, and raised several arguments associated with the
“sovereign citizen” or “redemptionist” movements. 1 For example, he contested a writ of
judgment that used his “corporate issue name” (using all upper-case letters, see Ford v.
Pryor, 552 F.3d 1174, 1179 (10th Cir. 2008)) and proclaimed that there was “no lawful
money.” He demanded that each defendant “produce a Certified Copy of each of [his or
her] OATHS OF OFFICE with an attached Bond to PROVE they have legal and lawful
standing to operate in commerce against [Coppedge], a Secured Party Creditor.”
Shortly after paying the filing fee, Coppedge lodged two other documents with the
District Court. The first document was captioned “Motion for Injunction and Emergency
Stay” (ECF No. 006), and seemed to request that the District Court enjoin the pending
state-court writ of possession. Its attachments included an affidavit submitted to the
Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County—in which Coppedge represented that he
intended to “appeal” that court’s decision to the Federal District Court—and a July 2012
order denying a request for summary judgment. The second document was captioned
“Motion to Dismiss Writ of Possession due to Fraud . . . Emergency Stay and Injunction”
1
See, e.g., United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 766–67 (7th Cir. 2011); Bey v.
Stumpf, 825 F. Supp. 2d 537, 539–46 (D.N.J. 2011).
2
(ECF No. 007). It argued that a writ of possession was voided in 2010 and that the state
courts were erroneously allowing the voided writ to be acted upon. The District Court
denied both motions, citing two grounds for declining to issue the requested injunction:
abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and a possible jurisdictional bar
under the Rooker-Feldman 2 doctrine. In so doing, it acknowledged Coppedge’s similar
actions in other District Courts. See, e.g., Coppedge v. Beaumont, No. 10–394, 2010 WL
2382944 (D. Del. June 11, 2010). Coppedge timely appealed; the case otherwise remains
open in District Court at the time of writing.
“[O]rders granting or denying preliminary injunctions are immediately appealable
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).” Nutrasweet Co. v. Vit-Mar Enters., 112 F.3d 689,
692 (3d Cir. 1997). 3 We review generally for abuse of discretion, but we examine the
Court’s underlying factual findings for clear error and address questions of law de novo.
N.J. Retail Merchs. Ass’n v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 374, 385 (3d Cir. 2012).
Coppedge has not shown that he is entitled to a preliminary injunction, as he did
not meet the burden, which he bears, of establishing his right to injunctive relief. See
Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co. v. Shelley Knitting Mills, Inc., 268 F.2d 569, 574 (3d Cir.
2
D.C. Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S.
413 (1923).
3
Having analyzed Coppedge’s original filings and the order of the District Court, we
conclude that he was requesting preliminary injunctive relief and not merely a temporary
restraining order. Were this not the case, we would lack jurisdiction. Nutrasweet, 112
F.3d at 692.
3
1959). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to
succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in
the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
Neither Coppedge’s complaint nor his subsequent submissions demonstrated a likelihood
of success on the merits. In fact, he explicitly stated that he wanted the District Court to
sit in appellate review of state-court proceedings, a role specifically prohibited by
Rooker-Feldman. See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d
159, 169 (3d Cir. 2010) (discussing the “prohibited exercise of appellate jurisdiction by
the district court”). Further, in order for Younger abstention to apply (subject to certain
exceptions that are not implicated here), there must be 1) ongoing state judicial
proceedings, 2) implicating important state interests, 3) that give the parties an adequate
opportunity to raise the relevant federal claims. Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 670
& n.4 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam). The District Court identified “pending state court
proceedings involving Coppedge and Deutsche Bank raising issues directly related to
those raised by Coppedge in this matter,” and observed that Pennsylvania has “an
important interest in resolving real estate issues” in its courts. Coppedge has not cast any
doubt on the existence and adequacy of the Pennsylvania judicial proceedings, and when
the first and third prongs of the Younger test are met, “neither injunctive nor declaratory
relief will be available in cases in which the federal relief would render the state court’s
4
orders or judgments nugatory.” Id. at 671 (citations omitted). 4
Thus, finding no substantial question to be presented by this appeal, we will
summarily affirm the order of the District Court. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246,
247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). Coppedge’s additional submissions to this Court, to the
extent that they request any independent relief, are denied. In closing, we note that
Coppedge’s sovereign-citizen-based averments, which frequently rely on attacks on the
judiciary and invocations of alchemistic, archaic, and irrelevant formalism, are unlikely
to bring him relief in any court of law, and he would be wise to direct his energies in a
more productive direction.
4
We separately observe that real estate, and especially the regulation, titling, and sale
thereof, has traditionally been regarded as an important state interest. See, e.g., BFP v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 544 (1994) (citing Am. Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219
U.S. 47, 60 (1911)); Burkart v. Coleman (In re Tippett), 542 F.3d 684, 689 (9th Cir.
2008) (citing BFP); Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Martinez, 505 F.3d 658, 664 (7th Cir. 2007)
(holding that “the regulation of real estate professionals engaged in the business of
timeshare brokerage” qualifies as “a valid, legitimate state interest” under the second
prong of the Younger test); see also Lazaridis, 591 F.3d at 671 n.5; Witco Corp. v.
Beekhuis, 38 F.3d 682, 689 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Probate law, like real estate law and
domestic relations law, has traditionally been within the province of the individual
states.”) (emphasis added).
5