Adams v. Hunsberger

Opinions of the United
2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
1-29-2008
Adams v. Hunsberger
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 07-3949
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DLD-99 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 07-3949
GEOFFREY ADAMS,
Appellant
v.
MARDI HUNSBERGER, Superintendent;
GARY HILER, Acting Major (PRC);
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;
IVORY BARNETT, Hearing Examiner;
ROBERT S. BITNER, Chief Hearing Examiner
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 04-cv-00213)
District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
January 10, 2008
Before: BARRY, CHAGARES and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 29, 2008)
OPINION
PER CURIAM
Geoffrey Adams, proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court’s entry of summary
judgment in favor of Appellees. For the reasons that follow, we will dismiss this appeal
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Adams filed the instant lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania in August 2004. In response to the District Court’s order
granting Appellees’ motion for a more definite statement, Adams filed an amended
complaint in April 2006. As defendants, in addition to the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections, he named four SCI-Laurel Highlands employees, Superintendent Mardi
Hunsberger, Prison Review Committee (“PRC”) Member Gary Hiler, Hearing Examiner
Ivory Barnett, and Chief Hearing Examiner Robert S. Bitner. Following a period of
discovery, Appellees moved for summary judgment, which the District Court granted
over Adams’ objections in September 2007. Adams now appeals.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because
Appellant has been granted in forma pauperis status pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, we
review this appeal for possible dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). An
appeal must be dismissed under § 1915(e)(2)(B) if it has no arguable basis in law or fact.
See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
We review a District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. See
Pennsylvania Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 235 (3d Cir. 1995). Summary
judgment is proper only if it appears “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
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and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c), Carrasca v. Pomeroy, 313 F.3d 828, 832-33 (3d Cir. 2002). If a motion for
summary judgment demonstrates that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the
nonmoving party must set forth specific facts showing a genuine material issue for trial
and may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings. Connors v. Fawn
Mining Corp., 30 F.3d 483, 489 (3d Cir. 1994). After a careful review of the record, we
conclude that the District Court correctly entered summary judgment against Adams on
all of his claims.
Adams’ amended complaint is based on a misconduct filed against him by Captain
Chero, who was not named as a defendant. The misconduct alleged that Adams called
another inmate a “fucking cracker,” tried to kick him, and grabbed him around the waist.
Both the victim and a confidential informant corroborated this account, which Adams
denied. Hearing Examiner Barnett found Adams guilty of fighting, sentenced him to
thirty days’ disciplinary custody in RHU, and directed that he be removed from his job.
Barnett’s findings were upheld by the three member PRC, Superintendent Hunsberger,
and Chief Hearing Examiner Bitner.
Adams claims that during the hearing on the misconduct charge, Barnett denied
him the opportunity to call a medical witness who would have testified that, because
Adams has one short leg, he could not have attempted to kick the victim as alleged.
Adams alleges that Barnett’s denial of this witness violated his rights under the
Americans with Disabilities Act. Adams also claims that after he was charged with the
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misconduct, Appellee Hiler, one of the three members of the PRC, came to see him in the
RHU, told him that his appeal was denied in retaliation for his filing of lawsuits, and
made several racist remarks to him. Adams claims that Hiler further retaliated against
him by having him transferred to SCI-Laurel Highlands. Additionally, Adams alleges
that while he was in the RHU, certain unnamed corrections officers denied him meals and
that Hiler knew of but did not do anything to correct the situation. Next, Adams alleges
that Superintendent Hunsberger sanctioned these violations of his rights by sustaining the
PRC’s decision and made statements acknowledging that the misconduct was filed
against Adams in retaliation for his prior filing of lawsuits, and that Chief Hearing
Examiner Bitner similarly sanctioned these violations by sustaining the decisions below.
Adams claims that, as a result of Appellees’ actions, he was transferred to a
different prison, his security level was increased, he lost his job and currently has a
significantly lower-paying job, he was held in administrative custody for fifty-eight days
following his thirty-day sentence in the RHU, his arthritis worsened due his transfer to
SCI-Frackville, which uses forced moist/damp air for ventilation, and he developed cysts
all over his body, which the medical staff at SCI-Laurel Highlands planned to treat, but
which the medical staff at SCI-Frackville have claimed are untreatable. He maintains that
these repercussions are the result of unconstitutional retaliation and constitute a denial of
his rights to medical care and due process.
The District Court properly concluded that Adams’ claims against the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections were barred, as it is not a “person” within the
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meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71
(1989), and that Adams failed to state a claim against any of the Appellees under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, as he did not allege any discriminatory conduct based on
his disability. With respect to his due process claims, the District Court correctly
concluded that Adams failed to identify a liberty or property interest protected by the due
process clause. Accordingly, neither the alleged denial of witnesses nor the other
consequences flowing from the misconduct deprived him of his right to due process. See
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Next, the District Court held that, while
Adams did not specifically invoke the Eighth Amendment in his amended complaint, to
the extent that he sought to raise an Eighth Amendment claim, he failed satisfy its
requirements. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828-29 (1994). Specifically, Adams
failed to allege that any of the named defendants personally denied him food or medical
care, see Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1988), nor did his allegations
demonstrate a “substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828. Accordingly,
the District Court properly entered summary judgment on these claims.
Finally, with respect to his claims of retaliation, the District Court held that Adams
had not properly exhausted his claim. See Jones v. Brock, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 910,
923 (2007). Adams contests whether the Court may enter summary judgment based on
his failure to exhaust, where Appellees did not move for summary judgment on this basis.
See Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that exhaustion under the PLRA
is an affirmative defense to be pled and proven by defendants). We need not resolve this
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dispute at the present time, since, as Appellees argued in their motion for summary
judgment, even if Adams were able to make out a prima facie case for retaliation, they
could still prevail by “proving that they would have made the same decision absent the
protected conduct for reasons reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.”
Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001). Because Adams’ misconduct charge
was supported by the evidence, and because the resulting repercussions – Adams’ loss of
his job, time in the RHU, and transfer to SCI-Frackville – properly flowed from the
misconduct, Appellees were entitled to summary judgment on this claim.1
For the foregoing reasons, Brown’s appeal is without legal merit and will be
dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
1
To the extent Adams challenges the filing of the misconduct as retaliatory, as noted
by Appellees and the District Court, he failed to name either of the officers involved in
the filing as defendants. None of the named defendants can be held liable for their action.
See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1988).
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