James Martin v. Delaware Law School

Opinions of the United
2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
12-19-2008
James Martin v. Delaware Law School
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 08-3310
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"James Martin v. Delaware Law School" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 66.
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ELD-17 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 08-3310
JAMES L. MARTIN,
Appellant
v.
DEL. LAW SCHOOL DELAWARE LAW SCHOOL OF WIDENER UNIVERSITY;
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION; BUREAU OF TRAFFIC SAFETY OPERATIONS; PA BOARD
OF LAW EXAMINERS; COMMONWEALTH NATIONAL BANK; POLYCLINIC
MEDICAL CENTER OF HARRISBURG; PHILHAVEN HOSPITAL; THOMAS
GATES; JOHN C. WALTERS; LEBANON VALLEY COLLEGE; LEGAL SERVICES
ASSOCIATION; JOHN E. FEATHER, JR; JAMES T. REILLY
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civil No. 85-cv-00053)
District Judge: Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel
Submitted for Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
December 11, 2008
Before: BARRY, CHAGARES and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: December 19, 2008)
OPINION
PER CURIAM
In January 1985, appellant James Martin filed a civil action in the United
States District Court for the District of Delaware against numerous defendants alleging
violations of, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986, Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., as well as the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Martin’s causes of actions and allegations are
more fully set forth in the District Court’s opinion reported at Martin v. Delaware Law
School, et al., 625 F. Supp. 1288 (D. Del. 1985). Judgment was eventually entered against
Martin, and we affirmed that judgment on August 14, 1989. See C.A. No. 88-3428.
Martin returned to the District Court in January 1993 with a motion filed under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b)(4), wherein he argued, among other things, that the action should be
reopened because the District Court judge failed to recuse himself despite his past
involvement with the Delaware Law School. The District Court denied Martin’s motion
in an order entered on May 10, 1993, and we summarily affirmed that decision on
December 20, 1993. See C.A. No. 93-7401.
Martin returned to the District Court yet a second time on July 24, 2007, once
again seeking to have the underlying action reopened. This time Martin argued that
reopening was warranted under either Rule 60(b)(4), (5) or (6). While it is less than clear,
it appears that the impetus behind Martin’s latest effort to reopen stems from his actions
on May 24, 2007, at which time he sought, but was refused, a renewal of his driver’s
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license from the Delaware Division of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”). Martin asserts that the
problem he experienced at the DMV is a result of the “documented misconduct of the
parties to this case,” which, Martin claims, has not been “corrected despite the passage of
more than twenty-five (25) years.” See Motion to Reopen at 1-2.
Martin’s Reopen Motion fared no better than his first one. In a Memorandum
Opinion entered on June 6, 2008, the District Court concluded that the grounds asserted in
Martin’s motion were nothing more than a “legally frivolous attack” on the decisions of
the District Court judge who originally heard the case and disposed of the initial reopen
motion filed in 1993. Moreover, the District Court concluded that the motion was
“brought well beyond the bounds of the ‘reasonable time’ requirement imposed by Rule
60(c).” See District Court Mem. Opin. at 2. To the extent Martin intended to rely on
Rule 60(b)(4) in an attempt to avoid a timeliness problem, the District Court concluded
that Martin’s efforts proved unsuccessful under the circumstances presented, i.e., where
he was using Rule 60(b) merely as a mechanism to “wast[e] the judicial system’s time and
resources with successive motions arguing identical issues.” Id. at 3. Accordingly, the
District Court issued an Order denying Martin’s motion to reopen. A subsequent order
was entered denying Martin’s request seeking reconsideration of that decision.
This timely appeal followed. We have jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and review the District Court’s orders denying Martin’s motions
filed under Rule 60(b) and Rule 59(e) for an abuse of discretion. See Brown v. Phila.
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Hous. Auth., 350 F.3d 338, 342 (3d Cir. 2003); Max’s Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176
F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999). Martin has filed a motion asking us to summarily reverse
the District Court’s decision to deny him relief in accordance with Rule 60(b).
Summary action is warranted if an appeal presents no substantial question. See
Third Circuit LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. While we agree with Martin’s general contention
that this appeal is appropriate for summary disposition, we do not agree that such action is
warranted in favor of a summary reversal of the District Court’s post-judgment decision.
Rather, after careful review of the record in this case together with Martin’s submissions,
and for essentially the same reasons set forth by the District Court, we will summarily
affirm its denial of Rule 60(b) relief. We do not hesitate to conclude – and do so without
further discussion – that the District Court acted within its discretion in denying Martin’s
post-judgment motion. Martin’s motion for recusal is denied as moot. None of the
circuit judges he seeks to have recused are members of the panel that entertained this
appeal.
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