Newell v. Comm Social Security

Opinions of the United
2005 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
1-25-2005
Newell v. Comm Social Security
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 04-1455
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005
Recommended Citation
"Newell v. Comm Social Security" (2005). 2005 Decisions. Paper 1553.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005/1553
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2005 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 04-1455
JANICE NEWELL
Appellant
v.
COMM ISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 01-2850)
District Judge: Honorable Anne E. Thompson
Submitted November 3, 2004
Before: ALITO, BARRY, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges.
(Filed January 25, 2005)
OPINION OF THE COURT
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff-Appellant Janice Newell appeals the amount of attorney fees awarded per
order by the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey pursuant to the Equal Access
to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412.1 We remand for further proceedings consistent with this
decision.
I. Facts
Newell applied to the Social Security Administration for widow’s disability benefits. Her
application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Subsequently, an Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) denied her application and the Appeals Council concluded that there was no ground
1
The EAJA provides in pertinent part:
(d)(1)(A) Except as otherwise specifically provided by
statute, a court shall award to a prevailing party other
than the United States fees and other expenses, in
addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection
(a), incurred by that party in any civil action (other than
cases sounding in tort), . . . brought by or against the
United States in any court having jurisdiction of that
action, unless the court finds that the position of the
United States was substantially justified or that special
circumstances make an award unjust.
(B) A party seeking an award of fees and other
expenses shall, within thirty days of final judgment in
the action, submit to the court an application for fees
and other expenses which shows that the party is a
prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award
under this subsection, and the amount sought, including
an itemized statement from any attorney or expert
witness representing or appearing in behalf of the party
stating the actual time expended and the rate at which
fees and other expenses were computed. The party shall
also allege that the position of the United States was not
substantially justified.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A-B).
2
for further review. Newell challenged the Commissioner’s ruling in the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey. The District Court affirmed the Commissioner’s ruling. Thereafter,
Newell filed an appeal with this Court, advancing two arguments in support of her position: (1) the
ALJ failed to analyze the evidence, review the testimony, or offer expert medical opinion as to her
impairments prior to the expiration of her insurance status, and (2) the ALJ neglected to explain why
he rejected Newell’s argument that the expiration of her insured status for widow’s benefits should
have been extended until August of 1998. At oral arguments before this Court, Newell abandoned
the second of the two arguments, thus accepting August 31, 1997 as the cut-off date. In October of
2003, we issued an opinion reversing the decision of the District Court and remanding the case for
further proceedings before the Commission. See Newell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 347 F.3d 541, 549-
550 (3d Cir. 2003). Following our remand, Newell filed an application with the District Court for
attorney fees in the amount of $8,299. The Commissioner opposed the motion on the grounds that
the Commissioner’s position was “substantially justified” in accordance with Morgan v. Perry, 142
F.3d 670, 682 (3d Cir. 1998) (attorney fees and costs will not be granted upon a finding that the
government’s position was “substantially justified”). The District Court concluded that the
Commissioner’s position was not substantially justified, but then awarded Newell only half of the
attorney fees requested because Newell withdrew one of the two arguments initially advanced. The
District Court noted:
The Equal Access to Justice Act was not intended to fund the maintenance of
claims with no legal basis. However, counsel’s affidavit in support of his
motion does not delineate the hours spent on each of the two issues. Because
Plaintiff only raised two issues on appeal, and her counsel withdrew one at
3
oral argument because it was not supportable, this Court will reduce counsel’s
requested amount by half.
This timely appeal followed.
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We generally review an
award of attorney fees under the EAJA under an abuse of discretion standard. Newmark v. Principi,
283 F.3d 172, 174 (3d Cir. 2002).
III. Discussion
Generally speaking, a “party seeking attorney’s fees has the burden to prove that its
request for attorney’s fees is reasonable.” See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d
Cir. 1990). And, in any case implicating the provisions of the EAJA, “it is important ‘for the
district court to provide a concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award.’” United
States v. Eleven Vehicles, 200 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
U.S. 424, 437 (1983)). See also Ranco Indus. Products Corp. v. Dunlap, 776 F.2d 1135,1140
(3d Cir. 1985) (“the district court [must] explain on the record the basis for its calculation” when
determining attorney fee awards).
Here, Newell’s counsel did not delineate the hours spent on each of the two original
claims. In response, the District Court simply reduced the requested attorney fees award in half
because one of the two arguments originally advanced was abandoned. W hile this award may in
4
fact may be the correct result, the methodology employed by the District Court to reach this
conclusion was inadequate. The failure of Newell’s attorney to set out a full and complete
accounting of the work performed does not discharge the District Court of its responsibility to
explicate, on the record, a basis for the award. It does not appear that the District Court
conducted a hearing, requested an itemization of the time spent per argument, or otherwise tried
to calculate how many of the total hours expended by Newell’s attorney were devoted to the
abandoned argument. Cutting the award in half because one half of the arguments was
abandoned, irrespective of how many work hours were spent on each argument, does not
comport with the requirement of Eleven Vehicles, Dunlap, and Rode that the District Court
provide an explained reason as to why the requested attorneys fees were deemed unreasonable
and excessive. Accordingly, we remand to the District Court for the purpose of determining the
appropriate attorney fees to be awarded based on the time expended multiplied by a reasonable
hourly rate. See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 796 (2002).
We have considered all of the other arguments advanced by the parties and conclude that
they are without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court will be vacated.
5