United States v. Coleman

Opinions of the United
2007 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
3-7-2007
USA v. Coleman
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 05-4118
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 05-4118
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
RANDY COLEMAN
also known as
STEVEN JOHNSON
also known as
STEVEN LEWIS
also known as
KHABIR HAFIZ
Randy Coleman,
Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 01-cr-00038-1)
District Judge: Clarence C. Newcomer
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 13, 2006
Before: FISHER, CHAGARES and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: March 7, 2007 )
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Randy Coleman argues (1) that the District Court erred in raising sua
sponte the non-retroactivity principle of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); and
(2) that the rule of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), should be applied
retroactively. The former argument is without merit and the latter argument is foreclosed
by the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. ___
(Feb. 28, 2007). For the reasons that follow, the District Court’s judgment denying
Coleman’s habeas petition will be affirmed.
I.
Because we write for the parties only, we will forgo a lengthy recitation of the
factual and procedural history of this case. On January 23, 2001, a grand jury in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania returned an indictment charging Coleman with
possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking activity, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c), possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). Coleman proceeded to trial on May 9, 2001. At trial, the statements of an
adverse witness who had died were introduced pursuant to the “excited utterance” hearsay
exception of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2). On May 11, 2001, the jury convicted
Coleman on all counts and on July 29, 2001, the District Court imposed a sentence of 220
months of imprisonment, five years of supervised release, a $1,000 fine, and a special
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assessment of $300. On June 3, 2003, we affirmed the conviction and sentence. See
United States v. Coleman, 68 Fed. Appx. 300 (3d Cir. 2003) (unpublished).
On October 18, 2004, Coleman filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 habeas petition raising,
inter alia, the issue of a violation of his right to confront witnesses pursuant to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford. 541 U.S. at 60. The Government did not raise
the affirmative defense of Teague – that is, the principle that with rare exception for
“watershed rules,” new rules of criminal procedure do not apply retroactively to cases
already final on direct review. 489 U.S. at 311 (plurality opinion). However, the District
Court invoked the principle of Teague sua sponte, finding that in order to raise a
challenge based on Crawford, Coleman first had to establish that the rule announced in
that case applied retroactively. Applying Teague, the District Court found that Crawford
did not announce a watershed rule of criminal procedure and did not affect primary rights.
Accordingly, it denied Coleman’s habeas petition. Coleman filed a motion for
reconsideration. Although the District Court denied the motion, it granted a certificate of
appealability as to whether Crawford applies retroactively.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction over this criminal matter pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3231, and over Coleman’s collateral petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Because the
District Court issued a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 regarding its
final decision denying habeas relief, we have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1291. We
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review the District Court’s legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Cepero, 224 F.3d
256, 258 (3d Cir. 2000).
Coleman challenges the District Court’s authority to raise the issue of the
retroactivity of Crawford sua sponte. This challenge must fail. Although “a court need
not entertain the [non-retroactivity issue] . . . if the State has not raised it . . .,” Goeke v.
Branch, 514 U.S. 115, 117 (1995) (per curiam), we clearly retain the discretion to reach
the issue sua sponte. See Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 229 (1994) (“[A] State can
waive the Teague bar by not raising it. . . . Although we undoubtedly have the discretion
to reach the State’s Teague argument, we will not do so in these circumstances.”); Wilmer
v. Johnson, 30 F.3d 451, 455 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Although we have the discretion to reach
the . . . [non-retroactivity issue] sua sponte . . . we decline to do so in this case.”).
Although the doctrine of non-retroactivity is not a jurisdictional hurdle, it remains a
“threshold question,” Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 389 (1994), that a court
appropriately raises as the “first step” in its review of a habeas petition. Schiro, 510 U.S.
at 228.
Coleman also argues that, even if it was not error for the District Court to raise the
issue of the retroactivity of Crawford sua sponte, the District Court’s conclusion that
Crawford should not be retroactively applied was erroneous. This argument is foreclosed
by the Supreme Court’s holding in Whorton v. Bockting, supra, that the rule of Crawford
is not a watershed rule of criminal procedure to be applied retroactively.
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III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment denying
the petition for habeas relief.
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