Robin Valdez v. Carl Danberg

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 13-4259
_____________
ROBIN S. VALDEZ,
Appellant
v.
CARL DANBERG; PERRY PHELPS; CHRISTOPHER KLEIN;
CERTAIN INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEES OF THE STATE OF
DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION; DAVID PIERCE
On Appeal from the District Court
for the District of Delaware
(District Court No.: 1-11-cv-00216)
District Judge: Honorable Leonard P. Stark
Argued on July 9, 2014
Before: RENDELL, CHAGARES and JORDAN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 4, 2014)
Jeffrey K. Martin, Esquire (Argued)
Martin & Associates, P.A.
1508 Pennsylvania Avenue
Suite 1C
Wilmington, DE 19806
Counsel for Appellant
Ryan P. Connell, Esquire (Argued)
Delaware Department of Justice
820 North French Street
Carvel Office Building, 6th Floor
Wilmington, DE 19801
Counsel for Appellees
OPINION
RENDELL, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Robin Valdez appeals the order of the United States District Court for
the District of Delaware granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment on his
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Valdez, who has been completely deaf since birth, was incarcerated at the James
T. Vaughn Correctional Center (“Vaughn”) in Smyrna, Delaware from April 12, 2009
through January 22, 2010. The reasons for Valdez’s incarceration are not relevant to this
appeal, and we do not address them herein.
In early October 2009, Valdez sent a letter to Perry Phelps, Warden of Vaughn,
complaining that he had not been granted access to a telephone typewriter (“TTY”)
device, which enables hearing impaired individuals to communicate over the telephone.
The letter was received in Phelps’s office on October 5, 2009. Phelps referred the letter
to correctional counselor Ron Hosterman, with copies to Deputy Wardens Christopher
Klein and David Pierce. On October 7, 2009, Valdez followed up on his letter with a
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formal grievance, reiterating his complaints about the lack of access to the TTY and
urging that he must be permitted to use the phone two to three times per week as hearing
inmates were able to do. As with Valdez’s letter, this grievance was referred to
Hosterman. In a follow-up document, Hosterman noted that, “[f]ollowing a meeting with
his counselor which allowed the use of the TTY phone, Valdez signed off for informal
resolution of this grievance.” (J.A. 181.)
Valdez filed a second grievance on January 7, 2010. As in the first grievance, he
stated that he was being denied access to the TTY device, and noted that he had been able
to use the TTY only twice during his entire nine-month incarceration. Like the first, this
grievance was referred to Hosterman. On January 11, Hosterman reported that, “[i]n a
meeting with his counselor, Valdez was reminded of the previous directions he received
about contacting his co[u]nselor to arrange use of the TTY, and he signed off for informal
resolution.” (J.A. 173.) Valdez was released from Vaughn eleven days later.1
Valdez testified that he was put into solitary confinement on two occasions during
his time at Vaughn, both times for fighting with another inmate. Valdez states that he
was unable to express himself to corrections officers during these incidents due to the
lack of a sign language interpreter. On at least one of these occasions, guards used
pepper spray on Valdez. Although in pain, Valdez states that he was unable to
communicate his injuries to prison staff, and therefore received no medical attention. A
1
Valdez testified that he filed other letters and grievances in addition to those contained
in the record. However, in the grievance filed on January 7, 2010, mere days before he
was released, Valdez states that it was his second grievance. (See J.A. 175.)
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misconduct hearing was held in connection with at least one of these incidents.2 Though
the hearing was held outside his cell, Valdez was evidently required to sit in his cell
without any way of knowing what was being said, and without any method of
communicating his version of events to the hearing officers. The hearing resulted in
Valdez’s being found guilty of misconduct.
Valdez also testified that he had poor eyesight, but without a sign language
interpreter, was unable to effectively explain this problem to prison medical staff. As a
result of the lack of corrective treatment, he suffered from migraines. In addition, he
testified that he had pain in his appendix but had difficulty communicating this pain to
medical staff without the assistance of an interpreter.
It is undisputed that, during the entirety of Valdez’s incarceration, Vaughn had no
policies for accommodating the needs of deaf inmates. In March of 2011, the Bureau of
Prisons instituted a new policy for compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act,
42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. (“ADA”), which specifically provided for “appropriate auxiliary
aids and service accommodations” for hearing impaired inmates and required that they
receive “information about the location of accessible services, activities, and facilities in
a format that is accessible to people who are deaf or hard of hearing.” (J.A. 140.)
Valdez filed his complaint in this matter on March 11, 2011, naming Delaware
Department of Correction Commissioner Carl Danberg, Warden Phelps, and Deputy
Wardens Klein and Pierce as defendants in their individual capacities. Relevant for our
2
It is unclear whether the pepper spray injury or the misconduct hearing occurred in
connection with the first time Valdez was put into isolation, the second, or both.
4
purposes, Valdez’s complaint included: (1) a § 1983 claim for cruel and unusual
punishment for failing to accommodate his hearing disability; (2) a § 1983 claim for
failure to train and/or maintenance of wrongful customs, practices and policies; and (3) a
§ 1983 claim for cruel and unusual punishment for subjecting Valdez to solitary
confinement without a satisfactory hearing.3
On July 26, 2012, the defendants moved for summary judgment. The District
Court granted the defendants’ motion in full, holding that: (1) Valdez had failed to
produce evidence that each of the individual defendants was personally involved in the
alleged deprivation of his rights; (2) the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity
because their conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known; and (3) the Court lacked personal
jurisdiction because Valdez had failed to effect personal service on the individual
defendants. Valdez filed this timely appeal.4
II. DISCUSSION
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Azur v. Chase
Bank USA, Nat’l Ass’n, 601 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010). “Summary judgment is proper
where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits
show there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
3
Valdez’s complaint also included claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, 29
U.S.C. § 794 et seq., and a § 1983 claim for cruel and unusual punishment for excessive
length of detention awaiting extradition. Valdez no longer pursues those claims.
4
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291.
5
We have held that:
To establish § 1983 liability in [the prison] context, a plaintiff
must first demonstrate that a prison official had knowledge of
the prisoner’s problem and thus of the risk that [harm] was
being, or would be, inflicted. Second, the plaintiff must show
that the official either failed to act or took only ineffectual
action under circumstances indicating that his or her response
to the problem was a product of deliberate indifference to the
prisoner’s plight. Finally, the plaintiff must demonstrate a
causal connection between the official’s response to the
problem and the [violation of the federal right].
Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1110 (3d Cir. 1989). It is well-established that an
individual government defendant in an action under § 1983 must have had some personal
involvement in the alleged wrongdoing to be held liable. Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d
347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005).
Furthermore, it is well-established that a prison official cannot be held liable under
§ 1983 under a respondeat superior theory. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676
(2009); Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 2010); Evancho, 423
F.3d at 353. However, supervisors may still be held liable under § 1983 for their own
violations of an individual’s constitutional rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. We have
recognized two theories of supervisory responsibility: (1) where a supervisor establishes
and maintains a policy, practice or custom which directly causes a constitutional harm;
and (2) where the supervisor participates in violating a plaintiff’s rights, directs others to
violate them, or has knowledge of and acquiesces in the violations. Santiago, 629 F.3d at
129 n.5. See also Sample, 885 F.2d at 1116-17 (supervisory liability may be imposed
only where the supervisor was the “moving force” behind the constitutional tort).
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A. Personal Involvement of Phelps, Klein and Pierce
The only evidence in the record regarding the defendants’ knowledge of Valdez’s
difficulty gaining access to the TTY is Valdez’s October 2009 letter to Warden Phelps.
Upon receiving Valdez’s letter, Warden Phelps referred the complaint to Ron Hosterman,
with instructions to handle the issue, and sent copies to Pierce and Klein. Klein testified
that he believed the issue was being handled without his further involvement. Pierce
testified that it was incumbent upon Valdez to seek access to the telephone through his
correctional counselor. Valdez has presented no evidence demonstrating that it was the
responsibility of Phelps, Pierce or Klein to personally ensure that he was provided access
to the TTY. Cf. Sample, 885 F.2d at 1110-11 (affirming district court’s finding of liability
under § 1983 where “Diecks acknowledged . . . that he believed his investigation was the
only avenue available to an inmate challenging detention and this was confirmed by the
fact that Diecks did not refer Sample to anyone else in a position to resolve the
problem.”). Nor has Valdez presented evidence that defendants had any reason to believe
that delegating the matter to Hosterman would be insufficient. As such, Valdez has failed
to demonstrate that Phelps, Pierce or Klein were deliberately indifferent to the concerns
raised in his October 2009 letter.
Valdez later filed two formal grievances regarding his lack of access to the TTY.
The evidence indicates that both grievances were referred to Hosterman, that Hosterman
followed up with Valdez within a matter of days, and that Valdez signed off on informal
resolutions to both grievances. There is no evidence that Phelps, Pierce or Klein ever
saw or were otherwise made aware of either of these grievances. Accordingly, Valdez
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has failed to demonstrate that any of these three named defendants were aware that there
was an ongoing problem with respect to his access to the TTY, much less that they
caused, or were deliberately indifferent to, such problems.
None of the defendants were questioned in their depositions regarding Valdez’s
lack of a sign language interpreter during medical evaluations or treatment; accordingly,
Valdez’s testimony on these issues is uncontradicted. However, Valdez points to no
evidence that any of the named defendants were ever notified of any problems with his
access to medical care or an inability to communicate with medical staff. Nor does he
indicate that he ever filed any complaints or grievances that would have put the
defendants on notice of these issues. Accordingly, Valdez cannot demonstrate that the
defendants were personally involved in preventing him from communicating effectively
with medical personnel.
Similarly, none of the defendants were questioned during their depositions
regarding Valdez’s lack of an interpreter during his misconduct hearing, and none dispute
Valdez’s account of that incident—i.e., that the misconduct hearing was held outside his
cell without an interpreter, and he had no way of knowing what was going on. While
such allegations, if taken as true, raise serious questions, Valdez has not pointed to any
evidence suggesting that any of the named defendants were aware that he was not granted
an interpreter during his misconduct hearing. Valdez does not indicate in his deposition
or his answers to interrogatories who was present at that hearing, and nothing in the
record suggests that any of the named defendants would normally have been present at
such hearings. Nor does he indicate that he filed any complaints or grievances that would
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have put any of these defendants on notice that he had not had the assistance of an
interpreter at his misconduct hearing. Absent such evidence, Valdez cannot demonstrate
that these defendants had any personal involvement in depriving him of his rights in
connection with his misconduct hearing. See Sample, 885 F.2d at 1110 (requiring that a
prison official have knowledge of the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights to be
found liable under § 1983).
Nor may Phelps, Pierce or Klein be held liable under § 1983 for failing to
implement policies to accommodate deaf inmates. First, there does appear to have been a
policy in place for Valdez to request to use the TTY. As noted supra, Valdez was to
notify his correctional counselor when he wished to use the device.5 Though this might
have been difficult for him at times, that difficulty does not mean that there was no policy
in place. Moreover, Valdez has not pointed to any evidence that would demonstrate that
it was the responsibility of any of these named defendants to establish or implement
policies for providing interpreters during misconduct hearings or medical examinations or
treatment. In fact, the record indicates that when an ADA policy was ultimately
implemented, it was done at a higher level, by the Bureau of Prisons. Absent evidence
that the named defendants were responsible for implementing policies with respect to
deaf inmates but deliberately failed to do so, they cannot be held liable under § 1983.
B. Personal Involvement of Commissioner Danberg
5
In his deposition testimony, Valdez admitted that he was aware that he needed to
contact his correctional counselor in order to request access to the TTY. He testified that
when he wished to use the TTY he would wave his hands to get the counselor’s attention,
but that it was “impossible.” (J.A. 60.) He admitted that he did get to use the TTY
“when [he] was lucky enough to get the counselor’s attention.” (Id.)
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Valdez does not claim that Commissioner Danberg had actual knowledge of his
alleged difficulties in gaining access to the TTY device or that he did not have the
assistance of an interpreter during medical appointments or misconduct hearings. Rather,
Valdez appears to base Danberg’s liability entirely on his position as Commissioner of
the Department of Correction and his failure to implement department-wide policies
regarding the treatment of deaf inmates. In his deposition, Danberg testified that before
he took over the Department of Correction in February 2007, there were no written
policies regarding deaf inmates specifically or compliance with the ADA generally. He
testified that when he became Commissioner, he specifically asked that such a policy be
developed. In fact, Danberg testified that the Bureau-level ADA policy that was
eventually implemented in early 2011 was created at his direction.
“Individual defendants who are policymakers may be liable under § 1983 if it is
shown that such defendants, ‘with deliberate indifference to the consequences,
established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the]
constitutional harm.’” A.M. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d
Cir. 2004) (quoting Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir.
1989)). See also Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 328 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[I]n a claim
alleging failure to promulgate policy as a basis for § 1983 liability, the failure must be an
intentional choice and amount to subjective deliberate indifference.”) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). See also Tafoya v. Salazar, 516 F.3d 912, 922 (10th Cir.
2008) (“At the summary judgment stage, the requirement of deliberate indifference
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imposes a burden on the plaintiff to present evidence from which a jury might reasonably
infer that the prison official was actually aware of a constitutionally infirm condition.”).
Here, Valdez has produced no evidence suggesting that Danberg was aware that
deaf inmates had been denied use of the TTY or that any deaf inmates had not been
provided with interpreters during medical treatment or misconduct hearings. Valdez has
pointed to no evidence that Danberg was aware of any issues with deaf inmates at all. As
such, no reasonable jury could find that Danberg was deliberately indifferent to the
alleged violations of Valdez’s rights. Moreover, any claim of deliberate indifference on
Danberg’s part is undermined by his uncontradicted testimony that, when he became
Commissioner of the Department of Correction, he set about establishing a policy to
address issues arising under the ADA, including issues relating to deaf or hearing
impaired inmates. As such, Valdez has failed to adduce evidence sufficient for a
reasonable jury to find that Danberg’s failure to immediately implement an ADA policy
was the product of deliberate indifference to the problems of inmates with disabilities.
Because we agree that Valdez has failed to identify facts that would allow a
reasonable jury to find that any of the named defendants were personally involved in the
alleged deprivation of his statutory or constitutional rights, we will affirm the District
Court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants.6
6
Because we affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on the ground that
Valdez has failed to demonstrate the personal involvement of any named defendant, we
do not discuss in detail the issues of qualified immunity or service of process. With
respect to qualified immunity, however, we note that the right of a state prisoner to
receive reasonable accommodations under the ADA has been clearly established since
the Supreme Court’s decision in Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206
11
(1998). In addition, we disagree with the District Court’s holding that it lacked personal
jurisdiction because Valdez failed to effect service of process. The defendants actively
litigated this case for over a year after serving their Answer, failing to pursue the issue of
service of process in any meaningful way until they filed their motion for summary
judgment in July of 2012—after the statute of limitations on Valdez’s § 1983 claims had
expired. By failing to press the issue earlier, they waived it. See Bel-Ray Co. v. Chemrite
Ltd., 181 F.3d 435, 443-44 (3d Cir. 1999); In re Texas Eastern Transmission Corp., 15
F.3d 1230, 1236 (3d Cir. 1994); King v. Taylor, 694 F.3d 650, 656-61 (6th Cir. 2012).
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