Phillips v. Keyport

Opinions of the United
1997 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
2-21-1997
Phillips v. Keyport
Precedential or Non-Precedential:
Docket 95-5143
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Recommended Citation
"Phillips v. Keyport" (1997). 1997 Decisions. Paper 43.
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 95-5143
GEORGE PHILLIPS; PHILIP VITALE
Appellants
v.
BOROUGH OF KEYPORT; VICTOR RHODES; BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 93-cv-00415)
Argued December 8, 1995
BEFORE: STAPLETON, SAROKIN,* and ROSENN, Circuit Judges
Reargued En Banc
September 19, 1996
BEFORE: SLOVITER, Chief Judge, BECKER, STAPLETON,
MANSMANN, GREENBERG, SCIRICA, COWEN, NYGAARD,
ALITO, ROTH, LEWIS, McKEE and ROSENN,
Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed February 21, 1997)
Lewis H. Robertson (Argued)
Evans, Osborne, Kreizman & Bonney
P.O. Box BB
Red Bank, NJ 07701
Attorney for Appellants
* Hon. H. Lee Sarokin heard argument before the original panel
but retired from office prior to the en banc hearing.
1
Frank N. Yurasko
63 Route 206 South
P.O. Box 1041
Somerville, NJ 08876
Gordon N. Litwin (Argued)
Ansell, Zaro, Bennett & Grimm
60 Park Place
Newark, NJ 07102
Attorneys for Appellee
Borough of Keyport
Michael A. Irene, Jr.
Suite 6
422 Morris Avenue
Long Branch, NJ 07740
Attorney for Appellee
Board of Adjustment
OPINION OF THE COURT
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:
Appellants planned to open an adult book and video
store, "X-Tasy", in the Borough of Keyport, New Jersey. Over a
ten month period, they sought the necessary zoning and
construction permits. Their applications were ultimately denied
on the basis of an "adult entertainment uses" ordinance enacted
by the Borough allegedly in response to those applications.
Appellants insist that delays, denials, and revocations in the
permitting process violated their right to substantive due
process, that the ordinance violates their right to freedom of
speech, and that they are entitled to recover litigation expenses
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Appellants also contend that the Borough
2
is equitably estopped to deny that they are authorized to pursue
their project.
I. The Factual Background
In early 1992, George Phillips and Philip Vitale
spotted an abandoned one-story building on Route 36 in the
Borough of Keyport, a 1.5-square-mile community in Monmouth
County, New Jersey. After visiting the site, they became
interested in the property as a potential location for an adult
video and book store. After checking zoning and land use
regulations, they met with the owner to negotiate a lease of the
property. The parties agreed that, if Phillips and Vitale could
obtain a zoning permit for the intended use of the property, they
would execute a lease.
Phillips contacted Vic Rhodes, construction official
and zoning officer of the Borough, and asked him to perform an
unofficial inspection of the property to advise plaintiffs as to
what they would need in order to obtain a certificate of
occupancy. He did so on February 18th, and informed Phillips and
Vitale that they would have to comply with various requirements
regarding designation of parking places. A week later, Phillips
and Vitale submitted to Rhodes an application for a zoning permit
to "operate a retail book store w/ novelties - amusements &
videos." App. at 29. The address listed on the application was
"#65 Hwy. 36." Id. The line below the address specified, "Block
103, Lot 59." Id. Attached to the application was a survey of
3
"Lots 59 & 61, Block 103 of the Official Tax Map of the Borough
of Keyport." App. at 30.
The property that Phillips and Vitale eventually leased
-- and that Rhodes inspected -- is actually located on Lot 61.
While Lots 59 and 61 are contiguous, they are situated in
different zoning areas. Lot 59 is located in a district zoned as
"residential." Lot 61 is situated in a "highway commercial"
district. The survey clearly indicated which land was Lot 59 and
which was Lot 61.
A few days later, Rhodes telephoned Vitale and
requested that he clarify the nature of plaintiffs' intended use
of the property. Vitale complied by describing the intended use
in writing as "(1) video sales & rentals"; "(2) amusements -
adult video arcade"; and "(3) no one under 21 years of age
admitted." App. at 31. There was at that time no zoning
restriction specifically pertaining to commercial establishments
selling, renting or exhibiting sexually explicit material. On
March 9th, Rhodes issued to plaintiffs a zoning permit for Block
103, Lot 59.
On March 13th, Phillips and Vitale entered into a
five-year lease for "[t]hat portion of the premises known as
Block 103, Lot 59 also known as 65 Highway 36." App. at 32. The
lease specified that the premises were to be used for "video
sales and rental, amusements and adult video arcade" and as "a
retail adult book store with novelties and gifts," and that "[n]o
one under 21 years of age [would be] admitted to the premises."
The lessees agreed to "obtain any and all necessary government
4
permits and approvals to conduct the business as deemed necessary
by such governmental entities."
On March 18th, Rhodes issued plaintiffs three
construction permits under their zoning permit. Plaintiffs
allege that they thereafter expended substantial sums of money to
repair and renovate the property for their intended use.
By this time, however, word of the plans for an adult
book store had spread around the Borough and had generated
significant opposition. Charles Barreca, who lives directly
behind the property at issue, stated at a Borough Council meeting
on March 23rd that he would do all he could to stop plaintiffs
from opening their proposed store and that he had begun to
circulate a petition in the area to that end. At the same
meeting, the Borough attorney explained that the Zoning Board of
Adjustment could review and overturn Rhodes's decision to issue
the zoning permit. Other local leaders, including the mayor,
also voiced their opposition. Faithful to his promise, on March
29th, Barreca appealed the issuance of the zoning permit to the
Board, and the Board announced that it would review the matter at
its upcoming meeting, on April 20th. On April 2nd, Rhodes issued
and posted a "stop construction" notice, ordering plaintiffs to
stop work at "Block 103, Lot 61, 65 Hwy 36" until the appeal was
resolved. The appeal was based on the mistaken identification of
the lot number.
On April 14th, Phillips and Vitale filed a second
application for a zoning permit, this time with the proper
address of the location. The application stated that their
5
intention was "to operate a retail bookstore w/ novelties,
amusements & videos, adult video arcade, video sales & rentals
(no one under 21 years of age admitted)." App. at 42.
On April 20th, the Board of Adjustment held its hearing
on the first application. Barreca attended, along with another
resident, to urge reversal. Phillips and Vitale were represented
by counsel, who admitted that the permit had been issued for
Block 103, Lot 59, that this location was in a residential
district, and that his clients' intended use was not permitted in
such a district. Barreca and his supporter submitted eight
photographs purporting to show that the present condition of the
plaintiffs' proposed building and site differed from the
conditions represented on the old survey attached to their
application for the zoning permit. On the basis of this
evidence, the Board granted the appeal and reversed Rhodes's
decision to issue the initial zoning permit.
Eight days later, Rhodes advised plaintiffs that their
second application for a zoning permit had been denied due to (1)
inaccuracies in the survey they had submitted with the
application, (2) the need to replace a fence pursuant to
Ordinance 25:1-14.6.B, and (3) reports from a previous tenant
that the sewer line servicing the building did not operate.
Phillips and Vitale undertook to correct the problems and, on
June 16th, submitted a third application for a zoning permit,
together with a revised survey and receipts for sewer line
repairs.
6
A week later, while the plaintiffs' third application
was pending, members of the Borough Council introduced at a
Council meeting two ordinances targeted at establishments
involved in so-called adult entertainment. Ordinance No. 30-92,
entitled "Public Indecency," would prohibit female topless and
bottomless exhibitions and male bottomless exhibitions. It was
patterned after the Indiana statute upheld by the Supreme Court
in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991). Ordinance
No. 31-92, entitled "Adult Entertainment Uses," ("the Ordinance"
or "Ordinance 31-92") would restrict adult entertainment uses to
industrial districts and prohibit them within 1000 feet of
residential zones, schools, churches, and public playgrounds,
swimming pools, parks and libraries. Under the proposed scheme,
Phillips and Vitale would need a use variance to open their
store, because they were located in a highway commercial
district. The Council referred the second ordinance to the
Borough Planning Board for review. In connection with the
ordinances, Mayor John J. Merla stated to the Asbury Park Press
correspondent:
We're not going to tolerate this kind of filth in the
Borough of Keyport. We don't support it
(adult entertainment) going into any
community in the Bayshore.
App. at 14-15.
On July 23rd, the Borough Planning Board held a public
meeting to consider proposed Ordinance No. 31-92. The Board had
earlier solicited and reviewed a legal opinion concerning the
Ordinance, and at the hearing, it heard an oral presentation by
7
an engineering expert. It recommended that the Council pass the
proposed ordinance, but suggested three changes, the most
significant of which was to reduce the "buffer zone" from 1000 to
500 feet.
At the Council meeting on July 28th, the Council
adopted Ordinance No. 31-92 as amended in light of the Planning
Board's suggestions. The minutes of the meeting indicate that,
although the meeting was open to the public for comments, the
sole comment on Ordinance No. 31-92 was made by the Borough
counsel, reporting the Planning Board's recommended changes and
stating that the mayor had disqualified himself at the Planning
Board meeting. Ordinance No. 31-92 contained the following
legislative findings and prohibitions:
(a) In the development and execution of this
section it is recognized that there are
certain uses which, because of their very
nature, are recognized as having serious
objectionable operational characteristics.
These uses create and promote a deleterious
effect on the Borough's neighborhood
characteristics, administration of schools,
and the commercial and economic viability of
the community. These uses impact on the
Borough's neighborhood areas and conflict
with the intent of the Borough Master Plan,
particularly those segments listed on pages
16 and 19 therein which provide that a
primary zoning objective is to preserve and
protest [sic] existing residential areas and
to enhance the desirability thereof. Adult
Entertainment Uses are such uses.
The Borough of Keyport is a small residential
community with its commercial areas and zones
highly integrated with its residential
properties. The commercial properties are in
close proximity to its educational,
religious, residential and youth recreation
facilities with a high volume of pedestrian
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activity, including children throughout the
area.
The industrial zone as it exists is not
comprised of major industrial operations, but
of mixed use nature including
retail/commercial uses, it is so situated as
to provide easy access and highway exposure.
The industrial zone is suitably distant and
buffered from the residential and mixed
commercial zones as to minimize a negative or
deleterious effect.
In order to prevent the deterioration of the
community, to preserve the neighborhoods of
the Borough of Keyport, to ensure the
economic prosperity of the community, and to
provide for the protection and well being of
the quality of life in the Borough of
Keyport, certain regulations are necessary to
prevent these adverse effects.
(b) Adult Entertainment Uses1 are prohibited
in all zones, except where expressly
permitted.
1. Ordinance 31-92 provides the following definition of "Adult
Entertainment Uses":
ADULT ENTERTAINMENT USES, INCLUDE:
(1) ADULT BOOKSTORE - An establishment having as a
substantial or significant portion of its stock in trade books,
magazines, other periodicals, or any tangible items and objects,
not necessarily of a reading or photographic nature, which are
distinguished or characterized by their emphasis on matter
depicting, describing or relating to specified sexual activities
or specified anatomical areas, as defined below, or an
establishment with a segment or section devoted to the sale or
display of such material.
(2) ADULT MOTION PICTURE THEATER - An enclosed building
with a capacity of fifty (50) or more persons used for presenting
material distinguished or characterized by an emphasis on matter
depicting, describing or relating to specified sexual activities
or specified anatomical areas, as defined below, for observation
by patrons therein.
(3) ADULT MINI MOTION PICTURE THEATER - An enclosed
building with a capacity for less than fifty (50) persons used
for presenting material distinguished or characterized by an
emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to specified
sexual activities or specified anatomical areas, as defined
below, for observation by patrons therein.
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(c) In such zones where Adult Entertainment
Uses are expressly permitted, no Adult
Entertainment Use shall be located:
(a) within 500 feet of any residence,
residential use and/or residential zone; or
(b) within 500 feet of any of the
following users:
1. Churches, monasteries, chapels,
synagogues, convents, rectories, religious
artifice or religious apparel stores, or any
religious use; or
2. Schools, up to and including the
twelfth (12) grade, and their adjunct play
areas; or
3. Public playgrounds, public swimming
pools, public parks and public libraries.
App. at 59 (codified at Keyport, N.J., Rev. Gen Code, ch. XXV,
§ 25:1-15.15 (1992)).
On September 9th, Rhodes informed Phillips and Vitale
by letter that their third application for a zoning permit was
(..continued)
(a) For the purpose of this subsection,
"specified sexual activities" is defined as
human genitals in a state of sexual
stimulation or arousal; acts of human
masturbation, sexual intercourse or sodomy;
and fondling or other erotic touching of
human genitals, pubic region, buttock or
female breast; and "specified anatomical
areas" is defined as less than completely and
opaquely covered human genitals, pubic
region, buttock or female breast below a
point immediately above the top of the
areola; and human male genitals in a
discernibly turgid state, even if completely
and opaquely covered.
(4) CABARET - An establishment which features go-go
dancers, exotic dancers, strippers, or similar entertainers.
App. at 57-58 (codified at Keyport, N.J., Rev. Gen. Code, ch.
XXV, § 25:1-3(a) (1992)).
10
denied because: (1) they lacked "ample parking," (2) a site plan
was required, and (3) issuance of the permit sought would be
inconsistent with "31-92 Section 2 25:1-15.15.b Adult
Entertainment Uses." App. at 70. Phillips and Vitale appealed
the denial, and the Board of Adjustment held public hearings on
the appeal. On December 21st, a unanimous Board voted to deny
the appeal, finding that plaintiffs' proposed use fell within the
definition of Adult Entertainment Uses and that such uses were
prohibited in a highway commercial district, where plaintiffs'
site was located. The Board also found that plaintiffs had failed
to demonstrate that Rhodes erred regarding the issues of
inadequate parking and the need for a site plan. Phillips and
Vitale then instituted this suit.
11
II. The Issues On Appeal And The District Court Process
In this appeal, Phillips and Vitale advance four
arguments: (1) Ordinance No. 31-92 violates their right of free
expression because it is not narrowly tailored to achieve a
substantial, content-neutral governmental interest and because it
does not leave adequate alternative channels of communication;
(2) the Borough violated their right to substantive due process
by revoking their original permits, by delaying action on their
two subsequent applications, and by denying their third
application based on Ordinance No. 31-92; (3) they are
"prevailing parties" entitled to attorneys' fees and costs
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and (4) the Borough is equitably
estopped from revoking their original permits.
In response to the complaint, Rhodes and the Borough
filed a motion to dismiss rather than an answer.2 The district
court denied their motion. In the course of doing so, the court
ruled on the basis of the allegations of the complaint that
Ordinance No. 31-92 is content neutral and serves a substantial
state interest. The only governmental interests identified by
the district court were "preserving the quality of urban life"
and "shielding minors from sexually explicit materials" --
interests quoted not from the Ordinance or the record but from
Supreme Court cases. App. at 140-41. See Young v. American Mini
Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976) (plurality opinion)
2. The Board of Adjustment filed a motion to dismiss and, later,
an answer to the complaint. This answer consisted primarily of
general denials and did not identify any secondary effects that
might justify Ordinance 31-92.
12
("[I]nterest in attempting to preserve the quality of urban life
is one that must be accorded high respect."); Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968) (state's "interest in the well-
being of its youth" justified some restriction of the First
Amendment). The court declined to grant the motion to dismiss,
however, because it was unclear from the complaint and exhibits
(a) whether the Ordinance provided alternative channels for adult
entertainment expression, and (b) whether the Borough was
equitably estopped from prohibiting the plaintiffs' proposed use.
It did hold that the complaint failed to state a substantive due
process claim and dismissed that count of the complaint.
The district court thereafter entertained the
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on their challenge to
Ordinance No. 31-92 and their motion for a preliminary injunction
barring enforcement of that Ordinance. On June 15, 1994, the
district court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the issue of
whether Ordinance 31-92 left alternative channels available for
adult entertainment. A second evidentiary hearing was held two
days later to receive evidence on the equitable estoppel issue.
At the beginning of this hearing, defense counsel announced that
the Borough Council had met in special session on the evening of
June 15, 1994, and had declared an intention to amend the
Ordinance to reduce the buffer from 500 feet to 300 feet.
Both motions were ultimately denied. The district
court viewed the record as establishing that the Ordinance, as
amended to reduce the buffer zone to 300 feet, afforded a
constitutionally sufficient opportunity for adult entertainment
13
expression. This finding, together with the conclusions reached
in deciding the motion to dismiss, meant that Ordinance No. 31-92
was constitutional and that plaintiffs could not demonstrate a
likelihood of success on this claim. The court expressed no view
regarding the constitutionality of the 500 foot buffer version of
the Ordinance.
The district court's third and final order came in
response to the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on their
equitable estoppel and § 1988 claims. The district court first
ruled that the undisputed record facts established a lack of
reasonable reliance by the plaintiffs. The district court then
found that the plaintiffs were not "prevailing parties" within
the meaning of § 1988. The resulting order denied plaintiffs'
motion for summary judgment and concluded as follows:
FURTHER ORDERED that since there remain no
issues of material fact and this Court having
resolved all legal issues in defendants'
favor, that the above-captioned action be and
is hereby DISMISSED in its ENTIRETY as MOOT.
Order of Feb. 14, 1994, App. at 247.
III. The Challenge to Ordinance No. 31-92
Speech, be it in the form of film, live presentations,
or printed matter, that is sexually explicit in content but not
"obscene" is protected under the First Amendment. Schad v.
Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65-66 (1981); Mitchell v.
Comm'n on Adult Entertainment Establishments, 10 F.3d 123, 130
(3d Cir. 1993). The Fourteenth Amendment extends this protection
to the state and local levels. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
14
Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1514 (1996). However, not every
regulation of protected speech violates the First Amendment; nor
is every form of speech regulation subject to the same degree of
scrutiny when challenged in court. As the Supreme Court
explained in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 114 S.
Ct. 2445, 2459 (1994) (citations omitted):
Our precedents . . . apply the most exacting scrutiny
to regulations that suppress, disadvantage,
or impose differential burdens upon speech
because of its content. . . . In contrast,
regulations that are unrelated to the content
of speech are subject to an intermediate
level of scrutiny, because in most cases they
pose a less substantial risk of excising
certain ideas or viewpoints from the public
dialogue.
State regulations of speech that are not regarded as
content neutral will be sustained only if they are shown to serve
a compelling state interest in a manner which involves the least
possible burden on expression. Regulations of speech that are
regarded as content neutral, however, receive "intermediate"
rather than this "exacting" or "strict" scrutiny. This includes
regulations that restrict the time, place and manner of
expression in order to ameliorate undesirable secondary effects
of sexually explicit expression. City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (zoning ordinances designed to
combat the undesirable secondary effects of businesses that
purvey sexually explicit material are to be reviewed under the
standards applicable to "content-neutral" time, place, and manner
regulations). We articulated the "intermediate scrutiny"
standard applicable to such measures in Mitchell v. Comm'n on
15
Adult Entertainment Establishments, 10 F.3d 123, 130 (3d Cir.
1993):
[R]easonable time, place, and manner regulations of
protected speech are valid if: (1) they are
justified without reference to the content of
the regulated speech; (2) they are narrowly
tailored to serve a significant or
substantial government interest; and (3) they
leave open ample alternative channels of
communication.
Thus, when a legislative body acts to regulate speech,
it has the burden, when challenged, of showing either (1) that
its action serves a compelling state interest which cannot be
served in a less restrictive way, or (2) that its action serves a
substantial, content-neutral, state interest, is narrowly
tailored to further that substantial state interest, and leaves
adequate alternative channels for the regulated speech. If the
state chooses the second alternative in a setting like the
present one, it must come forward with "evidence of incidental
adverse social effect that provides the important governmental
interest justifying reasonable time, place and manner
restrictions on speech or expressive conduct." Id. at 133.
Moreover, the legislative body "must . . . be prepared . . . to
articulate and support its argument with a reasoned and
substantial basis demonstrating the link between the regulation
and the asserted governmental interest." Id. at 132.
A. Content Neutrality And Narrow Tailoring
The district court concluded, on the basis of the
legislative findings contained in Ordinance No. 31-92, that the
16
Ordinance is an effort to suppress the secondary effects of
sexually explicit expression and not sexually explicit expression
itself. Apparently, it further tacitly concluded, without
explanation, that Ordinance No. 31-92 was narrowly tailored to
achieve that objective. We conclude that the district court was
simply not in a position to make these findings.
These findings were made by the district court when the
case was in an unusual procedural posture. It sustained the
constitutionality of an ordinance substantially burdening the
exercise of protected speech (1) without an answer from the
defendants identifying the secondary effects alleged to justify
the burden on expression, and (2) without a record supporting the
reasonableness of any legislative expectations regarding the
likelihood of these secondary effects and the ameliorative effect
of the ordinance.
The complaint alleges that the plaintiffs wished to
disseminate adult entertainment and that the defendants "applied
an unconstitutional ordinance to [them] with a purpose to
restrain their sale, rental, exchange and exhibition of adult-
theme videos, as well as adult books, magazines and the like
because of their content." ¶ 60. It further alleges, inter
alia, that the ordinance burdens only adult entertainment
expression, "is not rationally related to a valid governmental
purpose," "is not intended to further any substantial or
compelling governmental purpose," "significantly restricts access
to protect[ed] speech," "is not supported by a reasoned or
significant basis," "is not narrowly tailored," and "is a
17
subterfuge for the suppression of expression protected by the
First Amendment." ¶ 61.
When an ordinance burdening speech is thus challenged,
it must be "justified" by the state. Renton, 475 U.S. at 48.
However, because the Borough filed no answer in this case, we do
not yet know how the Borough will seek to justify the Ordinance.
There is no articulation by the state of what it perceives its
relevant interests to be and how it thinks they will be served.
This is particularly troublesome in a case, like this, where the
legislative findings speak in terms of "serious objectionable
operational characteristics," "deleterious effects," and "the
deterioration of the community" without identifying in any way
those "characteristics," those "effects," or that
"deterioration."
On remand, the Borough must be required to articulate
the governmental interests on the basis of which it seeks to
justify the ordinance. It should then have to shoulder the
burden of building an evidentiary record that will support a
finding that it reasonably believed those interests would be
jeopardized in the absence of an ordinance and that this
ordinance is reasonably tailored to promote those interests. It
is the Borough that carries the burdens of production and
persuasion here, not the plaintiffs. Renton, 475 U.S. 41; Schad
v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981). Moreover, it is the
district court, not the Borough, that must make the findings
necessary to determine whether the ordinance is consistent with
the First Amendment. See id.; Renton, 475 U.S. 41.
18
It is clear from the district court's opinion that it
believed its conclusions to be dictated by Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc. The Supreme Court there upheld the
constitutionality of a municipal ordinance of the City of Renton,
Washington, that prohibited any "'adult motion picture theater'
from locating within 1000 feet of any residential zone, . . .
dwelling, church, or park, and within one mile of any school."
475 U.S. at 44. Renton is a city of approximately 32,000 people
located just south of Seattle. The Court held, inter alia, that
the Renton Council was entitled to rely "on the experience of,
and studies produced by, the City of Seattle," id. at 51,
concerning the secondary effects of such theaters. As the Court
put it, "The First Amendment does not require a city, before
enacting an ordinance, to conduct new studies or produce new
evidence independent of that already generated by other cities,
so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably
believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses."
Id. at 51-52.
The Renton Court did not sustain the constitutionality
of the ordinance before it based solely on legislative findings
there recited. The city justified the ordinance by placing the
Seattle studies in the record and the Court concluded that these
studies could reasonably be believed relevant to the problem that
the city was facing. Here, the district court had no way of
knowing what problem or problems the Borough thought it was
facing and there is no study or other evidence in the record
concerning the secondary effects of "adult entertainment uses."
19
Moreover, because the problem or problems that the Borough
believes it was facing have not been identified, the district
court was in no position to determine whether Ordinance 31-92 was
"narrowly tailored" to effectively ameliorate the interest or
interests the Borough sought to serve. While the requirement of
narrow tailoring does not mean that the ordinance must be the
least restrictive means of serving the Borough's substantial
interests, "[g]overnment may not regulate expression in such a
manner that a substantial portion of the burden on speech does
not serve to advance its goals." Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989). Accordingly, the issue of narrow
tailoring cannot be determined without knowing the undesirable
secondary effects the Borough relies upon to justify its
ordinance and more about the effect of Ordinance 31-92 in the
context of the Borough of Keyport.
Renton does not signal an abandonment of the elements
of the intermediate scrutiny standard that the Supreme Court has
traditionally applied to content neutral regulation of speech.
See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989);
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991); City of
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993);
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 114 S. Ct. 2445
(1994). In Turner Broadcasting, the Supreme Court held that a
summary judgment upholding the constitutionality of the FCC's
"must carry" provisions for cable stations was improperly
granted. The Court was divided on whether the challenged
provisions were content neutral and, accordingly, on the level of
20
scrutiny that should be applied. A majority agreed, however,
that the challenged provisions would not survive intermediate
scrutiny and emphasized the importance of applying the
traditional elements of intermediate scrutiny in a realistic
manner. Justice Kennedy, joined by the Chief Justice, Blackmun,
J., and Souter, J., found the intermediate scrutiny standard
articulated in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)3, to
be applicable and observed:
That the Government's asserted interests are
important in the abstract does not mean,
however, that the must-carry rules will in
fact advance those interests. When the
Government defends a regulation on speech as
a means to redress past harms or prevent
anticipated harms, it must do more than
simply "posit the existence of the disease
sought to be cured." Quincy Cable TV, Inc.
v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1455 (CADC 1985). It
must demonstrate that the recited harms are
real, not merely conjectural, and that the
regulation will in fact alleviate these harms
in a direct and material way. . . .
Thus, in applying O'Brien scrutiny we must
ask first whether the Government has
adequately shown that the economic health of
local broadcasting is in genuine jeopardy and
in need of the protections afforded by must-
carry. Assuming an affirmative answer to the
foregoing question, the Government still
bears the burden of showing that the remedy
it has adopted does not "burden substantially
more speech than is necessary to further the
government's legitimate interests." Ward,
491 U.S., at 799, 109 S. Ct., at 2758. On
the state of the record developed thus far,
and in the absence of findings of fact from
the District Court, we are unable to conclude
3. The Supreme Court has recognized that the "O'Brien test 'in
the last analysis is little, if any, different from the standard
applied to time, place and manner restrictions'" like those found
in Renton and Mitchell. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 798 (1959).
21
that the Government has satisfied either
inquiry.
Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2470. Justice O'Connor, joined by Scalia,
J., and Ginsburg, J., found that the "must carry" rules were not
content neutral but agreed that they "fail[ed even] content
neutral scrutiny" because:
"A regulation is not 'narrowly tailored' --
even under the more lenient [standard
applicable to content-neutral restrictions]
-- where . . . a substantial portion of the burden on
speech does not serve to advance [the State's
content-neutral] goals." Simon & Schuster,
502 U.S., at ______ - _____, n.** 112 S. Ct.,
at 511-512, n.**. . . .
Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2479.
It may well be that the defendants here, by pointing to
studies from other towns and to other evidence of legislative
facts, will be able to carry their burden of showing that the
ordinance is reasonably designed to address the reasonably
foreseeable secondary effect problems. Nevertheless, our First
Amendment jurisprudence requires that the Borough identify the
justifying secondary effects with some particularity, that they
offer some record support for the existence of those effects and
for the Ordinance's amelioration thereof, and that the plaintiffs
be afforded some opportunity to offer evidence in support of the
allegations of their complaint. To insist on less is to reduce
the First Amendment to a charade in this area.
B. The Adequacy of Alternative Channels
Ordinance 31-92, as originally proposed by the Borough
Council, prohibited adult entertainment uses located on any land
22
not zoned industrial or in a "buffer zone" -- i.e., less than
1000 feet from a residence or residential zone, school, church,
etc. As a result of advice from the Planning Board's engineer
that a 1000 foot buffer would leave no land available for an
adult bookstore, the Ordinance, as ultimately adopted, called for
a 500 foot buffer zone.
At the September 15, 1993, evidentiary hearing, the
plaintiffs' expert land use planner, George A. VanSant, testified
that the 500 foot version of the ordinance prohibited an adult
video store anywhere in the Borough. He tendered a map that
depicted the portions of Keyport zoned industrial with
superimposed arcs marking 500 feet from each residential property
in Keyport and adjacent areas. With respect to the buffers
associated with residential properties in adjacent areas, VanSant
explained that the Borough's zoning plan had been coordinated
with the zoning plans of the contiguous townships and that the
buffer provisions of the Ordinance, interpreted in the context of
the Borough's zoning ordinance, had to be applied to residential
property in contiguous areas.4 VanSant's map demonstrated that
4. The Supreme Court has suggested that, at least in the case of
small municipalities, opportunities to engage in the restricted
speech in neighboring communities may be relevant to a
determination of the adequate alternative channels. Schad v.
Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 76-77 (1981). In Schad,
Mount Ephraim, another New Jersey borough, attempted to ban "live
entertainment," including nude dancing, within the borough's
boundaries. Mount Ephraim asserted that nude dancing was "amply
available in close-by areas" within the county. Id. at 76.
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that Mount Ephraim could not
avail itself of such an argument as there was no county-wide
zoning nor any evidence of the availability of nude dancing in
"reasonably nearby areas." Id. Here, the Borough does not rely
on the availability of "adult entertainment" sites in neighboring
23
the 500 foot buffer left only a portion of two lots available for
an adult bookstore. One of these lots was owned by Jersey
Central Power & Light Company and was used as an electric
substation. The other was owned and occupied by a going
industrial concern. VanSant indicated that even if one of these
owners could be persuaded to sell or lease, however, neither lot
could be used for an adult bookstore because the Borough's zoning
ordinance, in accordance with customary zoning practice, defined
"use" in such a way that the entirety of each lot takes on the
character of the purpose for which any building thereon is
utilized. Thus, the placing of an adult bookstore anywhere on
either of these lots would result in a prohibited use within 500
feet of a residential area.
In response to this testimony, the defendants called
the Borough's Planning Board engineer, Paul M. Sterbenz. He
testified that the intent of the 500 foot ordinance was to leave
four lots in the industrial zone available for an adult
bookstore. He acknowledged, however, that when he reviewed the
500 foot version for the Planning Board he had inadvertently
failed to take into account a residential area in adjacent Hazlet
Township. He further acknowledged that when this error was
corrected only a portion of two lots were available for an adult
bookstore. Finally, on cross-examination, Sterbenz agreed with
VanSant's view that for zoning purposes in the Borough a lot
(..continued)
areas outside its limits; nor has it offered any evidence of such
sites.
24
takes on the character of the use to which any portion thereof is
put.
Despite this last concession, the defendants' counsel
continued to insist that a portion of two lots could be used for
an adult bookstore. In support of this position, they called
Richard Maser, the Borough Engineer for the Borough of Keyport.
He expressed the opinion that an adult bookstore could be
constructed on the portion of the two lots that lay outside the
500 foot buffer so long as other set back requirements were met.
He did not explain the basis for this opinion, however, and did
not comment on VanSant's and Sterbenz's understanding of "use."
In response to a question from defense counsel, Maser expressed
the further opinion that the Council's original intention of
leaving four lots available for an adult bookstore could be
accomplished by reducing the buffer zone to 250 feet.
On the evening of June 15th, after the close of the
hearing, the Borough Council held a special meeting and adopted a
resolution declaring its intention to reduce the buffer zone to
300 feet. It recognized that it could not legally effect the
change before the scheduled hearing on September 17th but
authorized counsel to advise the court of its intent and to
indicate that it considered itself bound to effectuate the
change.
At the beginning of the June 17th hearing on the
equitable estoppel issue, defense counsel advised the court of
the Council's resolution and declared that the amendment would
make three lots in their entirety available for an adult
25
entertainment use. He further indicated that a portion of a
fourth lot would be available. The resolution was marked as an
exhibit. Although the transcript does not affirmatively indicate
whether it was formally admitted into evidence, the court and
counsel explored the effect of the new ordinance on the map
exhibits. The court clearly indicated that it was considering
the resolution as a part of the evidence in the case and that it
considered the Borough bound by it. Counsel for Phillips and
Vitale did not at any time object to consideration of the
resolution by the court and concluded his closing argument on the
issue of alternative access with the following comments
concerning three "available" lots:
There is land that's legally available. It's occupied
by a quasi public entity [and a]
manufacturing concern that we can expect that
it's going to stay right there, and it's
occupied by lot 4, which is basically --
probably a non-buildable ravine, that's it.
And I'd submit that when we measure what the
Borough has done against what the Supreme
Court would permit, and permitted in Young
[v. American Theatres] and City of Rentin
[sic], that it has substantially restricted
access and that it is unconstitutional.
Tr. at 203.
As we have indicated, the district court upheld the
constitutionality of the 300 foot Ordinance. It did not comment
upon the constitutionality of the 500 foot Ordinance. In this
appeal, Phillips and Vitale do not argue that the 300 foot
ordinance fails to provide constitutionally sufficient
alternative channels of expression for adult entertainment. They
do insist that the district court erred in failing to rule upon
26
the constitutionality of the 500 foot Ordinance. They also
contend that the 300 foot Ordinance was not properly before the
district court and, alternatively, that it violates the First
Amendment, even assuming that it leaves constitutionally
sufficient alternative channels of expression for adult
entertainment.
We agree with Phillips and Vitale that the district
court erred in failing to adjudicate their § 1983 claim that the
500 foot version of Ordinance 31-92 violated their First
Amendment rights. As we have pointed out, the defendants have
not tendered record justification for the Ordinance tending to
establish that it is narrowly tailored to serve a substantial
state interest and the evidence from the June 15, 1993, hearing
would provide ample basis for concluding that this version of the
Ordinance leaves no alternative channel open for adult
entertainment expression. Contrary to the defendants'
suggestion, the issue of the constitutionality of this version of
the Ordinance is not moot. Phillips and Vitale have a § 1983
damage claim based on the 500 foot version of the Ordinance.
They seek damages for defendants' refusal to permit them to
operate an adult bookstore on Lot 61 from July 28, 1992, when
Ordinance 31-92 was first adopted, to the date in the fall of
1993 on which the 300 foot version of the Ordinance was adopted.
If the 500 foot Ordinance is unconstitutional, Phillips and
Vitale are entitled to any damages they can establish to have
been occasioned by it.
27
As Renton, 475 U.S. 41, 53-54, and Mitchell, 10 F.3d
123, 139, 144, indicate, the existence of adequate alternative
channels for adult entertainment expression is an essential
element for the state to satisfy when it relies upon its
authority to adopt time, place, and manner regulations.5 It
follows that, on remand, the district court must rule on whether
the 500 foot version of the Ordinance left adequate alternative
channels for adult entertainment expression. If the 500 foot
version of the Ordinance did not provide adequate alternative
channels, the district court should determine what, if any,
damages Phillips and Vitale suffered as a result of the adoption
of that version of the Ordinance.
Turning to the 300 foot Ordinance, we agree with the
defendants that Phillips and Vitale waived their right to
complain about the district court's considering that version of
the Ordinance. The record of the June 17th hearing clearly
establishes that the district court considered the defendants
bound by Council's September 15th resolution and that it intended
to consider the 300 foot version of the statute in connection
with the plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief. Plaintiffs'
counsel not only failed to object to consideration of that
Ordinance, but also assisted the court in understanding its
effect on the evidence produced at the September 15th hearing and
made a closing argument premised on its adoption.
5. The defendants have relied entirely on the authority of the
Borough to adopt content-neutral time, place, and manner
regulations and have not claimed that Ordinance 31-92 can pass
muster under strict scrutiny review.
28
On remand, the district court will be required to
adjudicate the constitutionality of the 300 foot version of the
Ordinance in order to determine Phillips' and Vitale's
entitlement to an injunction and to damages arising after its
adoption. Since Phillips and Vitale chose not to appeal from the
district court's determination that this version leaves adequate
alternative channels for adult expression, the district court
need not relitigate that issue in making these determinations.
C. The Necessity of the Presentation of Pre-Enactment Evidence
While we thus agree with appellants that they are
entitled to a reversal of the judgment against them on their
First Amendment claim, we reject their argument that they are
entitled to a mandate requiring the entry of a judgment in their
favor on this claim. Phillips and Vitale read Renton and our
decision in Mitchell as endorsing a per se rule that any
governmental regulation of speech is invalid if the adopting
entity did not have before it, at the time of adoption, evidence
supporting the constitutionality of the action taken. Thus, in
appellants' view, a governmental entity may successfully defend a
First Amendment challenge of the kind here mounted only if it can
show that it was exposed, before taking action, to evidence from
which one could reasonably conclude that undesirable secondary
effects would occur in the absence of legislative action and that
the particular action taken was narrowly tailored to ameliorate
those secondary effects. We find no such rule in Renton,
Mitchell, or any other governing precedent.
29
There is a significant difference between the
requirement that there be a factual basis for a legislative
judgment presented in court when that judgment is challenged and
a requirement that such a factual basis have been submitted to
the legislative body prior to the enactment of the legislative
measure. We have always required the former; we have never
required the latter. Whatever level of scrutiny we have applied
in a given case, we have always found it acceptable for
individual legislators to base their judgments on their own study
of the subject matter of the legislation, their communications
with constituents, and their own life experience and common sense
so long as they come forward with the required showing in the
courtroom once a challenge is raised. In reliance on this
approach, most municipal and county councils throughout the land
and some state legislatures do not hold hearings and compile
legislative records before acting on proposed legislative
measures. We perceive no justification in policy or doctrine for
abandoning our traditional approach. Moreover, we believe that
insistence on the creation of a legislative record is an
unwarranted intrusion into the internal affairs of the
legislative branch of governments.
If a legislative body can produce in court whatever
justification is required of it under the applicable
constitutional doctrine, we perceive little to be gained by
incurring the expense, effort, and delay involved in requiring it
to reenact the legislative measure after parading its evidence
through its legislative chamber. A record like that presented to
30
the town council in Renton can be easily and quickly assembled,
and a requirement that this be done is unlikely to deter any
municipal body bent on regulating or curbing speech. While we
agree with appellants that the creation of a legislative record
can have probative value on what the lawmakers had in mind when
they acted, we do not understand why its absence should be
controlling when the court is otherwise satisfied that the
legislative measure has a content-neutral target.
The Supreme Court's Renton case and our Mitchell case
sustained the constitutionality of the ordinances before them.
Renton, 475 U.S. at 54-55; Mitchell, 10 F.3d at 144. Thus, they
clearly cannot stand for the proposition that a legislative
record is a constitutional prerequisite to validity.6 Moreover,
in Mitchell, we expressly reserved this issue, observing that it
was "unnecessary . . . to reach or decide whether . . . a statute
6. Most of the cases cited by the dissent upheld the ordinances
at issue, and, just as Renton and Mitchell, cannot stand for the
principle that the lack of a legislative record is a fatal
constitutional defect. National Amusements, Inc. v. Dedham, 43
F.3d 731 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2247 (1995);
International Eateries of America, Inc. v. Broward County, 941
F.2d 1157 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 920 (1992);
Postscript Enter. v. Bridgeton, 905 F.2d 223 (8th Cir. 1990);
11126 Baltimore Blvd. v. Prince George's County, 886 F.2d 1415
(4th Cir. 1989), vacated on other grounds, 496 U.S. 901 (1990);
Berg v. Health & Hosp. Corp., 865 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1989); SDJ,
Inc. v. Houston, 837 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1988); cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1052 (1989). Although the courts did not sustain the
constitutionality of the ordinances in the other cases cited, in
the course of finding those ordinances invalid, Tollis, Inc. v.
San Bernardino County, 827 F.2d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1987), or
constitutionally suspect, Christy v. Ann Arbor, 824 F.2d 489, 493
(6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1059 (1988), the courts
focused on the failure of the municipalities to present any
evidence justifying the restrictions rather than on the role of a
legislative record.
31
passed without any pre-enactment evidence of need or purpose" can
be valid. Id. at 136.
The only case we have been able to find in which an
argument has been made similar to the one appellants here advance
is Contractors Association v. City of Philadelphia, 6 F.3d 990
(3d Cir. 1993). That case involved a constitutional challenge to
an affirmative action ordinance favoring minorities, women, and
disabled persons in the award of city construction contracts.
The governing law required that the provisions of the ordinance
that drew lines on the basis of race be subjected to strict
scrutiny. Id. at 1000. Thus, the city was required to show that
it had a compelling state interest and that the ordinance was the
least restrictive means of serving that interest. This meant
that the city had the burden of producing a strong evidentiary
basis for concluding that there had been preexisting
discrimination against minorities in which the city had played a
role and that the ordinance was necessary to remedy the
continuing effects of that discrimination. Id. at 1001-02.
The plaintiffs in Contractors urged this court to hold
that the ordinance was unconstitutional if the City Council did
not have before it at the time of the enactment of the ordinance
the required evidentiary basis. We rejected that argument.
While we acknowledged that the City Council did not have the
required strong evidentiary basis before it at the time it acted,
we held that the ordinance could be justified on the basis of
evidence acquired thereafter. Id. at 1003-04.
32
If we do not insist on a legislative record when we are
required to subject a legislative measure to the highest
scrutiny, we would be hard-pressed to rationalize insistence on a
legislative record when we are, as here, applying a lesser, more
deferential standard of constitutionality.
IV. The Challenge to the Permit Decisions
Appellants contend that their right to substantive due
process was violated when their initial permit applications were
revoked, when Rhodes, in connection with their subsequent
applications, imposed requirements he had not imposed previously,
and when Rhodes simply refused to act even after those
requirements were met. The actions and delay were allegedly the
result of a conspiracy entered into by Rhodes, the Board of
Adjustment and the Mayor because of their dislike of the content
of the materials appellants intended to sell. The reason given
for the revocations (i.e., the erroneous lot numbers) and the new
requirements, according to appellants, were simply pretexts to
mask a motivation that was wholly unrelated to the merit of their
applications. The actions and delay allegedly afforded the
Borough an opportunity to adopt Ordinance 31-92, which was then
advanced as a reason for the denial of the last application. The
district court dismissed the substantive due process count of the
complaint for failure to state a claim.
In the course of evaluating these claims, the district
court observed that "where there is an explicit textual
constitutional provision addressing the alleged wrongs -- as
33
there is here in the form of the First Amendment -- it must be
the guide for liability rather than 'the more generalized notion
of substantive due process.'" App. at 137. The court did not
explain, however, why the allegations of the complaint concerning
the period prior to the adoption of Ordinance 31-92 failed to
state a claim under First Amendment standards.
The analysis of the district court, as far as it goes,
is accurate. It does not follow, however, that these allegations
of the complaint fail to state a substantive due process claim
upon which relief could be granted.
The right to substantive due process conferred by the
Fourteenth Amendment includes the right to be free from state and
local government interference with certain constitutionally
recognized fundamental rights. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,
301-02 (1993); Collins v. Harkes Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125
(1992); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986). As we have
noted in connection with the challenge to the Ordinance, among
these fundamental rights are the rights expressly recognized by
the First Amendment in the context of federal government
interference.7 Thus, where a state or local official has
7. The constitutional basis is the same for both the challenge
to the Ordinance and the challenge to the permit decisions.
Both, in theory, are substantive due process claims governed by
First Amendment standards because of the rights allegedly
infringed. The district court's reference to "the more
generalized notion of substantive due process" may be
attributable to the fact that Phillips and Vitale rely, in
addition to First Amendment jurisprudence, on a line of our cases
relating to adjudicative decisions not alleged to have infringed
fundamental rights. E.g., Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 851, and cert. denied, 488 U.S. 868
(1988); Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. City of Philadelphia, 945 F.2d
667 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 984 (1992); Parkway
34
(..continued)
Garage, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 5 F.3d 685 (3d Cir. 1993);
DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of West Amwell, 53 F.3d 592
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 352 (1995); Blanche Road
Corp. v. Bensalem Township, 57 F.3d 253 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 303 (1995). As the defendants point out, these cases
are arguably at odds with some decisions in other circuits. See,
e.g., Nestor Colon Medina & Sucesores v. Custodio, 964 F.2d 32
(1st Cir. 1992); Shelton v. City of College Station, 780 F.2d 475
(5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 905, and cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 822 (1986). Phillips and Vitale claim that the
decisions to deny or delay their permits were based on a distaste
for the content of their speech. The relevant allegations of the
complaint read as follows:
60. In particular, but without limitation, the
Defendants have:
(a) purported to require Phillips and Vitale
to obtain a zoning permit notwithstanding
that they proposed no erection, construction
or structural alteration, and accordingly, no
such permit is required by Ord. 25:1-20;
(b) revoked the zoning permit issued to them
on about March 10, 1992, purportedly because
of misidentification of the property,
notwithstanding that Rhodes first physically
inspected the subject property; was under no
misapprehension as to location or any
particular with respect to the property, and
would have issued the permit had the property
been properly identified;
(c) processed and otherwise dealt with
Phillips' and Vitale's second and third
zoning permit applications, critically and
unfavorably because of the Defendants'
distaste for adult-theme materials;
(d) purposely delayed action on Phillips'
and Vitale's third zoning permit application
so as to permit the Borough Council an
opportunity to introduce and adopt an Adult
Entertainment Use Ordinance, the requirements
of which would render Phillips' and Vitale's
use a prohibited use in a Highway Commercial
District; and
(e) applied an unconstitutional ordinance to
Phillips and Vitale with a purpose to
restrain their sale, rental, exchange and
exhibition of adult-theme videos, as well as
35
prevented or punished constitutionally protected expression
because of distaste for the content of that expression, there is
(..continued)
adult books, magazines and the like because
of their content.
The only improper motivation alleged here is thus distaste for
the content of the speech involved. Because this case involves
only alleged infringements of the right to free expression, the
standard of liability articulated in the above-cited cases is
inapposite here.
36
substantive due process liability unless the defense can show
that the action taken satisfies the strict scrutiny test
prescribed in the First Amendment cases or that the same action
would have been taken in any event for reasons unrelated to the
expression. E.g., Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1971) (if failure to renew a teacher was
motivated by his exercise of his First Amendment rights and he
would otherwise have been renewed, there is a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (students disciplined for wearing arm
bands had their constitutional rights violated if motive was
disapproval of message); Board of Ed., Island Trees Union Free
Sch. Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (removing books from
library motivated by content disapproval rather than legitimate
educational concerns).
In Nestor Colon Medina & Sucesores, Inc. v. Custodio,
964 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1992), the plaintiffs had been denied a
land use permit for the construction of a "tourist residential
complex" in Puerto Rico. The plaintiffs included Dr. Maximo
Cerame Vivas, an outspoken member of an opposition party and a
critic of the government's environmental policies. The
plaintiffs alleged that the permit had been denied in retaliation
for Cerame Vivas's expressions of his political views. The court
reversed a summary judgment in the defendants' favor. It held
that to "the extent Cerame Vivas's substantive due process claim
[was] based on the alleged retaliation for his political views,"
it should be evaluated by First Amendment standards. Id. at 46.
37
After noting the Supreme Court's holding in Mt. Healthy, the
court concluded that the "same general principle would apply to a
retaliatory refusal to grant a permit", id. at 41, and concluded
that the plaintiffs' evidence was sufficient to permit an
inference that land use planning concerns were but a pretext to
mask a retaliatory motive.
We conclude that Phillips and Vitale have alleged facts
that, if proven, could serve as a predicate for a recovery on
their claim involving permit denial, delay and revocation.
Contrary to the defendants' argument, it seems clear to us from
the face of the Borough's zoning ordinance at the time of their
first application that the proposed use of Lot 61 was a permitted
use in a commercial zone. While the revocation of Phillips' and
Vitale's permits purported to rest on the fact that the authority
conferred by the permits was for Lot 59, which was in a
residential zone, the complaint alleges that everyone had a
common understanding that Lot 61 was the lot in question and
that, but for their dislike of the content of the proposed adult
entertainment expression, Rhodes or the Board of Adjustment would
have corrected the lot number on the permits and affirmed the
authority which Rhodes intended to grant. Similarly, the
complaint alleges that Rhodes and the Mayor interfered with the
processing of the second and third applications solely because of
their antipathy toward the content of the materials Phillips and
Vitale intended to market.
Under these circumstances, we conclude that the
district court was in error when it granted the motions to
38
dismiss the permit claim and that the case must be remanded for
further proceedings on that claim.
We offer one additional observation to assist the
district court in the further proceedings on this claim. We find
nothing improper in a good-faith decision by an authorized public
official to delay action on all applications for authority that
would be affected by a proposed amendment to the governing
ordinance in order to allow a reasonable time for a legislative
body to consider and vote on the proposal. Thus, if a public
official authorized by local law to impose a moratorium on the
issuance of permits imposed such a moratorium for the purpose of
allowing the municipality a reasonable opportunity to consider
whether the secondary effects of adult entertainment uses
required additional zoning regulation, any resulting delay could
not constitute a substantive due process violation. It is by no
means clear, however, that this is what happened here. As the
record develops, it may be that the trier of fact will reasonably
conclude that the delay occasioned by Rhodes or the Mayor was
occasioned not by concern for what the Borough Council might
determine to be undesirable secondary effects, but rather by
distaste for the sexually explicit material, as Phillips and
Vitale allege. The crucial difference in the two situations is
the propriety of the motivation of the official causing the
delay.
V. The Claim for Litigation Expenses under 42 U.S.C. § 1988
39
It follows from the foregoing discussion that Phillips
and Vitale may prevail on some or all of their federal claims.
To the extent they prevail on those claims, they will be entitled
to an award of reasonable costs and counsel fees under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988.8
VI. The Equitable Estoppel Claim
Finally, Phillips and Vitale argue that the Borough is
equitably estopped under New Jersey law from revoking the zoning
permit issued by Rhodes on March 9, 1992, and the construction
permits issued on March 18th. Specifically, they contend that
they reasonably relied on those permits to their detriment by
entering into the lease and by "beg[inning] to renovate the
property in order to prepare it for their contemplated use" after
receiving construction, electrical, and plumbing permits.
8. Phillips and Vitale argue that they should be entitled to an
award of the counsel fees they paid in connection with their
efforts to enjoin the 500 foot Ordinance even if they can prove
no compensable damage from that Ordinance and even if they lose
on their other federal claims. Their contention is based on the
following "catalyst theory": (a) the Borough adopted an
unconstitutional 500 foot Ordinance and relied upon it to deny
their application for a permit; (b) they challenged this
Ordinance and demonstrated at an evidentiary hearing that it
suppressed adult entertainment expression altogether; (c) as a
result of their suit and their demonstration, the Borough Council
repealed the 500 foot Ordinance; and (d) accordingly, they are
"prevailing parties" under § 1988 at least to this limited
extent. See, e.g., Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Housing Authority,
21 F.3d 541 (3d Cir. 1994); Dunn v. United States, 842 F.2d 1420,
1433 (3d Cir. 1988). Because the district court failed to
address this "catalyst theory" and because it may ultimately be
unnecessary to resolve the issues thus raised if Phillips and
Vitale are otherwise successful, we express no view on those
issues.
40
Appellants' Brief at 38. Without the zoning permit, they allege,
they would have done neither.
The district court rejected this argument in the course
of denying Phillips' and Vitale's motion for summary judgment.
It concluded that, under Lizak v. Faria, 476 A.2d 1189 (N.J.
1984), Phillips and Vitale could not demonstrate good faith
reliance on the initial zoning permits and, accordingly, were not
entitled to assert a claim of equitable estoppel. On appeal,
Phillips and Vitale argue, inter alia, that Lizak is
distinguishable and that they did rely in good faith on Rhodes'
initial determination.
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is well established
in New Jersey.
To establish a claim of equitable estoppel, the
claiming party must show that the alleged
conduct was done, or representation was made,
intentionally or under such circumstances
that it was both natural and probable that it
would induce action. Further, the conduct
must be relied on, and the relying party must
act so as to change his or her position to
his or her detriment.
Miller v. Miller, 478 A.2d 351, 355 (N.J. 1984); see Carlsen v.
Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan Trust, 403 A.2d 880, 882-83
(N.J. 1979). "A prerequisite of equitable estoppel" is that such
reliance be in "good faith." Lizak, 476 A.2d at 1198. "The
doctrine of equitable estoppel is applied 'only in very
41
compelling circumstances,' 'where the interests of justice,
morality and common fairness clearly dictate that course.'"
Palatine I v. Planning Bd. of Township of Montville, 628 A.2d
321, 328 (N.J. 1993) (citations omitted). In particular,
"equitable estoppel is rarely invoked against public entities,
although it may be invoked to prevent manifest injustice." W.V.
Pangborne & Co., Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Transportation, 562
A.2d 222, 227 (N.J. 1989); see O'Malley v. Dep't of Energy, 537
A.2d 647, 650-51 (N.J. 1987).
In Lizak, the Farias had applied for a zoning variance.
476 A.2d at 1191-93. After opposition from nearby residents,
the Woodbridge Township Board of Adjustment denied the variance.
Id. at 1191. However, the board failed to record its
determination in writing. As a result the Farias, under New
Jersey law, were entitled to an automatic grant of the variance.
Id. at 1192. A day after the Woodbridge Municipal Clerk
certified the grant of the variance, the Farias obtained a
building permit, and ten days later they began construction.
Within a month, the exterior of the building was completed at an
estimated expense of $60,000, almost one-half of the estimated
cost of the project. When a nearby resident realized what was
happening, she filed an appeal to the Township Council seeking
revocation of the variance and the permit and an order directing
the removal of the construction. The Farias responded that they
had relied on the issuance of a valid building permit in
proceeding with the construction and that the municipality was
42
equitably estopped from ordering the removal of the existing
structure. Id. at 1193.
The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the Farias'
argument. Id. at 1198-99. After noting that good faith reliance
is a prerequisite of equitable estoppel, the court explained:
The Farias' conduct . . . does not so much bespeak good
faith reliance as it reveals a "hasty effort
to attempt to acquire an unassailable
position to which [they] equitably should not
be entitled." They knew that their neighbors
objected to the proposal and that the Board
had orally disapproved their application.
Consequently, they reasonably could have
expected further opposition to the
construction. They chose to rely on the
advice of counsel that the Board's failure to
reduce its decision to writing converted its
oral denial into a statutory grant. Although
that advice was correct as far as it went,
the Farias' failure to publish a notice of
approval left the variance subject to appeal
for a reasonable time. In relying on their
attorney's opinion while the underlying
variance was still appealable, they took
their chances. They should not now be heard
to complain.
Id. at 1198 (citation omitted).
Phillips and Vitale, in this appeal, urge that there is
a world of difference between their circumstances and those of
the Farias. However, we reject appellants' effort to limit Lizak
to its admittedly egregious facts. The driving force in that
case was that parties who proceed with construction while their
permits are still appealable "[take] their chances." Id. As the
trial court in Lizak explained,
their reliance can not convert the permit into
something not subject to administrative and
judicial review. They could not reasonably
43
have relied upon the inviolability of
municipal actions that were still subject to
appeal. The . . . construction official's
action assured [the Farias] that a permit was
issuable, but not that [it] was not
appealable.
Lizak v. Faria, 434 A.2d 659, 664 (N.J. Super. 1981).
To sustain appellants' position here would eviscerate
the appellate process in land use applications. It would
encourage recipients of zoning permits to launch into large-scale
construction or renovation so as to present municipal authorities
with a fait accompli before other affected parties have exhausted
their opportunities to challenge the permit. We believe these
considerations support the clear mandate of the highest court in
New Jersey in Lizak.
VII. Conclusion
The judgment of the district court will be reversed and
the case will be remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
44
Phillips v. Borough of Keyport
No. 95-5143
ALITO, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting.
I join all but part IV of the opinion of the court. As
I read the plaintiffs' complaint, it asserts a substantive due
process claim under a line of panel decisions that stems from
Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
851 and 868 (1988). See also Blanche Road Corp. v. Bensalem
Township, 57 F.3d 253, 268 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 303
(1995); DeBlasio v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 53 F.3d 592, 599-
601 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 352 (1995); Midnight
Sessions, Ltd. v. City of Philadelphia, 945 F.2d 667, 683 (3d
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 984 (1992). Bello and the
subsequent panel decisions -- which followed Bello, as was of
course required -- seem to hold that substantive due process is
violated whenever a government official who harbors "some
improper motive," Midnight Sessions, Ltd., 945 F.2d at 683,
deprives a person of certain property rights, apparently
including the unrestricted use of the person's real estate. See
DeBlasio, 53 F.3d at 600-01.
Under these decisions, the plaintiffs could prevail on
remand by showing simply that the defendants deprived them of a
protected property interest for some "improper motive"; a motive
that is violative of the First Amendment would not have to be
shown. As the plaintiffs stated in their brief, under Bello,
45
"[i]n the land use context, . . . [w]here there is a deliberate
and arbitrary abuse of government power, an individual's right to
substantive due process may be violated."
Rather than applying (and thus reaffirming) Bello and
its progeny, the majority has transformed the plaintiffs' Bello
claim into what is in essence a First Amendment claim,9 and the
majority thus requires them to show on remand that the defendants
harbored an intent that was violative of the First Amendment.
This narrowing interpretation of the complaint is not proper in
an appeal from an order of dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12
(b)(6), but this approach permits the majority to evade the
question whether Bello was correct.
Since the plaintiffs have asserted a Bello claim, I
think that the in banc court should confront the question whether
Bello remains good law. If it does, the full court should not be
hesitant to reaffirm it. But if -- as the court's approach here
signals -- the in banc majority is uncertain about Bello's
validity, the court should not skirt the issue. The question is
properly before us; Bello and its progeny are important decisions
that are invoked with some frequency; and a resolution of the
validity of these precedents as components of circuit law would
9.To be sure, as the majority notes, the substantive component of
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause incorporates
specific guarantees set out in the Bill of Rights, including the
right to freedom of speech and of the press protected by the
First Amendment, and therefore in this sense every free speech
claim challenging a state action is a substantive due process
claim. But this aspect of the substantive component of due
process is very different from the aspect of substantive due
process on which Bello was based.
46
be useful to the district courts and the bar. The majority's
approach, which leaves these decisions in limbo, may lead to much
wasted litigation before the district courts and before panels of
this court, which are of course bound by Bello until it is
overruled by the in banc court or by the Supreme Court.
As I have previously suggested, see Homar v. Gilbert,
89 F.3d 1009, 1029-30 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part), cert. granted on other issue, 117
S. Ct. 678 (1997), I think that Bello was wrong and was based on a
misreading of Supreme Court precedent. In Bello, the plaintiffs
claimed that certain municipal officials had "improperly
interfered with the process by which the municipality issued
building permits, and that they did so for partisan political or
personal reasons unrelated to the merits of the application for
the permits." 840 F.2d at 1129. The panel held that "[t]hese
actions . . . if proven, are sufficient to establish a
substantive due process violation. . . ." Id. at 1129-30.
The panel wrote:
The Supreme Court has discussed the scope of the substantive due
process right in a number of recent cases. In Daniels
v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S. Ct. 662, 88 L. Ed. 2d
662 (1986), the Court, in holding that the due process
clause was not implicated by a state's negligent
deprivation of life, liberty or property, pointed out
that the guarantee of due process has historically been
applied to deliberate decisions of government
officials. Id. at 331, 106 S.Ct. at 665. The Court
noted that the clause was "`"intended to secure the
individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of
government,"'" id. (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110
U.S. 516, 527, 4 S. Ct. 111, 116, 28 L. Ed. 232 (1884)
(quoting Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.)
235, 244, 4 L. Ed. 559 (1819))), and distinguished the
Daniels case from cases involving an abuse of power.
47
In the related case of Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 106
S. Ct. 668, 88 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1986), the Court held that
mere negligence on the part of a state does not amount
to an abuse of state power such that constitutional due
process is implicated. Justice Blackmun, dissenting,
noted that he agreed with the majority's conclusion
that a "deprivation must contain some element of abuse
of governmental power, for the `touchstone of due
process is protection of the individual against
arbitrary action of the government.'" Id. at 353, 106
S.Ct. at 673 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
558, 95 S. Ct. 2963, 2975, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974). See
also Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263, 97 S. Ct. 555, 562, 50 L. Ed.
2d 450 (1977) (constitutional due process right to be
free of arbitrary or irrational zoning action); Pace
Resources, Inc. v. Shrewsbury Twp., 808 F.2d 1023,
1034-35 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, [482 U.S. 906], 107
S. Ct. 2482, 96 L. Ed. 2d 375 (1987) (to demonstrate
violation of right to substantive due process,
plaintiff must show that land use regulation was
arbitrary or irrational). These cases reveal that the
deliberate and arbitrary abuse of government power
violates an individual's right to substantive due
process.
840 F.2d at 1128-29.
In my view, this analysis is clearly flawed. In the
first place, neither Daniels v. Williams, supra, nor Davidson v.
Cannon, supra, provides much guidance on substantive due process
since neither was a substantive due process case. Instead, both
concerned procedural due process. In Daniels, the plaintiff was
an inmate who alleged that he had slipped and fallen on a pillow
that had been left on the stairs by a correctional deputy. The
Supreme Court summarized his constitutional claim as follows:
[The deputy's] negligence, the argument runs, "deprived" [the
plaintiff] of his "liberty" interest in freedom from
bodily injury . . . ; because [the deputy] maintains
that he is entitled to the defense of sovereign
immunity in a state tort suit, [the plaintiff] is
without an "adequate" state remedy
. . . . Accordingly, the deprivation of liberty was without "due
process of law."
474 U.S. at 328.
48
This was plainly a procedural, not a substantive, due
process claim. Substantive due process bars certain government
actions irrespective of the fairness of the procedures used to
implement them, Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115,
125 (1992), and the plaintiff in Daniels was not arguing that his
due process rights would have been violated even if fair
procedures had been available (i.e., even if he had been able to
obtain a complete recovery for his damages) under state law.
Rather, he was contending that the deprivation of his liberty
interest was "without due process of law" because the state did
not provide adequate post-deprivation procedures.
Similarly, the plaintiff in Davidson asserted a
procedural, not a substantive, due process claim. In that case,
the plaintiff was an inmate who claimed that prison officials had
negligently failed to protect him from a fellow inmate who
attacked him. The Court wrote:
[The plaintiff] emphasizes that he "does not ask this Court to
read the Constitution as an absolute guarantor of his
liberty from assault from a fellow prisoner, even if
that assault is caused by the negligence of his
jailers." Brief for Petitioner 17. Describing his
claim as "one of procedural due process, pure and
simple," id., at 14, all he asks is that [the state]
provide him a remedy.
474 U.S. at 348 (emphasis added).
Justice Stevens' concurrence also emphasized that the
claims in both Daniels and Davidson concerned procedural, not
substantive, due process. He wrote:
I do not believe petitioners have raised a colorable violation of
"substantive due process." 16/ Rather, . . .
Daniels and Davidson attack the validity of the
procedures that Virginia and New Jersey, respectively,
49
provide for prisoners who seek redress for physical
injury caused by the negligence of corrections
officers.
16/ Davidson explicitly disavows a substantive due process claim.
See Brief for Petitioner in No. 84-6470, p.7
("[P]etitioner frames his claim here purely in terms of
procedural due process"). At oral argument, counsel
for Daniels did suggest that he was pursuing a
substantive due process claim. Tr. of Oral Arg. in No.
84-5872, p. 22. However, the Court of Appeals viewed
Daniels' claim as a procedural due process argument,
see 748 F.2d 229, 230, n.1 (CA4 1984) ("There is no
claim of any substantive due process violation"), and
Daniels did not dispute this characterization in his
petition for certiorari or in his brief on the merits.
. . .
474 U.S. at 340 & n.16. Thus, it seems clear that neither
Daniels nor Davidson was a substantive due process case.
Moreover, neither Daniels nor Davidson provided any
extended or novel discussion of substantive due process. Daniels
devoted one sentence to the topic, see 474 U.S. at 331-32, and
Davidson did not mention it at all.
Despite the fact that Daniels and Davidson were not
substantive due process cases and had little to say about
substantive due process, Bello used them as the basis for an
important substantive due process holding. From them, Bello
extracted the unremarkable proposition that the constitutional
guarantee of due process was intended to protect the individual
against the arbitrary exercise of government power, and Bello
then reasoned that "the deliberate and arbitrary abuse of
government power violates an individual's right to substantive
due process." 840 F.2d at 1129. This reasoning overlooked the
fact that the primary means by which due process protects against
50
the arbitrary exercise of power by government officials is by
requiring fair procedures, i.e., by requiring adherence to
principles of procedural due process. Only in extreme
circumstances is it proper to invoke substantive due process.
In addition to Daniels and Davidson, Bello cited, in
support of its substantive due process analysis, one other
Supreme Court case, Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263 (1977), and one Third Circuit case,
Pace Resources, Inc. v. Shrewsbury Twp., 808 F.2d 1023, 1034-35
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906, reh'g denied, 483 U.S.
1040 (1987). However, Bello seems to have misinterpreted these
decisions in an important respect. Arlington Heights and Pace
Resources stand for the principle that a zoning ordinance
violates substantive due process if the zoning authority could
not have had a rational basis for adopting it. As Pace
explained, "`federal judicial interference with a state zoning
board's quasi-legislative decisions, like invalidation of
legislation for "irrationality" or "arbitrariness," is proper
only if the governmental body could have had no legitimate reason
for its decision.'" 808 F.2d at 1034 (citation omitted)
(emphasis added in Pace). Pace did not suggest that a plaintiff
could state a valid substantive due process claim merely by
alleging that an ill-motivated government official had interfered
with the plaintiff's use of his or her real estate. On the
contrary, Pace held that the challenged government actions in
that case did not violate substantive due process even though a
state court had found them to be "`arbitrary and unjustifiably
51
discriminatory.'" Id. at 1028, 1034 (citation omitted).
Furthermore, Pace quoted with approval a First Circuit case,
Creative Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 989 (1982), which stated that a
"conventional planning dispute," "regardless of . . . defendants'
alleged mental states," does not implicate substantive due
process, "at least when not tainted with fundamental procedural
irregularity, racial animus, or the like." Id. at 833 (emphasis
added).
Bello, however, took the highly deferential, objective
test set out in Arlington Heights and Pace -- whether the zoning
authority could have had a rational basis for its action -- and
turned it into a subjective test of good faith, i.e., whether
municipal officials' actions in connection with land use matters
were taken for "partisan political or personal reasons unrelated
to the merits of the application for the permits." 840 F.2d at
1129. This was a significant step, see 2 Ronald D. Rotunda and
John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law § 15.4 at 415 n.60
(1992 & 1996 Supp.), and the Bello court did not provide any
explanation for it.
The Supreme Court has stated: "As a general matter,
the Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of
substantive due process because guideposts for responsible
decisionmaking are scarce and open-ended. . . . The doctrine of
judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost care
whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field."
Collins, 503 U.S. at 125. However, Bello broke new ground,
52
without acknowledging that it was doing so, and I see nothing in
Bello or the cases that have followed it that convinces me that
every ill-motivated governmental action that restricts the use of
real estate constitutes a violation of substantive due process.
Most of the serious abuses that occur in this area, such as
instances of invidious discrimination, can be redressed by other
means, in either federal or state court or both. Under Bello and
its progeny, however, mundane land-use disputes that belong in
state court are transformed into substantive due process claims
cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, these precedents
may well be extended to other fields, such as public employment,
see e.g., Homar v. Gilbert, 89 F.3d at 1021; id. at 1026-28
(Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). I would
curtail this trend and would overrule Bello and the cases that
followed it. See Chesterfield Dev. Corp. v. City of
Chesterfield, 963 F.2d 1102, 1104-05 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding
that allegations that city arbitrarily applied zoning ordinance
were insufficient to state a substantive due process claim, and
stating in dicta that "[o]ur decision would be the same even if
the City had knowingly enforced the invalid zoning ordinance in
bad faith . . . . A bad-faith violation of state law remains only
a violation of state law."); PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez,
928 F.2d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 1991) ("Even assuming that ARPE engaged
in delaying tactics and refused to issue permits for the Vacia
Talega project based on considerations outside the scope of its
jurisdiction under Puerto Rico law, such practices, without more,
do not rise to the level of violations of the federal
53
constitution under a substantive due process label."), cert.
dismissed, 503 U.S. 257, reh'g denied, 504 U.S. 935 (1992);
Rivkin v. Dover Tp. Rent Leveling Bd., 143 N.J. 352, 371, 671
A.2d 567, 577 (holding that substantive due process was not
violated when rent leveling board member acted in biased manner,
and disagreeing with Bello because "we seriously doubt that the
Supreme Court will find a substantive due process violation to
exist when a governmental body denies a property right by conduct
that is 'arbitrary or irrational' under state law but neither
shocking to the conscience of a court in the sense of being a
departure from civilized norms of governance, nor offensive to
human dignity") (citation omitted), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 275
(1996).
Thus, while I would remand the plaintiffs' First
Amendment claim, both with respect to the defendants' pre- and
post-ordinance conduct, I would affirm the dismissal of the
plaintiffs' substantive due process claim.
54
Phillips, et al. v. Borough of Keyport, et al.
No. 95-5143
ROSENN, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
Although I agree with the majority's analysis of the
facts and much of the law, I differ with them with respect to
Part III (C), "The Necessity of Pre-Enactment Evidence." The
majority concludes that a municipality may constitutionally enact
an ordinance restricting the expression of speech without any
legislative record before it justifying such restrictions. I
believe that the Borough of Keyport's failure to articulate at
the time of enactment any governmental interest justifying its
ordinance No. 31-92, designed to curb protected speech
expression, is a fatal constitutional defect. The defect cannot
be cured by allowing the municipality to structure a post hoc
record more than four years later and then after judicial review
by a trial and appellate court.
I.
The majority and I agree that speech, whether in the
form of film, print, or live presentations, though sexually
explicit in content but not obscene, is protected under the First
Amendment. Maj. op. at 14-16. We further agree that when a
legislative body acts to regulate speech on the basis that its
action serves a substantial, content-neutral state interest, as
Keyport Borough did in this case, it must come forward with
evidence of adverse social effects that justify reasonable time,
55
place, and manner restrictions on speech or expressive conduct;
the municipality must support its position "with a reasoned and
substantial basis demonstrating the link between the regulation
and the asserted governmental interest." Maj. op. at 16, quoting
Mitchell v. Commission on Adult Entertainment, 107 F3d 123, 132
(3d Cir. 1993). It is undisputed that Keyport Borough failed
this indispensable requirement. It is also undisputed that the
district court sustained the constitutionality of the Keyport
ordinance which substantially burdened the exercise of protected
speech "without a record supporting the reasonableness of any
legislative expectations" that warranted its findings pertaining
to the likelihood of secondary effects and the ameliorative
effect of the ordinance.
[W]e do not yet know how the Borough will seek to
justify the ordinance. There is no
articulation by the state of what
it perceives its relevant interests
to be and how it thinks they will
be served. This is particularly
troublesome in a case like this,
where the legislative findings
speak in terms of "serious
objectionable operational
characteristics," "deleterious
effects," and "the deterioration of
the community" without identifying
in any way those [considerations].
Maj. op. at 18.
Where we part company, however, is that the majority,
in the face of a decision of the Supreme Court and decisions of a
substantial number of United States courts of appeals to the
contrary, holds today that a legislative body need have no record
before it at the time of enactment justifying an ordinance
56
regulating protected speech. Although I fully empathize with the
efforts of the Borough of Keyport to preserve a wholesome quality
of community life, I cannot lend my support to the majority's
potentially dangerous disregard of an established safeguard in
protection of cherished First Amendment rights, namely, a record
at the time of enactment justifying the restrictive regulation of
protected speech.
There is no question that local legislative bodies are
to be afforded great deference when it comes to zoning matters.
Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 616 F.2d 680, 698 (3d Cir. 1980).
The Supreme Court, however, has made clear that the latitude
generally afforded legislatures may be narrowed when First
Amendment concerns are at stake. See, e.g., Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1977).
Although sexually oriented materials are due less protection than
other forms of expression, Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427
U.S. 50, 70 (1975), their regulation by zoning nonetheless
triggers a heightened level of scrutiny. Courts have reconciled
respect for local land regulation concerns with the protection of
speech by requiring that municipalities impose restraints on
adult entertainment establishments only where there is evidence
that they have deleterious "secondary effects" upon the adjacent
areas. Id. at 71 n.4.
Although adult entertainment establishments may provide
a form of entertainment that is not without any First Amendment
protection from municipal authority, see Schad v. Mt. Ephraim,
452 U.S. 61, 65 (1980); American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 59,
57
the majority's position that the evidence may be developed at any
time after the zoning enactment until challenged in court runs
counter to the purpose of such an evidentiary requirement, the
view taken by the Supreme Court in City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), and by virtually every other
circuit in this country.
We are not free to ignore the purpose of the
requirement and the binding precedent. Thus, I find the majority
view on this issue unacceptable. The majority makes several
sweeping statements to the effect that this court has "never"
required more of a municipality than it make the required showing
once a challenge to legislation is raised. It ignores the
significance of the timing for the evidentiary record to justify
the restrictive impositions of speech; if speech is to be so
restricted, the justification should be stated at the time of
enactment so that appropriate judicial scrutiny might be made.
The majority offers no support whatsoever for its statements, and
I do not believe such support exists in our precedents with
respect to the regulation of protected speech.
Renton stands only for the proposition that a
municipality need not conduct its own pre-enactment studies
(i.e., that it may rely on studies conducted by other
communities). The unavoidable inference from Renton is that the
municipality must rely upon something at the time of enactment
justifying its action limiting freedom of speech. The various
courts of appeals, including our own in Mitchell, supra, have
emphasized the Supreme Court's statement that
58
[t]he First Amendment does not require a city, before
enacting such an ordinance, to conduct new
studies or produce evidence independent of
that already generated by other cities, so
long as whatever evidence the city relies
upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to
the problem that the city addresses.
Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52 (emphasis added). Accordingly, not a
single court of appeals has interpreted Renton as requiring
absolutely no pre-enactment evidence.10 The position adopted by
the majority leaves the Third Circuit an outlier among the United
States courts of appeals.
The majority asserts that because Renton and Mitchell
sustained the constitutionality of the ordinances before them,
they cannot stand for the proposition that a legislative record
is a constitutional prerequisite to validity. I strongly
disagree. Both the Renton Court and the Mitchell court leave no
doubt that pre-enactment evidence is indeed a constitutional
requirement; the courts sustained the ordinance in question
because they were satisfied that the enacting body had sufficient
evidence before it. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52; Mitchell, 10
F.3d at 134-35.
The majority also maintains that in Mitchell, this
court expressly reserved the issue of whether pre-enactment
evidence is necessary. Again, I disagree. Mitchell plainly
10.The Supreme Court itself, in a case decided four years after
Renton, seems to assume that at least some pre-enactment evidence
is required in this type of case. "We agree with the Court of
Appeals that the reasonableness of the legislative judgment,
combined with the Los Angeles study, is adequate to support the
city's determination . . .." FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S.
215, 236 (1990) (emphasis added).
59
requires such evidence. The skillful use of ellipses ought not
to allow us to circumvent binding precedent. The majority
asserts that Mitchell says that it was "unnecessary . . . to
reach or decide . . . whether a statute passed without any pre-
enactment evidence of need or purpose" can be valid. The full
quotation, sans ellipsis, makes quite a different point. It
reads: "Here, it is unnecessary for us to reach or decide
whether the doctrine of legislative notice of the incidental
activities common to adult book stores can save a statute passed
without any evidence of pre-enactment evidence of need and
purpose." Mitchell, 10 F.3d at 136 (emphasis added).
We are thus bound by both Supreme Court precedent and
the precedent of our own circuit to require at least some
evidence at the time of adoption before we sustain a restrictive
ordinance of the type currently before us. The majority is of
the view that the legislative body need have no factual basis
before it at the time of the enactment of the ordinance, and that
such a requirement is only necessary when the legislative
judgment is challenged in court. Maj. op. at 30. If we look to
cases decided in our sister circuits, we also see that no other
circuit in this country has espoused the extreme, and I believe
incorrect, position taken by the majority. Cases similar to the
one at bar have been decided in the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits.11 Every one of
11.National Amusements, Inc. v. Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 742 (1st
Cir.) (stating that a legislative body may rely on whatever pre-
enactment evidence it considers to be relevant), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 2247 (1995); 11126 Baltimore Blvd. v. Prince George's
County, 886 F.2d 1415, 1421-23 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding pre-
60
these circuits has interpreted Renton to require pre-enactment
evidence, and every one of these circuits has insisted upon such
evidence before affirming the constitutionality of a restrictive
zoning ordinance.
The majority argues that most of the cases I cite from
other circuits sustained the ordinance and "therefore cannot
stand for the principle that the lack of a legislative record is
a fatal constitutional defect." Maj. op. at 32, n. 6. Those
ordinances that were sustained, however, did have legislative
records at the time of their enactment. Those held
constitutionally defective, Tollis, Inc. v. San Bernardino
County, 827 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1987), or constitutionally
(..continued)
enactment evidence of secondary effect "sufficient under Renton
to withstand a constitutional challenge"), vacated on other
grounds, 496 U.S. 901 (1990); SDJ, Inc. v. Houston, 837 F.2d
1268, 1274 (5th Cir. 1988) ("We are persuaded that the City met
its burden under City of Renton to establish that there was
evidence before it from which the Council was entitled to reach
its conclusion . . .."), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052 (1989);
Christy v. Ann Arbor, 824 F.2d 489, 493 (6th Cir. 1987)
("Although both the Supreme Court in Renton and the Sixth Circuit
. . . have stated that a city need not conduct new independent
studies to justify adult business zoning ordinances, both courts
have required some relevant evidence to demonstrate that the
zoning ordinance was intended to address the secondary effects of
adult businesses"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1059 (1988); Berg v.
Health & Hosp. Corp., 865 F.2d 797, 803-04 (7th Cir. 1989)
(detailing the pre-enactment evidence and testimony upon which
governmental body relied); Postscript Enter. v. Bridgeton, 905
F.2d 223, 227 (8th Cir. 1990) (upholding an ordinance after
determining that the city council's pre-enactment findings were
adequate); Tollis Inc. v. San Bernardino County, 827 F.2d 1329,
1333 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The County must show that in enacting the
particular limitations . . . it relied upon evidence permitting
the reasonable inference that, absent such limitations, the adult
theaters would have harmful secondary effects"); International
Eateries of America, Inc. v. Broward County, 941 F.2d 1157, 1163
(11th Cir. 1991) (noting that Broward County had relied on the
experiences of Detroit in enacting its ordinance), cert. denied,
503 U.S. 920 (1992).
61
suspect, Christy v. Ann Arbor, 824 F.2d 489 (6th Cir. 1987).
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1059 (1988), did not have legislative
records.
The majority also looks for support to the decision by
this court in Contractors Ass'n v. City of Phila., 6 F.3d 990 (3d
Cir. 1993). Aside from the fact that Contractors is inapposite
in that it was an affirmative action case, principally sought
injunctive relief, and did not involve free speech, it does not
stand for the proposition that pre-enactment evidence is
unnecessary. We simply stated in Contractors that the pre-
enactment evidence considered by the Philadelphia City Council
could be supplemented by post-enactment evidence at the time the
case went to trial. Id. at 1003-04. Moreover, we were uncertain
whether the supplemental evidence did not in fact constitute pre-
enactment evidence because it was a study involving minimal risk
of "insincerity associated with post-enactment evidence" for it
consisted "essentially of an evaluation and re-ordering of pre-
enactment evidence. . . ." Finally, the court was strongly
influenced in permitting the admission of the post-enactment
study because "the principal relief sought, and the only relief
granted by the district court, was an injunction." Id. at 1004.
At this juncture, the effects of adult entertainment
establishments are so open and notorious that requiring
legislative bodies to consult studies or other evidence
confirming their deleterious impact may seem unnecessarily
burdensome -- just another hoop to jump through in the process of
lawmaking. However, this requirement is not without purpose. It
62
limits the risk that legislatures will impose restrictions on
speech activities on the basis of supposed secondary effects that
on closer scrutiny lack any evidentiary support, and it lends
support to the representation that the content-neutral interest
articulated by the lawmaking body was not merely pretextual and
illicitly designed to suppress speech expression, even that
constitutionally protected.12 I am as sympathetic as the
majority to Keyport's well-intentioned purpose of preserving its
community life, but the First Amendment cases show that "in those
instances where protected speech grates most unpleasantly against
the sensibilities that judicial vigilance must be at its height."
Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 87 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). Because the Borough of Keyport had no evidence of
deleterious secondary effects before it when it enacted its
restrictive zoning ordinance, our jurisprudence requires that we
strike down the ordinance as unconstitutional.
II.
Accordingly, I believe that we must reverse the
district court's grant of the defendants' motion to dismiss on
12.The majority suggests that this modest procedural hurdle will
be of little practical effect against a "municipal body bent on
regulating or curbing speech." Maj. op. at 31. I agree that a
legislature determined to restrict forms of speech to which it is
hostile may be able to conceal its impermissible motive behind a
quickly assembled evidentiary fig leaf. At the same time, I
would reasonably expect that the pre-enactment justification
requirement might act as a shield for the First Amendment not
merely from those with ill intent, who may be able to circumvent
any procedural requirements imposed, but also from
constitutionally-minded legislators driven by haste or
misconception.
63
the due process claims and reverse the district court's denial of
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the First Amendment
challenge to the "adult entertainment uses" ordinance No. 31-92.
For the reasons stated above, I would hold that the ordinance
does violate the First Amendment, strike it down, and remand the
case to the district court to consider plaintiffs' request for
damages. Finally, I would vacate the denial of attorney's fees
and also remand this issue to the district court for further
proceedings.
64