Pressley v. Johnson

Opinions of the United
2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
3-10-2008
Pressley v. Johnson
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 07-4193
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CLD-139 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 07-4193
SEAN PRESSLEY,
Appellant
v.
SUPT. P. JOHNSON; C.O. CLARK; C.O. YOLINSKY; C.O. M. FREEMAN; C.O. G.
FREEMAN; L.T. BLAKELY; CAPT. T. MCCONNELL; C.O. W. DUKE; C.O.
ABRAMS; C.O. CRUMB; CAPT. CLAYBORNE; DR. RUEDA; P.A. F. POLANDO;
DEPUTY SUPT. DICKSON; C.O. B. KNIGHT; C.O. FULLER; C.O. NEIPORT; CAPT.
SIMPSON; H.E. MATTHEWS; SGT. BEDILION; C.O. FRIDLEY; LT. E. FERSON;
C.O. ONSTOTT; C.O. SHAFER; LT. A. BOVO; C.O. ROSE; C.O. JOHNSON; C.O.
AKERS; SGT. GIDDENS; LT. J. HOLMES; SUPT. CONNER BLAINE; MAJOR
HASSETT; DEPUTY SUPT. MILLER; SMITH; MAHLMEISTER; BRUNO; CAPT.
GRAINEY, sued in their individual and official capacities; C.O. SIPOS; NURSE
DANNER
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 01-cv-02350)
District Judge: Honorable Terrence F. McVerry
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action
Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
Before: AMBRO, FUENTES and JORDAN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: March 10, 2008)
OPINION
PER CURIAM
This is an appeal from the District Court’s grant of summary judgment. For the
following reasons, we will summarily affirm. See 3rd Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.
Sean Pressley, a state prisoner currently incarcerated in the State Correctional
Institution at Mahanoy, filed a civil rights action in the District Court pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Named as defendants were various former employees/agents of the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. Pressley accused prison officials of violating
his Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Pressley also made numerous
allegations accusing the defendants of retaliating against him for filing grievances and
lawsuits against prison officials. According to Pressley, the retaliation took the form of
false misconduct reports, theft of his property, harassment and intimidation, transfer to a
different prison, and placement in administrative custody. On March 26, 2003, the
District Court entered an order granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to
the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims but denying the motion with
respect to the access-to-courts and retaliation claims. Next, on September 28, 2006, the
Court granted summary judgment for the defendants on Pressley’s access-to-courts
claims. Finally, on September 28, 2007 the District Court determined that Pressley’s
retaliation claims did not present a genuine issue of material fact and granted the
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defendants’ summary judgment motion.
Our standard of review of the District Court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is
plenary. Atkinson v. LaFayette College, 460 F.3d 447, 451 (3d Cir. 2006). We accept as
true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
therefrom and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Evancho v.
Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir. 2005). We also exercise plenary review over the
District Court’s grant of Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. See Whitfield v.
Radian Guar., Inc., 501 F.3d 262, 265 (3d Cir. 2007). A motion for summary judgment
should be granted only if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
For substantially the reasons given by the District Court, we find that Pressley
failed to state a Fourth, Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment claim. In his Fourth
Amendment claim, Pressley asserted that officers illegally searched and seized legal and
religious materials from his cell. A prisoner has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
his cell, however. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-26 (1984). Pressley’s
Eighth Amendment claims amounted to a generalized complaint about the conditions of
confinement in the restricted housing unit. We have previously rejected such a contention
in Griffin v.Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 709 (3d Cir. 1997). The District Court thus properly
found that Pressley did not allege a deprivation of a basic human need in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
Pressley’s numerous Due Process allegations also fail to state a claim. First,
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Pressley argues that prison officials denied him due process of law by destroying his
property. However, even an intentional deprivation of property in the prison setting is not
a due process violation if the prison provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy. See
Hudson, 468 U.S. at 532-33. The District Court held, and we agree, that Pennsylvania’s
inmate grievance procedure is an adequate post-deprivation remedy. See Tillman v.
Lebanon County Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 422 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that county
prisoner had adequate post-deprivation remedy through grievance system that allowed
prisoners to complain about “any” matter that is “unjust” and provided for direct appeal to
the warden).
Further, Pressley’s claim alleging a deprivation of access to the courts arising from
the destruction of his property was properly dismissed on the defendants’ summary
judgment motion. The property in question, according to Pressley, included legal
materials necessary for prosecution of his civil action in Pressley v. Horn, No. 99-01956
(W.D. Pa. 2004). The docket for the case indicates that Pressley was represented by
counsel and received a jury trial. To maintain a denial of access-to-courts claim, Pressley
must show that the deprivation of legal materials hindered his efforts to pursue a non-
frivolous legal claim. See Oliver v. Fauver, 118 F.3d 175, 177 (3d Cir. 1997) (plaintiff
alleging access to courts claim must show loss or rejection of a legal claim). Here, where
Pressley had the benefit of counsel, there is no nexus between the deprivation and any
loss suffered in the case. Therefore, Pressley cannot plausibly maintain an access-to-
courts claim based on this civil action.
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Pressley also made an allegation in his amended complaint that defendant John
Doe #5 destroyed his religious materials which hindered the free exercise of his religion.
Pressley, however, failed to elaborate on what religious materials were confiscated or
how it hindered his free exercise right. “To survive summary judgment, a party must
present more than just ‘bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions’ to show the
existence of a genuine issue.” McCabe v. Ernst & Young, LLP., 494 F.3d 418, 436-37 (3d
Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).
Pressley also complained about the investigation and processing of his inmate
grievances. Because there is no due process right to a prison grievance procedure,
Pressley’s allegations did not give rise to a Fourteenth Amendment violation. See
Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (collecting cases). To the extent
that Pressley raised a due process claim regarding his confinement in the restricted
housing unit (“RHU”), the District Court properly dismissed his claim. Pressley’s alleged
360 days of disciplinary custody does not constitute an atypical and significant hardship
in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,
484 (1995); see also Griffin, 112 F.3d at 703 (exposure to the conditions of administrative
custody in Pennsylvania prison for periods as long as 15 months falls within the expected
parameters of prisoner’s sentence). Further, we agree with the District Court’s analysis
that Pressley’s allegations concerning his placement in administrative custody do not state
a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Pressley also asserted that Appellees violated his constitutional rights by filing
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false misconduct reports, which resulted in his disciplinary custody in the RHU.
However, as it appears that Pressley had a procedural opportunity to address his assertion
that the misconduct reports were false, that claim must fail. See Smith v. Mensinger, 293
F.3d 641, 654 (3d Cir. 2002) (as long as procedural requirements are satisfied, mere
allegations of falsified evidence or misconduct reports, without more, are not enough to
state a due process claim).
We also find that Pressley’s retaliation claims do not raise any genuine issues of
material fact. In so holding, we substantially adopt the Magistrate Judge’s reasoning in
her September 6, 2007 Report and Recommendation.
In order to prevail on a retaliation claim, Pressley was required to prove three
elements: 1) the conduct which led to the alleged retaliation was constitutionally
protected; 2) he was subjected to adverse actions by a state actor; 3) the protected activity
was a substantial motivating factor in the state actor’s decision to take the adverse action.
See Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001). While Pressley’s ability to file
grievances and lawsuits against prison officials is constitutionally protected, the District
Court correctly determined that there was no causal nexus between the alleged adverse
action and Pressley’s grievances.
Pressley’s misconduct offenses were supported by legitimate violations of prison
regulations. See Carter v. McGrady, 292 F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 2002) (no genuine issue of
material fact that jailhouse lawyer would have been disciplined notwithstanding his
jailhouse lawyering). Pressley admitted in at least two instances to violating prison
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regulations which led to misconduct charges. The other misconduct violations were
backed by thorough investigations including statements by prison officials, Pressley, and
eye-witnesses. See Massachusetts Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985)
(holding that the requirement of a written statement for the reasons relied upon by the
disciplinary board “does not imply that a disciplinary board’s factual findings . . . are
subject to second-guessing upon review”). In each instance, the Appellees presented
evidence that pointed to a legitimate reason for the misconduct violations. Pressley failed
to present evidence showing that any of the incidents were “substantially motivated” by
his lawsuit against prison officials. Therefore, the District Court properly granted
summary judgment for the defendants. See Arnold Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. General Motors
Corp., 786 F.2d 564, 581 (3d Cir. 1986) (in reviewing grant of summary judgment,
appellate court cannot ignore uncontested facts that render inferences unreasonable).
Regarding Pressley’s transfer to SCI-Greene, there was sufficient uncontroverted
evidence presented that the transfer occurred due to his ongoing disruptive behavior at
SCI-Pittsburgh.1 Other alleged retaliatory incidents–including Pressley’s placement in
administrative custody and the alleged theft of his property–occurred months after prison
officials reportedly learned of his original civil action. Therefore, no sufficient causal
nexus existed between Pressley’s constitutionally protected activity and prison officials’
adverse action. See Black v. Lane, 22 F.3d 1395, 1407 (7th Cir. 1994) (for an inference of
1
The defendants presented evidence that in the past ten years, Pressley has incurred
80 institutional misconducts.
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retaliation to be plausible, there must not be a significant gap in time between the exercise
of protected activity and the purported act of retaliation).
Accordingly, because this appeal presents us with no substantial question, we will
summarily affirm the District Court’s order. See 3rd Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.
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