Glenda Cain v. Wellspan Health

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 10-1216
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GLENDA CAIN,
Appellant
v.
WELLSPAN HEALTH
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District Of Pennsylvania
District Court No. 08-cv-1704
District Judge: The Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
March 21, 2011
Before: FUENTES, SMITH and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: March 25, 2011)
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OPINION
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
Glenda Cain, who is African-American, was employed by York Hospital, a wholly
owned subsidiary of Wellspan Health (“Wellspan”), as a team-leader in the York
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Hospital cafeteria. Cain was purportedly dismissed for permitting her subordinate to
make unauthorized entries into the Hospital’s electronic time keeping system in such a
way that suggested Cain had arrived to work on time when in fact she had not. Following
her termination, Cain filed suit against Wellspan, alleging race and gender discrimination
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and state law claims for breach of
contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The District Court granted
summary judgment in favor of Wellspan on all counts. Cain now appeals. We will
affirm. 1
I.
We write only for the parties and assume their familiarity with the factual and
procedural history of this case, which are carefully set forth in the District Court’s
opinion. See Cain v. Wellspan Health, No. 1:08-cv-1704, 2009 WL 5112352, at *1
(M.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2009). In her detailed and thoughtful opinion, Judge Rambo
explained her reasons for granting Wellspan’s motion for summary judgment on the same
issues raised on appeal. Since we can add little to the District Court’s reasoning, we will
affirm the order granting summary judgment substantially for the reasons set forth in the
court’s opinion.2
1
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2
We will discuss one argument in greater detail. Appellant also maintains that the
District Court did not consider that her federal discrimination claims arose out of
Wellspan’s failure to “allow her to confront her accusers and have an opportunity to be
represented by an attorney during the termination process.” Bl. Br. 7. We disagree with
appellant’s characterization of the District Court opinion. The District Court did consider
2
II.
Next, we consider Wellspan’s pending motion for sanctions, filed on July 28,
2010, which seeks imposition of costs or dismissal of Cain’s appeal. Wellspan cites two
reasons in support of this motion: (1) appellant’s failure to provide a credible explanation
for filing her opening brief three days after the filing deadline of July 12, 2010 and
Wellspan’s late receipt of Cain’s submissions; and (2) appellant’s violation of this
Court’s July 21, 2010 Non-Compliance Order. On July 21, 2010, this Court ordered
appellant to remedy certain defects in the filing of her brief and appendix by July 26,
2010. Although appellant complied with some of our requirements by the deadline, she
did not come into complete compliance with the Order until August 6, 2010. It is within
our discretion to sanction an attorney or party for failing to comply with a court order or
the filing requirements set forth in our local rules. L.A.R. 107.3.
Given that appellant satisfied all the requirements of our Non-Compliance Order
by August 6, 2010, and in light of the fact that on August 17, 2010 we granted appellant’s
motion to file the brief and appendix out of time, we will deny Wellspan’s motion for
sanctions.
the “procedures employed by Wellspan to investigate the allegations of wrong doing by
Cain” but found these procedures were relevant only if Cain “had produced evidence that
Wellspan used some other procedures where similar complaints were lodged against
Caucasian or male employees.” Id. at *8. However, Cain “has produced no such
evidence, and, thus, her focus on the underlying investigation is merely a distraction.” Id.
In short, Judge Rambo concluded that “[t]he record is devoid of any evidence that
Wellspan approached other similarly situated allegations of dishonesty differently.” Id.
We agree. For this same reason, we are not now persuaded by appellant’s argument that
the procedures of the grievance process provided evidence of race or gender
discrimination, given that appellant did not provide any evidence that other complaints
were treated differently.
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III.
For the reasons above, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Wellspan and deny Wellspan’s motion for sanctions.
4