Dwight Mitchell v. Joseph Fuentes

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 18-1089
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DWIGHT D. MITCHELL,
Appellant
v.
COLONEL JOSEPH R. FUENTES, Superintendent of the New Jersey State Police;
VINICIUS VINCENTE; DAMEON CRAWFORD
______________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
(D.C. Civ. Action No. 3:12-cv-03394)
District Judge: Hon. Freda L. Wolfson
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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
on November 13, 2018
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Before: GREENAWAY, JR., SHWARTZ, and BIBAS, Circuit Judge
(Opinion Filed: January 25, 2019)
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OPINION*
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*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.
This is a case arising from Dwight D. Mitchell’s federal civil rights action against
New Jersey State Troopers Vinicius Vincente and Dameon Crawford,1 and the untimely
death of Mitchell’s attorney, William H. Buckman, Esq. Mitchell appeals from the
District Court’s denial of his untimely motion to reopen the case pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) (“Rule 60(b)(6)”). For the reasons discussed below, we will
affirm the District Court.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The underlying events of this case occurred over eight years ago on June 6, 2010,
at approximately 12:48 a.m., when Officers Vincente and Crawford stopped Mitchell’s
vehicle on Route 287 in Edison Township. The events preceding the stop are disputed.
According to Mitchell, Officers Vincente and Crawford were motivated by biases (racial
and otherwise2) and fabricated the claim that Mitchell was speeding and driving
recklessly. According to Vincente’s testimony, he and Crawford were travelling at
approximately 70 miles per hour (“mph”) when Mitchell’s vehicle moved into the left
lane and “took off,” reaching a speed of 130 mph. Mitchell, 2012 WL 603221 at *1.
1
For consistency, we are using the spelling of the parties’ names that appears in the case
caption.
2
According to the New Jersey Superior Court opinion, Mitchell claimed that the stop was
related to “driving while black.” State v. Mitchell, No. A-3524-10T3, 2012 WL 603221,
at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 27, 2012). However, in his Second Amended
Complaint, Mitchell argues that the officers were biased against him because he was
“driving an expensive sports car with a beautiful woman.” App. 133. Mitchell does not
dispute driving above the 65 mph speed limit, but claims he sped up to avoid colliding
with the officers’ vehicle.
2
Following the stop, Officers Vincente and Crawford issued Mitchell citations for
speeding at 130 mph in a 65 mph zone and for reckless driving. Mitchell was convicted
of both charges in Municipal Court, but appealed to the Superior Court of New Jersey
and then to the New Jersey Appellate Division, which ultimately upheld his speeding
conviction (albeit for speeding at 90 mph in a 65 mph zone) and reversed his reckless
driving conviction.
On June 5, 2012, Mitchell filed a Complaint in the District of New Jersey alleging,
inter alia, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violation claims against Officers Vincente
and Crawford; a failure to supervise claim against then-Superintendent of the New Jersey
State Police, Colonel Joseph R. Fuentes; and a claim for violation of the New Jersey Civil
Rights Act (“NJCRA”). Vincente, Crawford, and Fuentes moved to dismiss the
Complaint, arguing that Mitchell’s claims were either barred by collateral estoppel or
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Mitchell cross-moved for leave
to file a First Amended Complaint. The District Court granted Mitchell leave to amend
his Fourteenth Amendment and NJCRA claims, and dismissed his Fourth Amendment
claims on the grounds of collateral estoppel. On July 11, 2013, Mitchell, represented by
Buckman, filed his First Amended Complaint, and Vincente and Crawford3 again moved
to dismiss. On March 18, 2014, the District Court granted the motion to dismiss and
terminated the case. On October 14, 2014, Buckman died. Mitchell learned of
Buckman’s death almost a week later, on or about October 20, 2014.
3
Colonel Fuentes was no longer named a defendant in the First Amended Complaint.
3
Prior to Buckman’s passing, Mitchell contends that he and Buckman
communicated about the status of his case multiple times, including in February 2014 and
in late August 2014, and each time Buckman “assured [him] that his . . . case was
proceeding well.” Appellant’s Br. at 4. Mitchell further contends that Buckman failed to
alert him to the District Court’s order dismissing the case, and failed to appeal or advise
Mitchell on how to appeal the District Court’s order. Once Mitchell learned that his case
had been dismissed and that Buckman’s updates on his case had been incomplete or
inaccurate, he “contacted approximately 10 other civil rights lawyers[,]” all of whom
advised him that he had no legal recourse. Id. at 6-7. On May 31, 2017—over three
years after his case was terminated—Mitchell, proceeding pro se, filed a motion to
reopen his case pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6). The District Court denied the motion and
Mitchell appealed.
II. DISCUSSION4
We review a District Court’s denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion.
Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Brown v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 350
F.3d 338, 342 (3d Cir. 2003)). “A district court abuses its discretion when it bases its
decision upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an erroneous conclusion of law, or an
improper application of law to fact.” Id., 757 F.3d at 118 (citing Morris v. Horn, 187
F.3d 333, 341 (3d Cir. 1999)).
4
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
4
Under Rule 60(b), a “court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding” under an enumerated set of circumstances. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b). The final enumerated provision, Rule 60(b)(6), serves as a “catch-all,” and
“allows a court to relieve a party from a judgment for ‘any other reason that justifies
relief’ aside from the more specific circumstances described in Rules 60(b)(1)-(5).”
Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(6)). “A motion under Rule (60)(b) must be made within a reasonable time,” which
is generally “no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of
the proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c). While the one-year limit does not explicitly
apply to Rule 60(b)(6) motions, a movant under Rule 60(b)(6) must show “‘extraordinary
circumstances’ justifying the reopening of a final judgment.” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545
U.S. 524, 535 (2005) (citations omitted). Indeed, a movant under Rule 60(b)(6) must
show, absent relief, “an ‘extreme’ and ‘unexpected’ hardship will result.” Budget Blinds,
536 F.3d at 255 (quoting Mayberry v. Maroney, 558 F.2d 1159, 1163 (3d Cir. 1977)).
Mitchell does not meet this requirement and we will therefore affirm the District Court’s
denial of his Rule 60(b)(6) motion.
Mitchell argues that his lack of legal education, his inability to access
computerized legal research programs, and Buckman’s failure to communicate the
termination of the case and abandonment of the appeal, amount to “extraordinary
circumstances” warranting Rule 60(b)(6) relief. Appellant’s Br. at 19-20. While it is
unfortunate that, following Buckman’s death, Mitchell was left to file his Rule 60(b)(6)
motion pro se, the circumstances that prevented Mitchell from seeking timely relief from
5
the lower court’s judgment do not outweigh the interests in preserving the finality of a
judgment that is over three years old. See Budget Blinds, 536 F.3d at 255. Rule 60(b)
motions must be brought within a reasonable time. Here, Mitchell knew of his counsel’s
passing within a week of it occurring yet waited two years before informing the Court
that he sought relief. The lack of interest by any attorney to take on his case did not stop
him from notifying the Court that he wished to pursue his case. Thus, Mitchell’s failure
to seek timely relief was unreasonable. Furthermore, the contested events that led to
Mitchell’s ultimate speeding conviction occurred over eight years ago, and he does not
contest driving above the 65 mph speed limit on Route 287 all those years ago.
Mitchell’s civil rights claims were adjudicated on the merits, and although he remains
dissatisfied with Buckman’s failure to file a Second Amended Complaint or to appeal
upon the termination of the case, Mitchell has not demonstrated that, absent relief under
Rule 60(b)(6), he will suffer extreme or unexpected hardship. Buckman’s representation
of Mitchell, however lacking, did not rise to the level of egregiousness that warrants Rule
60(b)(6) relief. Cf. Boughner v. Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 572 F.2d 976, 977-79
(3d Cir. 1978) (holding that attorney’s failure to oppose motion for summary judgment
constituted an extraordinary circumstance warranting relief under Rule 60(b)(6) where
attorney failed to file responsive pleadings in fifty-two other cases). The District Court
therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.5
5
Appellees also raise a futility argument, stating that “[e]ven if this Court were to find
that Mitchell showed exceptional circumstances sufficient to grant his motion to vacate,
denial would still be proper because it would have been futile to allow the filing of
Mitchell’s Second Amended Complaint.” Appellees’ Br. at 10-11. In light of our finding
6
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Mitchell’s
Rule 60(b)(6) motion.
that Mitchell has not demonstrated extraordinary circumstances warranting Rule 60(b)(6)
relief, we need not address this argument.
7