James Douris v. State of New Jersey

DLD-280 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-1010
___________
JAMES GEORGE DOURIS,
Appellant
v.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 10-cv-02836)
District Judge: Honorable Peter G. Sheridan
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
September 13, 2012
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN AND VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: October 2, 2012)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
James George Douris appeals from an order or
orders 1 of the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey. Because no substantial
question is presented by his appeal, we will summarily
affirm the District Court’s orders.
I.
Because the parties are familiar with the facts of
the case, we will set forth only those facts necessary
to understanding the appeal. Douris, who alleges a
number of disabilities, filed a complaint against the
State of New Jersey (“the State”) with claims stemming
from an incident in which he was ticketed in May 2008
for failure to wear a seat belt. Before the State
answered, Douris filed a First Amended Complaint. In
that complaint, Douris alleged that he was injured at
the Hopewell Township Municipal Court and at the
Lawrence Township Municipal Court when he tried to
access those courts in order to contest his ticket. He
alleged that the courts were not compliant with Title
1
See Section II, infra.
2
II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Douris’s complaint also
alleged that the New Jersey Superior Court in Trenton
was not ADA compliant, because the court papers were in
small type. In paragraph 20 of the amended complaint,
Douris alleged that he was denied access to viewing a
criminal trial at the Superior Court of New Jersey in
New Brunswick, in violation of the ADA.
The State filed a motion to dismiss the amended
complaint, arguing that Douris could not relitigate the
propriety of his seat-belt ticket, due to the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine, 2 and that Douris’s other claims should
2
See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries,
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (explaining that
Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal court review of
“cases brought by state-court losers complaining of
injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered
before the district court proceedings commenced and
inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments”). At the time Douris filed his federal
complaint, he had already contested his traffic ticket
in municipal courts in New Jersey and lost, and had
attempted to appeal the guilty finding in the Superior
Court of New Jersey. We agree that the District Court
could not entertain an appeal of the guilty finding.
3
be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Fed.
R. Civ. P.”). After a hearing, the District Court
agreed, and dismissed the amended complaint with
prejudice, with the exception of the allegations in
paragraph 20 of the complaint, which the District Court
dismissed without prejudice, as the allegations were
unrelated to the remainder of the complaint. The Court
explained in its ruling that Douris could bring the
claims raised in paragraph 20 in a new complaint, if he
desired.
About a week later, Douris filed a “Motion to the
Court to File a Second Amended Complaint.” The motion
argued that the District Court erred by dismissing his
complaint without giving him an opportunity to file
another amended complaint. Douris attached a proposed
Second Amended Complaint. A magistrate judge denied the
motion as moot, stating that the matter was closed and
that Douris had not sought leave to reopen. Less than
4
a week later, Douris filed a document titled,
“Plaintiff’s Motion as the Court Allowed Plaintiff the
Right to Amend the First Amended Complaint with no Time
Limit to Amend.” The District Court then entered an
order denying Douris’s motion to file a second amended
complaint, and stated that any claims he would like to
raise related to paragraph 20 of the complaint “must be
filed as a new complaint, rather than an amended
complaint, to initiate a new case under a separate
docket number.” Douris appealed two days later.
II.
We construe Douris’s “Motion to the Court to File a
Second Amended Complaint” 3 and his “Motion as the Court
3
It is not clear that the Magistrate Judge had the
authority to decide Douris’s post-decision motion to
amend his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), (B)
(authorizing magistrate judge to hear and determine
pretrial matters, and to conduct hearings and submit
proposed findings of fact and recommendations for
disposition in posttrial criminal matters); Colorado
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. B.B. Andersen Constr.
Co., 879 F.2d 809, 811 (10th Cir. 1989) (decisions in
matters referred to magistrate judge under “additional
duties” provision of § 636(b)(3) are not directly
appealable to court of appeals). Because Douris’s
5
Allowed Plaintiff the Right to Amend the First Amended
Complaint with no Time Limit to Amend” as motions to
reconsider the District Court’s November 7, 2011 order
dismissing his complaint. Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d
201, 208 (3d Cir. 2002) (courts may consider post-
judgment motions as motions filed pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b)). As each motion was
filed within 28 days of the November 7th order, the
time to appeal that order began to run “from the entry
of the order disposing of the last [of the two]
motion[s].” Rule 4(a)(4)(A), Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure (“Fed. R. App. P.”). We thus have
jurisdiction to review the November 7th order, and the
order denying Douris’s second motion to amend the
complaint. 4
motion to amend his complaint was ultimately heard by
the District Court, we will review that final order.
4
We note that Douris’s notice of appeal mentions
only the December 28, 2011 order denying his last
motion. Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B), an
appellant must “designate the judgment, order, or part
thereof being appealed.” Courts generally construe
6
III.
We first turn to the November 7th order granting
the State’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint.
Our review of a district court's order granting a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is
plenary. Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224,
230 (3d Cir. 2008). To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must “plead[] factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).
We may affirm a district court for any reason supported
submissions from a pro se litigant liberally and hold
them “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520 (1972) (per curiam); see also Higgs v. Att’y Gen.,
655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011). However, Douris is
an experienced litigator. See Douris v. Middletown
Township, 293 F. App’x 130, 132-33 (2008) (district
court did not err in denying in forma pauperis status
based on Douris’s abusive filings). Nevertheless, in
this instance, we will give Douris the benefit of
liberal construction. Douris is cautioned that any
future notices of appeal should conform to Rule 3.
7
by the record. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 191
(3d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
A. Claims Involving the New Jersey Superior Court
We agree that Douris’s claims against the New
Jersey Superior Court failed to state a claim for
relief under the ADA. In order to state a claim for
relief under Title II of the ADA, “a plaintiff must
allege: (1) that he is a qualified individual with a
disability; (2) that he was either excluded from
participation in or denied the benefits of some public
entity's services, programs, or activities or was
otherwise discriminated against; and (3) that such
exclusion, denial of benefits or discrimination was by
reason of his disability.” Toledo v. Sanchez, 454 F.3d
24, 31-32 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Parker v. Universidad
de Puerto Rico, 225 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2000)); 42
U.S.C. § 12132. Douris’s complaint alleges facts that
would establish that he is a qualified individual with
a disability, but the complaint fails to plead factual
8
matter that would allow the Court to infer that he was
“excluded from participation” or “denied benefits” at
the Superior Court because of his disabilities.
The amended complaint alleges that Douris appealed
his seat-belt violation at “the State Superior Court in
Trenton New Jersey at such time the access to the Court
was not accessible to Douris in his wheelchair,” and
that he was “unable to proceed with the appeal and the
appeal died.” Amended complaint, dkt. #4-1, ¶5. The
complaint does not explain why or when the court was
inaccessible, but Douris explained at oral argument in
the District Court that “there were some bird droppings
that were bothersome to him, so he didn’t enter one
day,” and that “there were issues with moving up and
down to different floors; there’s elevators, but they
may be mechanical and there may be a need for sheriff’s
officers to help Mr. Douris.” Dist. Ct. Op., dkt. #68,
at 5. Thus, it appears that Douris was not excluded
from the courthouse; rather, he chose not to enter, and
9
when he did enter, he was assisted when he needed to
move between floors.
The amended complaint alleges that the New Jersey
courts failed to provide him with legal counsel, but
there is no requirement under the ADA that courts
provide legal counsel for a person with disabilities.
Whether counsel should have been provided is a matter
that could have been litigated within the appeal from
Douris’s conviction.
The amended complaint alleges that the “papers and
legal case law” at the Superior Court in Trenton were
not readable, presumably because the type was too
small. It is not clear whether Douris sought any
accommodations; e.g., by asking that specific legal
provisions be enlarged. Further, Douris’s complaint
concedes that when he had trouble reading court orders,
the judge rewrote them in larger print so that he could
see them. Amended complaint, dkt. #4-1, ¶19. Thus,
Douris’s complaint does not show that he was excluded
10
from participation in the appeal because of the small
type.
Douris’s amended complaint also alleged that he was
unable to access the Superior Court in New Brunswick on
an unknown date as a public viewer because there were
“locked doors.” Douris does not allege factual matter
that would allow the court to infer that he was
excluded from the proceeding because of his disability.
If the doors were locked, then nobody would have been
able to enter the court, disability or no disability.
B. Claims Involving New Jersey Municipal Courts
Along with its motion to dismiss, the State of New
Jersey provided affidavits and certifications to
support the motion with regard to claims involving the
municipal courts. Douris also provided numerous
exhibits in connection with his responses. “[B]ecause
the District Court reviewed affidavits and other
documents outside of the pleadings in evaluating [the
State’s] motion to dismiss, we review the record
11
pursuant to Rule 56 [of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure].” Albright v. Virtue, 273 F.3d 564, 570 (3d
Cir. 2001); Rule 12(b)(6). We review a district
court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, using the
same standard as the district court. Pichler v. UNITE,
542 F.3d 380, 385 (3d Cir. 2008). Summary judgment is
appropriate if the record reveals “no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Summary judgment was appropriate here on the claims
involving the municipal courts. The State of New
Jersey, the only named defendant, provided affidavits
noting that the Hopewell Township Municipal Court and
the Lawrence County Municipal Court are under the
control and authority of Hopewell Township and Lawrence
Township, respectively, and not under the control of
the State of New Jersey. See also N.J. Stat. Ann.
2B:12-15 (“Suitable courtrooms, chambers, offices,
equipment and supplies for the municipal court, its
12
administrator's office and its violations bureau shall
be provided by the municipality or by a county that has
established a central municipal court.”). Thus,
Douris’s allegations that he was injured at those
courts, and that those courts are not ADA-compliant,
are not proper claims against the State of New Jersey. 5
C. New Jersey Law Against Discrimination
Douris’s amended complaint also contained claims
pursuant to the state’s law against discrimination.
Because the District Court properly dismissed all of
the federal claims, the Court did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing the state-law claims as well.
5
Claims under Title II of the ADA are subject to
the statute of limitations for personal injury claims
in the state in which they are raised. Disabled in
Action of Pa. v. SEPTA, 539 F.3d 199, 208 (3d Cir.
2008). New Jersey has a two-year statute of
limitations for personal injury claims. N.J. Stat.
Ann. 2A:14-2. It thus appears that most, if not all,
of Douris’s claims are barred by the statute of
limitations. Because the statute of limitations is an
affirmative defense, and because the State did not
raise the issue in the District Court, we do not rely
on the untimeliness of the claims as a basis for
affirming the District Court’s dismissal.
13
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 6
IV.
In his post-dismissal motions to amend his
complaint, Douris argues that the District Court should
have given him an opportunity to amend his complaint
before dismissing (the bulk of) his claims with
prejudice. We agree. “[I]f a complaint is subject to
a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must permit
a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be
inequitable or futile.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245-46(citation omitted). We need not remand for further
proceedings, however, because Douris submitted his
6
We also affirm the District Court’s decision to
deny injunctive relief. Douris apparently clarified at
oral argument that he sought an injunction against
officers issuing him tickets in the future for not
wearing his seat belt. Whether Douris is required to
wear a seat belt is a matter that was considered by the
state courts when Douris contested his traffic
violation, and we do not discern any violation of the
ADA in New Jersey's enforcement of the seat belt laws.
See N.J. Stat. Ann. 39:3-76.2g (providing exception to
seat belt requirement if "driver or passenger possesses
a written verification from a licensed physician that
the driver or passenger is unable to wear a safety seat
belt system for physical or medical reasons").
14
proposed amended complaint to the District Court, and
his proposed amendment does not cure the defects that
we have discussed above.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, and the reasons given by
the District Court, we will affirm the District Court’s
judgment.
15