Smith v. Devline

Opinions of the United
2007 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
7-11-2007
Smith v. Devline
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 06-4844
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Recommended Citation
"Smith v. Devline" (2007). 2007 Decisions. Paper 783.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007/783
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 06-4844
KIM SMITH,
Appellant
v.
DIRECTOR DEVLINE; MS. BARBARA HILL, Caseworker;
CASE MANAGER MORRIS; CLAUDIA ASBURY, Intake Staff;
INTAKE STAFF CONNIE; CHARLES SULLIVAN; CHRIS CARDOVA;
SHIFT SECURITY SUPERVISOR FRANK; RENEWAL INC,
the chairman of the board
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
D.C. Civil Action No. 04-cv-00558
(Honorable Joy F. Conti)
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 3, 2007
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, FUENTES and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Filed July 11, 2007)
OPINION OF THE COURT
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Kim Smith, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s order
entering summary judgment in favor of Appellees. For the reasons that follow, we will
affirm.
Smith filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District
of Pennsylvania pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges that in 2004, he was paroled
from the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution-Coal Township to Renewal, Inc.
(“Renewal”), a treatment center. Smith alleges that, while he was a resident at that
center, Renewal employees denied him access to health care, prevented him from
attending medical appointments, forced him to live in a room without heat, interfered
with his access to mail, denied him the opportunity to leave the facility to seek
employment, and placed him in a job that negatively affected his medical conditions.
Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that they were entitled to
judgment as a matter of law because Smith could not show that Renewal and its
employees were acting “under the color of state law,” as is required to state a claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Based on the affidavit of Doug Williams, Chief Executive Officer of
Renewal, the District Court granted the motion and entered judgment in favor of
Appellees.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a
district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Pennsylvania Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt,
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63 F.3d 231, 235 (3d Cir. 1995). Summary judgment is proper only if it appears “that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Carrasca v. Pomeroy, 313 F.3d 828,
832-33 (3d Cir. 2002).
To prevail on his claim under § 1983, Smith must show not only that Renewal
violated his rights, but also that it acted under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487
U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Smith bears the burden of proving that Renewal acted under the color
of state law. Roberts v. Stetson School, Inc., 256 F3d 159, 164 (3d Cir. 2001).
The following facts remain uncontradicted by Smith. Renewal is a non-profit
corporation that provides treatment services to offenders in the criminal justice system to
facilitate their successful re-entry into society. Although Renewal contracts with various
government entities, some residents of the program pay the cost of the program without
any governmental assistance. Renewal is governed by a board of trustees, who volunteer
for the position and are elected by the board of directors. None of the members of the
board of directors are appointed by a governmental entity. The policies and procedures
that govern the residents of the program and the employees of Renewal are created and
adopted by Renewal and are not set by a governmental entity. Renewal has full discretion
over who is admitted into its program; a governmental entity cannot force or require
Renewal to accept any particular person into its program. When a resident commits a
program violation, Renewal does not have the authority to return the resident to prison.
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Renewal is required to notify the proper governmental authority, who then determines
whether the resident should be returned to prison or remain in the program.
The inquiry regarding whether Renewal’s actions can be considered taken under
color of state law is fact specific. Groman v. Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 638 (3d Cir.
1995). Smith failed to submit any facts from which the District Court could have
concluded that Renewal and its employees were acting under the color of state law. In his
objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, Smith states that he
has never taken the position that Appellees operate under the color of state law because
such proof is not required for a civil rights action under § 1983. (Doc. 127, p. 5). Smith
is mistaken. As we have explained, a plaintiff in a § 1983 action bears the burden of
proving that the defendant was acting under the color of state law. See Roberts v. Stetson
School, Inc., 256 F3d at 164. Appellant has failed to meet that burden.
Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court properly entered summary
judgment in favor of Appellees, and we will affirm that judgment.
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