Bassem Kandil v. Gary Yurkovic

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 10-2343
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BASSEM KANDIL; FLORA KANDIL
SAMEH A. ABOELATA; HALLA KANDIL,
Appellants
v.
GARY YURKOVIC, POLICE OFFICER;
ANTHONY MARK ABODE, POLICE OFFICER;
WILLIAM C. OELS, III, POLICE OFFICER; WILLIAM OELS, JR., SERGEANT;
EDWARD T. BOBADILLA, POLICE OFFICER;
CHIEF OF POLICE; CITY OF NEW BRUNSWICK;
CITY OF NEW BRUNSWICK POLICE DEPARTMENT;
MIDDLESEX COUNTY PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE;
MIDDLESEX COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, JOHN DOE
SUPERVISING OFFICERS 1-10; JOHN DOES 1-10; ABC CORPS, 1-10
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-06-cv-04701)
District Judge: Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 20, 2011
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Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES, and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: October 17, 2011 )
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OPINION
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AMBRO, Circuit Judge
Appellants Bassem Kandil and his family members appeal from a summary
judgment entered against them by the District Court. Kandil argues that it improperly
withheld jurisdiction over his case and that, as a matter of public policy, the release-
dismissal agreement he signed should not be enforced against him. For the reasons that
follow, we hold that federal jurisdiction exists over this case and that there are genuine
issues of material fact as to the enforceability of the agreement. Accordingly, we vacate
the District Court’s judgment and remand.
I. Background
New Brunswick, New Jersey police officers arrested Kandil in October 2004. He
was charged with aggravated assault, resisting arrest, and disarming a police officer. A
Middlesex County grand jury subsequently indicted Kandil on these charges. In the
ensuing months, both the State and Kandil conducted discovery. The State also offered
Kandil a plea agreement, which he declined. Throughout these proceedings and in this
appeal, the same counsel has represented Kandil.
In October 2005, Judge Frederick DeVesa of the Superior Court of New Jersey
held a status conference. At that conference, Assistant Prosecutor Marcia Silva renewed
the State’s plea offer. However, the State declined to enroll Kandil in the Pretrial
Intervention program (―PTI‖), which would have suspended the charges against him
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during two years of supervised release, after which the charges would be dropped. Judge
DeVesa then invited the parties’ counsel into his chambers for an off-the-record
negotiation. During that negotiation, he learned that Kandil had filed a Notice of Tort
Claim under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act. The parties’ counsel then reached a
compromise: Kandil could enroll in the PTI program, but in exchange he would waive all
civil claims against State entities and officials.
Kandil applied for admission to the PTI program the very day of the status
conference. However, ten days later, the Probation Department denied Kandil’s
application. To justify its denial, the Department cited the violent nature of Kandil’s
alleged offense, the public need for prosecution, and the gravity of what might have
occurred had Kandil wrested control of the officer’s weapon. On learning of this denial,
Assistant Prosecutor Silva (who had promised Kandil’s admission to the program) sought
an override of the denial from First Assistant Prosecutor Julia McClure. McClure granted
the override, provided that Kandil attend anger management classes and, again, waive all
civil claims.
In November 2005, the parties returned to Judge DeVesa’s courtroom for a PTI
enrollment hearing. There, the State formally enrolled Kandil in the PTI program. Judge
DeVesa also specifically questioned Kandil and his counsel about Kandil’s waiver of any
civil claims. Both Kandil and his counsel affirmed that they understood the implications
of that waiver. The parties stipulated that they would sign a written release-dismissal
agreement waiving civil claims by December 2, 2005.
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In September 2006, Kandil filed this civil case in the District Court, having never
signed a release-dismissal agreement waiving those claims. Kandil’s claims against the
police officers include common-law tort claims and claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
Probation Department, observing that a waiver of precisely such claims was a condition
of Kandil’s enrollment in the PTI program, filed a Notice of Motion for Termination in
February 2007. Thereafter, Kandil signed a release-dismissal agreement releasing all
civil claims arising out of his arrest, including the pending matter in the District Court.
This agreement satisfied the Probation Department, and Kandil completed the PTI
program in November 2007. Therefore, the underlying criminal charges against Kandil
were dismissed.
The defendants, citing Kandil’s written release of his claims against them, moved
in the District Court for summary judgment. In granting the motion, the Court held that it
lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine (discussed below) and, in the
alternative, that Kandil’s release-dismissal agreement is enforceable against him as a
matter of public policy. Kandil now appeals to our Court both grounds of that holding.
For the reasons that follow, we agree with Kandil at least that there is a genuine issue of
material fact and that summary judgment was thus inappropriate. We therefore vacate
the District Court’s grant of summary judgment and remand.
II. Discussion
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review in the summary judgment context is plenary.
Thus, ―we are required to apply the same test that the district court should have utilized
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initially.‖ Jackson v. Danberg, 594 F.3d 210, 215 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotation marks and
citation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine
issues of material fact, drawing all justifiable inferences in favor of the non-movant.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 255 (1986).
A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
The District Court held that it lacked jurisdiction over this case because of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. We disagree.
That doctrine, which takes its name from two Supreme Court cases, generally
withholds jurisdiction of federal courts (save the United States Supreme Court) over state
judgments, as they are more appropriately appealed within the state judiciary. See D.C.
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S.
413 (1923). It is narrow in scope. The Supreme Court has explained that it ―is confined
to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-
court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the
district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of
those judgments.‖ Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284
(2005). We have distilled Exxon’s holding into the following four-part test, each part of
which must be satisfied: ―(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff
complains of injuries caused by the state-court judgments; (3) those judgments were
rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court
to review and reject the state judgments.‖ Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox
Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
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This case does not meet those criteria.1 Kandil did not ―lose‖ in state court. The
state court order at issue is Judge DeVesa’s Order of Postponement (of Kandil’s criminal
charges) that memorializes the parties’ compromise: the State would suspend its charges
against Kandil, which it did, and Kandil would waive any civil charges against State
actors, which he (eventually) did.
More importantly, the injuries that Kandil asserts in this suit and on appeal were
not ―caused by the state-court judgment.‖ The core of Kandil’s complaint is his tort and
§ 1983 claims against the police officers. Those claims existed before any state court
case; the state-court judgment in no sense ―caused‖ those alleged injuries. See Great W.
Mining, 615 F.3d at 166-68 (citing examples of injuries that do and do not meet this
criterion and offering the ―timing of the injury‖ as a ―useful guidepost‖ for resolving the
question); Turner v. Crawford Square Apts. III, L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2006)
(―Turner’s complaint raised federal claims, grounded on the FHA, not caused by the
state-court judgment but instead attributable to defendants’ alleged FHA violations that
preceded the state-court judgment.‖) (emphasis in original).
Kandil does not technically ―complain‖ that his waiver caused injury, as waiver is
asserted against him as an affirmative defense. Nonetheless, his waiver is in effect the
main issue before us. He argues that his release-dismissal agreement is unenforceable,
1
The District Court relied on one of our pre-Exxon holdings to conclude that Rooker-
Feldman applies. However, Exxon is read as a narrowing of our Court’s earlier Rooker-
Feldman jurisprudence. Thus, we have noted that ―caution is now appropriate in relying
on our pre-Exxon formulation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.‖ Gary v. Braddock
Cemetery, 517 F.3d 195, 200 n.5 (3d Cir. 2008).
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which is a question of contract law and public policy. That a state-court order recited that
the waiver was in exchange for entry into the PTI program is, for Rooker-Feldman
analysis, of no import. In this respect, Kandil’s position is like that of the plaintiff in
Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289 (2011). He lost in state court, then sued in federal
court to challenge the constitutionality of the state laws under which he was convicted.
The Court held that Rooker-Feldman did not bar his claim. Id. at 1298. Similarly here,
Kandil challenges the legality of the contract that would govern the state court decision,
not a state court decision itself.
We conclude that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not preclude jurisdiction in
this case. We must thus consider the District Court’s alternative basis for its holding –
that Kandil’s waiver of civil claims is enforceable and requires judgment against him.
B. Release-Dismissal Agreement
The District Court held that even if it had jurisdiction, Kandil’s release-dismissal
agreement must be enforced against him, barring this suit. We hold that there are
genuine issues of material fact, and thus we vacate and remand.
Our law places few limits on the substance of contractual bargains. In particular,
parties may give up important legal rights to gain a benefit they seek, provided that their
agreement is knowing and voluntary. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742
(1970) (holding that plea agreements are enforceable). However, the Supreme Court has
constrained the enforceability of agreements that waive civil suits in exchange for release
from prosecution, such as the release-dismissal agreement in this case. See Town of
Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987).
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Rumery establishes two requirements for a release-dismissal agreement to be
enforceable. First, the agreement must be voluntary. 480 U.S. at 393-94. We answer the
question of voluntariness with reference to ―the knowledge and experience of the
defendant, the severity of the criminal charges, whether a legitimate criminal justice
objective supports the release, whether the defendant was represented by counsel, and
whether the execution of the release was judicially supervised.‖ Livingstone v. North
Belle Vernon Borough, 12 F.3d 1205, 1210 (3d Cir. 1993) (en banc) (―Livingstone I‖)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). Second, enforcement of the agreement must be in
the public interest, an inquiry that emphasizes avoiding prosecutorial misconduct.
Rumery, 480 U.S. at 395-96. The burden is on the civil-case defendants to ―show that
upon balance the public interest favors enforcement.‖ Cain v. Darby Borough, 7 F.3d
377, 381 (3d Cir. 1993) (en banc). In this context, we ask whether the facts known to the
prosecutor at the time of the agreement support the proffered public interest reason for
the agreement and whether the proffered reason is the prosecutor’s actual reason for
seeking the agreement. Livingstone v. North Belle Vernon Borough, 91 F.3d 515, 527
(3d Cir. 1996) (―Livingstone II‖).
Kandil concedes that the release-dismissal agreement was knowing and voluntary.
See Kandil Br. at 8, 28. The Rumery Court found it important that the plaintiff was a
businessman. Kandil is an auto salesman and finance manager. The Rumery Court found
it important that the plaintiff was not in jail when he made the agreement. Kandil was not
in jail. The Rumery Court found it important that an experienced criminal lawyer
represented the plaintiff. Kandil has been represented throughout this case by a lawyer
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who was an assistant prosecutor for nine years. The Rumery Court found it important
that the plaintiff’s lawyer had drafted the agreement. Kandil’s lawyer drafted the
agreement. The Rumery Court found it important that the plaintiff had three days to
consider the agreement. Kandil had much longer between Judge DeVesa’s suggestion of
the agreement on October 18 and Kandil’s decision to enroll in the PTI program, thereby
committing to the agreement on November 9. We therefore agree that Kandil’s
agreement was voluntary.
The second question, whether enforcement of Kandil’s agreement is in the public
interest, is more challenging. The officials seeking the agreement’s enforcement must
present a legitimate public-interest reason why they sought the waiver. In this context,
the ―public interest‖ has included subjecting the agreement to judicial supervision,
avoiding stress on defendants and key witnesses, avoiding the costs of prosecution, and
avoiding frivolous civil lawsuits. See Livingstone II, 91 F.3d at 527-30. We then subject
this reason to an ―objective‖ and a ―subjective‖ analysis. The ―objective‖ analysis asks
whether the facts known to the prosecutor at the time of the agreement suffice to establish
that it was in the public interest. The ―subjective‖ analysis asks whether the reason
proffered was in fact the reason that the prosecutor sought the agreement.
Defendants advance three reasons why they asked Kandil to waive his civil claims
in exchange for admission to the PTI program. First, they contend that the prosecutors,
Silva and McClure, admitted Kandil to the program for legitimate reasons that included
his lack of criminal history and the fact that he merely unholstered the officer’s weapon
rather than seizing it. Second, they argue that because Judge DeVesa was the first to
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suggest the release-dismissal agreement, the prosecutors did not seek the agreement to
cover their own misconduct. Third, Kandil’s civil suits, they offer, would be marginal
and judicial resources are better used elsewhere. They base this argument on internal
investigations by the police department absolving the officers of bias and excessive force.
Our ―objective‖ analysis of these three reasons raises questions about whether they
suffice to establish that the release-dismissal agreement was in the public interest. The
first reason might illuminate why the prosecutors enrolled Kandil in the PTI program, but
it says little about why waiver of civil suits was a precondition. Indeed, the prosecutors
knew those facts—that Kandil merely unholstered the officer’s weapon, that he had no
criminal record, that he was employed and married—before the October 2005 status
conference. Yet at that status conference they refused to enroll Kandil in the PTI
program. Only after the status conference, once the waiver of civil claims was on the
table, did the prosecutors change their mind.
The second reason, that Judge DeVesa suggested the agreement, is far from the
kind of judicial supervision that would put the agreement in the public interest. The
parties dispute that Judge DeVesa, as opposed to the prosecution, suggested the
agreement, as their conference was off the record. Even if Judge DeVesa did suggest the
agreement, he hardly supervised it. At the PTI enrollment hearing, he noted that ―I see
here in the proposed order for the Court’s signature that the defendant as a condition of
Pretrial Intervention intends to execute some type of a [hold] harmless agreement against
[the] officers . . . .‖ App. 506. This remark does not show close scrutiny or an awareness
of the merits of Kandil’s civil claims.
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The third proffered reason, that Kandil’s civil suits appeared marginal or frivolous,
requires closer analysis. In Livingstone II, we wrote that unless ―unusually strong public
interests‖ support the other reasons, prosecutors must conduct an ―individualized
analysis‖ of the plaintiff’s potential civil claims before seeking a release-dismissal
agreement. 91 F.3d at 529 & n.16. In this case, the police department’s internal
investigations are the kind of case-specific inquiry that Livingstone II requires. However,
as in Livingstone II, the District Court here did not consider whether these investigations
were enough to support the conclusion that Kandil’s civil claims were marginal or
frivolous. More importantly, as in Livingstone II, ―[i]t is not now clear whether [the
prosecutors] considered the marginal or frivolous nature of [Kandil’s] claims‖ in deciding
to seek a waiver. See 91 F.3d at 530 n.17. Rather, the only reasons they offered at their
depositions were that Judge DeVesa had suggested the waiver and that Kandil had agreed
to it. App. 411 (McClure), 499 (Silva). Thus, as in Livingstone II, we remand ―so that
the parties can address the question of whether [Kandil’s] civil claims were regarded—
and, if so, whether they were properly regarded—by the prosecuting attorney as marginal
or frivolous.‖ 91 F.3d at 530.
Our ―subjective‖ analysis of appellees’ proffered reasons raises still more
questions. In September 2005, before anyone suggested that Kandil waive his civil
claims, Kandil’s counsel submitted discovery evidence of police misconduct to the
prosecutors. That evidence, consisting largely of interviews with witnesses and an
interrogatory answered by Officer Yurkovic, suggests an alternate motive for the release-
dismissal agreement. It indicates that Yurkovic was having a ―casual sexual relationship‖
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with a woman named Pamela, that Kandil and his friends were conversing with Pamela
and her friend on the night of the incident, that Yurkovic arrived and demanded Kandil’s
driver’s license on observing him with Pamela, and that Yurkovic may have thereafter
cursed, mocked Kandil’s home town of Flemington, and grabbed Kandil. App. 600-09,
635-36.
Defendants do not challenge this evidence directly. Rather, they note that no
discovery about these events has been undertaken in this civil case, as opposed to
Kandil’s criminal case. Appellee Br. at 72. More importantly, they emphasize that
prosecutors reviewed Kandil’s discovery evidence and concluded that they should
proceed with their prosecution in spite of it. Id. at 18, 69, 73. However, the record on
which defendants found their assertion suggests that the official in the prosecutor’s office
responsible for allegations like Kandil’s may have only ―flipped through‖ the discovery
materials before concluding that ―there doesn’t seem to be a problem here.‖ App. 819.
Regardless of the thoroughness of the inquiry into the discovery, the record establishes
that the prosecutors were aware of this evidence of misconduct before they sought the
release-dismissal agreement. As in Livingstone II, that awareness ―lends credence to the
inference‖ that the prosecutors’ subjective motivation for pursuing the waiver agreement
was not purely in the public interest. See 91 F.3d at 533.
The record contains other evidence tending to make the prosecutors’ subjective
motivation a genuine issue of material fact. In early November 2005, about a month and
a half after Abramowitz determined that Kandil’s discovery evidence did not present a
problem, Assistant Prosecutor Silva spoke to First Assistant Prosecutor McClure. In that
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discussion about enrolling Kandil in PTI, she raised ―this issue of the two girls [Pamela
and her friend] and were they there and weren’t they there and that kind of thing.‖ App.
498. ―This issue‖ may thus have been relevant to the prosecutors’ decision to put Kandil
in the PTI program in exchange for his release-dismissal agreement. The same
deposition testimony reveals that this prosecutor’s office had no history of requiring
release-dismissal agreements to enroll in the PTI program. App. 496. That one was
required in this case, and only in this case, could suggest that they paid additional
attention to their decision.
On this important question of the agreement’s public-interest merits, the District
Court is silent. It properly states the law and recognizes that the question demands an
objective and a subjective analysis. However, in holding that Rumery does not bar
enforcement of the agreement, the Court observes only that Kandil received the benefit of
his bargain and that he was represented by counsel.
We therefore vacate and remand the judgment of the District Court so that it might
assess in the first instance whether, under Livingstone II, enforcement of Kandil’s
release-dismissal agreement is in the public interest. On remand, the parties may wish to
address more thoroughly the prosecutors’ motives for seeking the agreement and the
relationship of Kandil’s discovery evidence to that decision. Evidence such as the
deposition testimony of First Assistant Prosecutor McClure, which was provided to us
only in part, may be pertinent to making this assessment.
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