James Anderson V.

BLD-033 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 11-3730
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IN RE: JAMES ANDERSON, a/k/a J. Hendel,
Petitioner
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On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus
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Submitted Pursuant to Fed. R. App. Pro. 21
November 3, 2011
Before: SCIRICA, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
(Filed: December 1, 2011)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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PER CURIAM.
Petitioner James Anderson, a/k/a James J. Hendel, pleaded guilty to aggravated
assault and unlawful restraint in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. On July 8,
1993, he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 5-17 years, to be followed by four
years of probation. On September 11, 1997, Anderson filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. The District Court dismissed the petition on the ground that Anderson’s
claims were barred from federal habeas review due to a procedural default, and he could
not show cause for the default or that failure to consider his claims would result in a
fundamental miscarriage of justice, see Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991).
Anderson appealed, and we denied his application for a certificate of appealability in
C.A. No. 98-1753 on November 26, 1999.
Anderson was paroled on November 6, 2009. He was rearrested and adjudicated
guilty of a probation violation on March 16, 2010. Anderson then was sentenced on the
probation violation to a new term of imprisonment of 2-4 years, to be followed by one
year of probation.
In June, 2003, Anderson filed a second habeas corpus petition. It was transferred
to this Court to be treated as an application to file a second or successive habeas corpus
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), and we denied the application (C.A. No. 04-1527).
In 2005, Anderson filed a request for permission to file a second or successive habeas
corpus petition. We denied the application (C.A. No. 05-2085). In 2007, Anderson filed
a request for permission to file a second or successive habeas corpus petition. We denied
the application (C.A. No. 07-1099).
Recently, Anderson filed another application in this Court for authorization to file
a second or successive habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C § 2254. He also filed a
motion to be exempt from the filing requirements of Third Cir. LAR 22.5. On April 27,
2011, we granted his motion to be exempt from the filing requirements of Third Cir. LAR
22.5, denied his application to file another section 2254 petition challenging his 1993
sentence, and advised him that he did not need authorization from us to challenge his new
sentence of 2-4 years’ imprisonment on the probation violation.
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Anderson now files a petition for writ of mandamus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651,
in which he argues that his access to the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas,
has been, and is being, obstructed by the state court sentencing judge, the Honorable
Paula Pryor Dembe, the Clerk of Courts, and John Wetzel, Secretary of the Department
of Corrections. He seeks an order from us compelling the nominal respondents – Judge
Dembe, DOC Secretary Wetzel, and the state Clerk of Courts – to cease and desist from
blocking his correspondence with the state courts; to “formally enter” certain orders on
the state court docket in order to reopen the time for appeal; to furnish him with certain
records from his trial; and to correct all “errors and/or frauds” in the criminal record of
his case, among other things. Eventually, Anderson hopes to file another application for
authorization to file a second or successive habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C §
2254. (Petition, at 9.)
We will deny the petition for writ of mandamus. Our jurisdiction derives from 28
U.S.C. § 1651, which grants us the power to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in
aid of [our] . . . jurisdiction and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” A writ of
mandamus is an extreme remedy that is invoked only in extraordinary situations. See
Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976). Traditionally, it may be
“used ... only ‘to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed
jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so.’” Id.(quoting Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 n.2 (1967)).
Anderson does not allege an action or omission by a United States District Court
within this circuit over which we might exercise our authority by way of mandamus. Cf.
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United States v. Christian, 660 F.2d 892, 895 (3d Cir. 1981) (focal question for federal
appellate court is whether action of District Court impedes appellate jurisdiction granted
in some other provision of law). He does not allege an action or omission by a federal
officer, employee, or agency over which a United States District Court would have
mandamus jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (“The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of
the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.”)
Anderson asks only that we issue a writ of mandamus compelling action by state
officials, but, under 28 U.S.C. § 1651 and Kerr, we lack authority to compel the nominal
respondents to perform their duties in accordance with his wishes. See White v. Ward,
145 F.3d 1139, 1139 (10th Cir. 1998) (federal court lacks authority to direct state court to
perform its duty); Demos v. United States Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Wash., 925 F.2d
1160, 1161 (9th Cir.1991) (same).
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for writ of mandamus.
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