Nelson v. Comm of PA Welfare

Opinions of the United
2005 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
1-31-2005
Nelson v. Comm of PA Welfare
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 03-3875
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"Nelson v. Comm of PA Welfare" (2005). 2005 Decisions. Paper 1548.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No: 03-3875
MARTIN A. NELSON,
Appellant
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
WELFARE/
COUNTY BOARD OF ASSISTANCE; FEATHER HOUSTON, Secretary of
DPW Department of Public Welfare/County Board of Assistance
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 99-cv-05508)
District Judge: Anita B. Brody
Argued May 24, 2004
BEFORE: ROTH and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges, and
SCHWARZER,* Senior District Judge
(Opinion Filed: January 31, 2005)
*
The Honorable William W Schwarzer, Senior United States District Judge for the
Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
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Dana V. Szilier, Esquire (Argued)
Thomas M. Holland, Esquire
Law Offices of Thomas More Holland
1522 Locust Street, Grace Hall
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Counsel for Appellant
Howard G. Hopkirk (Argued)
Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania
15 th Floor, Strawberry Square
Harrisburg, A 17120
Theodore E. Lorenz
Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania
21 South 12 Street, 3 rd Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19107
Counsel for Appellee
OPINION
ROTH, Circuit Judge:
Martin A. Nelson is blind and has worked for the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania’s Department of Public W elfare from 1970 until his retirement in 2003.
Nelson initiated this suit on November 5, 1999, against the Commonwealth, the DPW and
Feather Houston, Secretary of the DPW. Nelson sued pursuant to the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12132, the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701, the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 PA. C ON. S TAT. A NN. § 953, and 42 U.S.C. §
1983. The amended complaint also alleged violations of a settlement agreement signed
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by Nelson and the DPW that resolved administrative complaints before the Equal
Opportunity Employment Commission (EEOC). In the agreement, the DPW promised to
perform obligations under a 1993 settlement agreement to accommodate Nelson by
providing him with a reader and with computer equipment. On December 9, 2002, the
District Court granted defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(b)(1) motion and dismissed all
claims except the Rehabilitation Act claim and the § 1983 claim against Feather Houston.
The District Court denied defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the two remaining
claims. DPW and Houston then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. They
averred that the relief sought by Nelson was already governed by prior litigation between
the parties in Nelson v. Thornburgh, 567 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1983), and the 1995
settlement agreement.
The District Court held a telephone conference to discuss the motion. The court
granted the motion to dismiss without prejudice under the mistaken impression that
Nelson could obtain complete relief by enforcing the 1995 settlement through the District
Court’s order in Nelson v. Thornburgh. Nelson appealed the dismissal and asked that the
case be remanded for further proceedings on his Rehabilitation Act and § 1983 claims.
Because we write only for the parties and the facts are familiar to them, we will
not repeat the facts here.
When determining whether the District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over a
particular case, we consider that question de novo. Shaffer v. GTE N., Inc., 284 F.3d 500,
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502 (3d. Cir. 2002); In Re Phar-Mor, Inc., Sec. Litig., 172 F.3d 270, 273 (3d. Cir. 1999).
The United States Supreme Court has extensively addressed the circumstances
under which a federal court has jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement. See
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. Of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994). The Court stated that
“[e]nforcement of [a] settlement agreement . . . whether through award of damages or
decree of specific performance . . . requires its own basis for jurisdiction.” Id. at 378. A
district court may have ancillary jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement if the court
retains jurisdiction by a separate provision or by incorporating the terms of the settlement
agreement into an order. Id. at 381. The District Court in Nelson v. Thornburgh did not
retain jurisdiction to enforce its judgment. Nelson agrees that this is so.
Nor did the District Court have subject matter jurisdiction in this case to enforce
the 1995 settlement agreement. The proper forum in which to enforce a settlement
agreement is the state court “unless there is some independent basis for federal
jurisdiction.” Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 382; see also O’Connor v. Colvin, 70 F.3d 530, 532
(9th Cir. 1995).
The parties entered into the 1995 settlement agreement to settle administrative
complaints before the EEOC. This agreement resolved differences between the parties
rooted in a 1993 agreement, which was the result of a discrimination charge against the
Philadelphia County Assistance Office. Nelson provided as consideration for the 1993
settlement agreement his promise not to institute a lawsuit against the Commonwealth for
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alleged ADA violations.
A federal court does not have jurisdiction over a settlement agreement just because
that agreement settled a federal cause of action. See O’Connor, 70 F.3d at 532. The
dismissal of the first action terminated federal jurisdiction. Id. An action to enforce the
settlement then becomes a separate contract dispute, based on the agreement. Id; see also
Shaffer v. Veneman, 325 F.3d 370, 373 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
If this case were a claim for enforcement of the settlement, it would not require
interpreting specific federal statutory provisions. Hence, it would have to be treated as an
action for breach of contract – with no independent basis for federal jurisdiction.
Nelson asserts, however, on page 14 of his brief that there is independent
jurisdiction for his two remaining claims, the alleged Rehabilitation Act and ADA
violations. He goes on to state that the 1995 “settlement agreement is evidence of
violations of the Rehabilitation Act occurring after the entry of the final order in Nelson v.
Thornburgh, the prior action.” It appears that, in accordance with the allegations of the
amended complaint but contrary to the interpretation of the District Court, Nelson is not
attempting to enforce the settlement agreement but rather to pursue his two remaining
claims, the Rehabilitation Act claim and the § 1983 claim against Houston.
These two claims must be remanded to the District Court to be adjudicated. We
will, therefore, vacate the District Court’s dismissal of them and remand them to the
District Court for further proceedings. At such time, the District Court will have to
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consider what impact Nelson’s retirement from DPW in June 2003 may have on his
claims for relief.
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