Ringwood Board of Education v. K.H.J. Ex Rel. K.F.J.

Opinions of the United
2007 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
12-12-2007
Ringwood Bd Ed v. J.
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 05-5222
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 05-5222
RINGWOOD BOARD OF EDUCATION
v.
K.H.J. on behalf of K.F.J.,
Appellant
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
(D.C. Civil No. 03-cv-04636)
District Judge: The Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 30, 2007
Before: BARRY, FUENTES, Circuit Judges, and DIAMOND,* District Judge
(Opinion Filed: December 12, 2007)
OPINION
BARRY, Circuit Judge
Appellant K.H.J. appeals the District Court’s reversal of a state administrative law
*
The Honorable Paul S. Diamond, United States District Judge for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
judge’s (the “ALJ”) decision holding that the Ringwood Board of Education (the
“Board”) did not provide her son, K.J., with a “free appropriate public education” under
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. We
find that the District Court did not accord the ALJ’s factual findings the proper level of
deference and will reverse.
I.
Inasmuch as we write primarily for the parties, we reprise only those facts that are
helpful in our discussion of the case.
K.J. is a young boy who suffers from a learning disability primarily affecting his
ability to read and write. K.J. has also been treated for bipolar disorder, attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder, and adjustment disorder. Just prior to the start of the 2001-2002
school year, K.H.J. enrolled her then six-year old son in the first grade at Peter Cooper
Elementary School in Ringwood, New Jersey after the Board’s Child Study Team
determined that his attention deficit hyperactivity disorder entitled him to special
education and related services under the IDEA. The Child Study Team developed an
individualized education program (“IEP”) for K.J. and he attended Peter Cooper for the
2001-2002 school year. Following that school year, K.H.J., apparently upset with what
she perceived to be a lack of academic progress on K.J.’s part, especially in the areas of
reading and written expression, requested that the Board pay for K.J. to be placed in an
out-of-district school that specializes in educating children with language based learning
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disabilities. The Child Study Team rejected the request, concluding that “Peter Cooper,
with its enriched core curriculum content and intensive remedial program . . . is the most
appropriate and least restrictive environment for [K.J.]” (App. at A104.) K.H.J. then
filed a pro se request for mediation and a due process hearing.
The parties presented their cases to the ALJ in a hearing that spanned seven days
and included live testimony from eight witnesses. On August 18, 2003, the ALJ ruled
that the Board had not provided K.J. with a free appropriate public education as required
by the IDEA and ordered the Board to pay for K.J. to attend the Banyan School, a small
private school located in Fairfield, New Jersey that teaches learning disabled students
using the Orton-Gillingham approach to reading instruction. The ALJ made thirty-two
findings of fact in its fifty-one page opinion, including:
16. During the 2001-2002 school year K.J. experienced negligible
progress in his reading. He would have been considered a non-
reader and writer by June 2002.
17. [In an IQ test administered in May 2002, K.J.] received a Full Scale
IQ of 114 . . . . This represented a significant increase in his IQ from
the test one year before and places K.J. in the above average IQ
category. This increase appears to be the result of a number of
factors, most prominently, the stability in his home life, therapy and
changes in medication, which allowed him to be more focused and to
concentrate better. Based on K.J.’s most current IQ testing, he
should have the potential of performing at least in the average grade
level in reading.
....
27. The failure to bring K.J. up to grade level affects K.J.’s ability to
perform in all subjects. . . .
28. The failure of K.J. to learn how to read and to progress to his proper
grade level has effected [sic] him psychologically and provided an
additional stressor to his already fragile psychological make up.
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29. K.J. is presently one to two years behind his grade level in reading
and writing. He has not met all of the N.J. CORE Curriculum
standards for kindergarten. In order for K.J. to come up to grade
level, he requires intensive teaching using the Orton-Gillingham and
similar multisensory techniques throughout the day. Peter Cooper
School is not providing this program to K.J. and their proposed IEP
does not envision such a program.
(App. at A1738-41) (emphases added.) The ALJ also stated that “it could be concluded
that K.J. not only did not progress, but that he regressed, since the goals [established in
his 2001-2002 school year IEP] were lowered [in his 2002-2003 school year IEP].” (Id.
at A1745.)
The Board challenged the ALJ’s ruling by filing suit in the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey. Relying solely on the administrative record, the
District Court reversed the ALJ’s decision and granted summary judgment in favor of the
Board. After summarizing the facts of the case and this Court’s IDEA case law, the
District Court explained its reasons for reversing the ALJ in a single paragraph:
I disagree with the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff failed to
provide K.J. with an appropriate education because the evidence shows
Ringwood conferred a meaningful educational benefit on K.J. The ALJ
found K.J.’s education at Ringwood to be inappropriate largely because he
could not read on his grade level. While K.J. may not have been reading at
grade level at the time [of] the ALJ hearing, he had made substantial
progress with his reading and writing. Although K.J. has an IQ score that
indicates he has the potential to perform at grade level, he is also diagnosed
as being bipolar, having ADHD, and as having weaknesses in reading and
language arts. As discussed above, a school district is not required to
maximize the potential of a disabled student. Instead, a district is only
required to provide a “meaningful educational benefit” that is more “than
trivial.” K.J. showed improvement throughout his time in the Ringwood
School District in many areas including reading and writing. K.J. entered
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the first grade with an IQ of 94, behavioral problems, attention difficulties,
and reading and writing problems. He showed improvement in all of these
areas by the end of the year. It may be true that his academic potential
could be maximized in an out of district placement. However, so long as
Plaintiff provides K.J. with a meaningful educational benefit, Plaintiff has
met its burden. Plaintiff has done so here. Therefore, this Court disagrees
with the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff failed to provide K.J. with an
adequate education.
(Id. at A12-13) (citations omitted) (emphases added.) The District Court’s analysis cited
to a single piece of documentary evidence to support its finding that K.J. “had made
substantial progress with his reading” – the IEP prepared for K.J. by the Board’s Child
Study Team for the 2002-2003 school year.1 The District Court did not cite to any
evidence, documentary or otherwise, to support its finding that the Board was responsible
for K.J.’s increased IQ score.
II.
When reviewing administrative decisions concerning a school district’s
compliance with the IDEA, this Court has declared that
the District Court must . . . afford “due weight” to the ALJ’s determination.
Under this standard, factual findings from the administrative proceedings
are to be considered prima facie correct, and if a reviewing court fails to
adhere to them, it is obliged to explain why. In addition, if a state
administrative agency has heard live testimony and has found the testimony
1
The District Court’s opinion actually references a diagnostic report and
recommendation from the Hackensack University Medical Center’s Institute for Child
Development dated June 6, 2002, but this document does not mention any progress made
by K.J. However, based on the District Court’s discussion of the 2002-2003 IEP earlier
in its opinion (App. at A7-8), the Court agrees with the parties that the District Court
likely meant to cite to this document instead of the Hackensack report.
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of one witness to be more worthy of belief than the contradictory testimony
of another witness, that determination is due special weight. Specifically,
this means that a District Court must accept the state agency’s credibility
determinations unless the non-testimonial, extrinsic evidence in the record
would justify a contrary conclusion. In this context, the word “justify”
demands essentially the same standard of review given to a trial court’s
findings of fact by a federal appellate court.
Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 199 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations
and quotations omitted).
In this case, the ALJ concluded, after hearing conflicting testimony on the issue,
that K.J. “experienced negligible progress in his reading” during the 2001-2002 school
year (A1738) (emphasis added) and that at the end of the 2002-2003 school year, K.J. was
still “one to two years behind his grade level in reading and writing.” (A1741.) The ALJ
also heard conflicting testimony on the reason for the significant increase in K.J.’s IQ
score between 2001 and 2002, and ultimately agreed with Dr. Brand that the Board did
not deserve a substantial amount of credit for that increase. The District Court rejected
both of these important factual findings without citing to any evidence in the record that
justified reaching a contrary conclusion.
While, of course, “we may still uphold [the District Court’s] decision if correct
under the appropriate standard of review,” S.H. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist., 336 F.3d
260, 271 (3d Cir. 2003), our review of the record has revealed little if any evidence
justifying the District Court’s decision to reject the ALJ’s factual findings. While the IEP
prepared for K.J. for the 2002-2003 school year does indicate that he had made significant
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progress during the 2001-2002 school year, reliance on this document is problematic
because it was prepared by the Board and is the root of the present litigation.
We are well aware that the IDEA does not require school districts to “maximize”
the potential of their disabled students. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 198 (1982).
However, the IDEA “‘calls for more than a trivial educational benefit’ and requires a
satisfactory IEP to provide ‘significant learning,’ and confer ‘meaningful benefit.’”
Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238, 247 (3d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted)
(quoting Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 182, 184 (3d
Cir. 1986)).
It is undisputed that K.J. is a child with “above average” intelligence. In
consideration of this fact and based on the testimony elicited at the administrative
hearing, the ALJ made a factual finding that K.J. had the “potential of performing at least
in the average grade level in reading.” (App. at A1738) (emphasis added.) Contrary to
the Board’s assertion, expecting a child with “above average” intelligence to perform in
the “average” range hardly qualifies as “maximizing” that child’s potential. We have
previously stated that “[w]hen students display considerable intellectual potential, IDEA
requires ‘a great deal more than a negligible benefit.’” Id. (quoting Polk, 853 F.2d at 182).
Because K.J. had only made “negligible progress” during the 2001-2002 school year and
was still one to two years behind grade level after the 2002-2003 school year, we find that
the ALJ properly concluded that the Board failed to provide K.J. with an appropriate
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education under the IDEA. We also find that the Board’s inability to provide K.J. with an
appropriate education within its district2 required them to pay for K.J. to attend an out-of-
district school that was capable of providing him with an appropriate education.
Ridgewood, 172 F.3d at 249 (stating that the “IDEA requires that disabled students be
educated in the least restrictive appropriate environment”).
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the Board and will remand with instructions to enter judgment in
favor of K.H.J. on the issue of liability and for a determination of the amount of fees and
costs owed to her by the Board.
2
The ALJ specifically found that, “other than Ms. Tanzola, the . . . teachers at Peter
Cooper [were] not prepared to implement the Orton method of teaching for K.J.” (Id. at
A1741.) The ALJ ultimately concluded that “[w]hile it would be better if K.J. could
receive a Free and Appropriate Education in District, the school has failed to provide
FAPE and there is no indication that they will adjust their program to provide same.”
(App. at A1747.)
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