Brilla v. Pettit

Opinions of the United
2003 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
1-31-2003
Brilla v. Pettit
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket 02-2076
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Recommended Citation
"Brilla v. Pettit" (2003). 2003 Decisions. Paper 831.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 02-2076
FREDERICK A. BRILLA
v.
JOHN PETTIT;
MICHAEL FAGELLA;
JOHN DOE, and;
JANE DOE, employees of the
District Attorneys Office of
Washington County,
Pennsylvania, and/or members
of the Washington County Drug
Task Force
John Pettit,
Appellant.
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 98-1021)
District Judge: The Honorable Robert J. Cindrich
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 16, 2003
Before: ROTH, FUENTES and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.
(Filed January 30, 2003)
OPINION OF THE COURT
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.
John Pettit, District Attorney of Washington County, Pennsylvania, appeals a
judgment entered on a jury verdict after a remittitur of punitive damages. He argues that the
court erred in denying his motion for judgment as a matter of law on Frederick A. Brilla’s
claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Appellant contends that the court erred: (1) in determining that there was sufficient
evidence for the jury to conclude that the district attorney deprived the plaintiff of his
constitutional rights by failing to return property to him within a reasonable time; (2) in
denying his motion for judgment as a matter of law with respect to punitive damage claims;
(3) in abusing its discretion by failing to award a new trial on the issues of liability and
punitive damages because the verdict was against the weight of the evidence; and (4) by
failing to remit further the punitive damages award. The jury returned a verdict of $1 in
compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages. In granting a remittitur, the
court reduced the punitive damages to $50,000.
Because the parties are familiar with the facts and the proceedings in the district
court, we will discuss only the questions of law and will affirm.
We are satisfied that there was sufficient evidence upon which to sustain a judgment.
Upon Brilla’s arrest, his property was seized and stored by the Pennsylvania State Police.
While the property was stored, the Appellant personally paid storage fees for almost seven
years, totaling $8,000. At the same time, Brilla had brought an action to retrieve his
property, and the Washington County Court of Common Pleas granted the relief sought.
The evidence is that the District Attorney’s office received copies of all orders issued by
the Clerk of Court. Nevertheless, Appellant, as the district attorney, refused to return the
property including lawn furniture, tractors, a motorcycle and other items. Pettit concedes
that the forfeiture action was resolved in Brilla’s favor.
In addition to paying storage costs, Pettit personally directed the property’s transfer
from the state police storage facility to the county jail and his own Drug Task Force office.
The jury could certainly infer from Pettit’s involvement – as an attorney, no less – that he
should have known that a forfeiture proceeding could never take 11 years to come to
fruition, and that at some point he should have questioned whether he was properly
continuing to be the “stakeholder” of Brilla’s property. His indifference to the issue of
whether he was justified in keeping such property gave rise to the award of punitive
damages.
We are satisfied that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict in favor of
Brilla and was not against the weight of the evidence as to require a new trial.
Pettit argues that although the district court reduced the punitive damages from
$100,000 to $50,000, it erred by not reducing it to a lower amount. In BMW of North
America, Inc v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), the Supreme Court established three
guideposts to assist courts in determining the reasonableness of a punitive damages award:
(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the tortuous conduct; (2) the ratio of punitive damages
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to compensatory damages; and (3) the difference between this remedy and the civil
penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. 517 U.S. at 574-575. In Lee v.
Edwards, 101 F.3d 805 (2nd Cir. 1996), our sister court concluded that these factors
should assist the court in the application of the “shock the judicial conduct” standard. 101
F.3d at 809.
The District Court stated:
Pettit’s conduct, although found reprehensible by the jury, was not as blameworthy
as wrongs we have seen in other civil rights cases. Moreover, the punitive damages
awarded in other civil rights cases involving much more egregious conduct indicates
that Brilla’s award is excessive. That being said, the calculation of a suitable
reduction is not an easy task. As the courts have recognized, the determination of a
remittitur is not amenable to precise calculation. Based on our review of other civil
rights cases, however, we believe that a remittitur of $50,000, for a total punitive
damage award of $50,000, is appropriate. A substantial punitive damages award is
warranted in this case in light of the important constitutional property right that was
violated. We find, however, that $50,000 is the maximum punitive damage recovery
that does not shock the judicial conscience.
App. at 16A. The court’s decision on remittitur will not be disturbed absent a manifest
abuse of discretion. Spence v. Bd. of Educ., 806 F.2d 1198, 1201 (3d Cir. 1986). We
conclude that the district court did not exceed the bounds of a proper exercise of
discretion.
* * * * *
We have considered all contentions of the parties and conclude that no further
discussion is necessary.
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.
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/s/ Ruggero J. Aldisert
Circuit Judge
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