Noone v. City of Ocean City

Opinions of the United
2003 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
3-17-2003
Noone v. Ocean City
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket 01-4072
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 01-4072
JAMES F. NOONE,
Appellant
v.
THE CITY OF OCEAN CITY;
OCEAN CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT;
DEAN SPENCER, SERGEANT;
JOHN DOE, LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 1-100,
jointly, severally and in the alternative;
SCOTT ADAMS, SERGEANT; JOHN WERLEY, LIEUTENANT;
RYAN WOKOCK, OFFICER; DAVE ROLAND, OFFICER;
LaROCCA; RICK COSTIGAN, OFFICER; ROBERT COOB;
TOM FINNEGAN, OFFICER; CHAD CALLAGHAN, OFFICER;
DENNIS JONES, OFFICER; JOHN CAMPO, OFFICER;
DAVE HALL, OFFICER; BRIAN TROSTLE, PATROLMAN;
JOHN DOE, LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 1-86,
jointly, severally and in the alternative
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
D.C. Civil Action No. 99-cv-01380
(Honorable Joel A. Pisano)
Argued September 20, 2002
Before: SCIRICA, ALITO and McKEE, Circuit Judges
(Filed: March 14, 2003 )
ARTHUR J. MURRAY, ESQUIRE (ARGUED)
Jacobs & Barbone
1125 Pacific Avenue
Atlantic City, New Jersey 08401
Attorney for Appellant
THOMAS B. REYNOLDS, ESQUIRE (ARGUED)
Reynolds & Drake
29 North Shore Road
P.O. Box 345
Absecon, New Jersey 08201
Attorney for Appellees,
City of Ocean City, Ocean City Police Department,
Sergeant Dean Spencer, Patrolman Brian Trostle,
Patrolman Bruce Warren
DAVID S. DeWEESE, ESQUIRE (ARGUED)
Stagliano & DeWeese
3200 Pacific Avenue
Wildwood, New Jersey 08260
Attorney for Appellees,
Sergeant Scott Adams, Lieutenant John Werley,
Officer Ryan Wokock, Officer Dave Roland,
Officer LaRocca, Officer Rick Costigan,
Officer Robert Coob, Officer Tom Finnegan,
Officer Chad Callaghan, Officer Dennis Jones,
Officer John Campo, Officer Dave Hall
OPINION OF THE COURT
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.
2
In this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff appeals the grant of summary judgment
in favor of defendant.
I.
This case involves two separate incidents that took place in Ocean City, New Jersey, at
the 2004 Glenwood Drive residence of plaintiff Dr. James F. Noone Jr. ("Noone"). On the
night of May 10, 1997, Noone’s son, James F. Noone, III (Noone III"), held a party at his
father's residence. Sergeant Dean Spencer of the Ocean City Police Department showed up
to investigate a stolen vehicle and a drunken driving incident. Spencer attempted to question
Noone III, who allegedly refused to provide information, including his name, date of birth, and
address. As a result, Spencer issued a summons charging Noone III with obstruction of justice,
a disorderly persons offense. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:29. The summons named “James Noone”
but did not include a date of birth or social security number.
Noone III did not respond to the summons. A municipal court issued a warrant for
“James Noone” on July 9, 1997, and forwarded it to the Police Department, where it was
entered into a computer system. The computer identified plaintiff Noone, the father.
Consequently, the warrant issued for Noone rather than Noone III. Patrol Officers Bruce
Warren and Brian Trostle served the warrant on July 19, 1997. Noone explained that he was
not in Ocean City on May 10, 1997, that he never received a copy of the summons and
complaint, and that the warrant was a mistake.1 Furthermore, because he was expecting 150
1
Although Noone asserted that Warren and Trostle had the wrong person, there was no
(continued...)
3
guests in the next half hour, he requested that the matter be resolved at a later date. Warren and
Trostle refused Noone's request and arrested him under the warrant. Noone was detained in
the Police Department for one hour before posting bail in the amount of $175.00. T h e
following year, on the night of July 25, 1998, Noone held his annual “Night in Venice” party
where officers of the Community Policing Unit witnessed underage drinking and reported
noise ordinance violations. In response, Defendants Robert Scott Adams, Johnathan Wereley,
Ryan Wokock, David Rowland,2 Daniel LaRocca, Rick Costigan, Robert Koob,3 Tom Finnegan,
and Dennis Jones (collectively, “Individual Defendants”) reported to Noone’s residence.
Based on their own observations, Individual Defendants entered Noone's property, including
his patio and house, where they remained for 15-30 minutes. The officers had neither a
warrant nor Noone's permission to gain entry.
Despite seeing what they believed to be underage drinking, Individual Defendants issued
no summons or citations while on Noone's property. But later on during the course of the
evening, ten to fifteen people associated with Noone's party were arrested for underage
drinking. Noone was neither arrested nor issued a summons or citation.
On March 26, 1999, Noone filed a complaint against Ocean City and the Police
Department (“Municipal Defendants”) and against Sergeant Spencer and 100 “John Doe” police
1
(...continued)
reference to Noone's son during Noone's discussion with Warren and Trostle.
2
The caption spells Officer Rowland’s name as “Roland.” His interrogatory answers use
the “Rowland” spelling.
3
The caption spells Officer Koob’s name as “Coob.”
4
officers. Soon after, Noone filed an amended complaint, adding the remaining defendants.4
He alleged, inter alia, that he was entitled to relief for violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Ocean City, the Police Department, Spencer, Trostle, and
Warren filed a joint motion for summary judgment. The remaining defendants filed separate
joint motions for summary judgment. The District Court Judge granted summary judgment to
all defendants. This appeal followed.5
II.
Our review of the entry of summary judgment is plenary. See, e.g., Beers-Capitol v.
Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 130 n.6 (3d Cir. 2001). We apply the same test the District Court
should have used initially. Omnipoint Communications Enter., L.P. v. Newton Township, 219
F.3d 240, 242 (3d Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c).
4
Three officers of the Police Department, Dave Hall, John Campo, and Chad Callaghan,
were also added as defendants in the Amended Complaint, but subsequently dismissed with
Noone's consent. Noone does not challenge this determination on appeal.
5
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1334, with
supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1291.
5
III. 1997 Incident
Under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove a person acting under color of state law
deprived him of a federal right. See Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 268 (3d
Cir. 2000). Government officials performing discretionary functions are generally not
liable for civil damages under § 1983 by reason of granted qualified immunity. Wilson v.
Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999). In determining qualified immunity, a court must first ask
whether “the facts alleged, viewed in the light most favorable to the party asserting the
injury, show that the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right.” Curley v. Klem, 298
F.3d 271, 277 (3d Cir. 2002). If answered affirmatively, the question becomes whether it
“would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
confronted.” Id. (citing Layne, 526 U.S. 603).
As noted, Noone alleges his arrest violated the Fourth Amendment. An arrest
violates the Fourth Amendment if executed pursuant to an erroneously issued warrant.
Berg, 219 F.3d at 269-71 (citing Whitley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971)).6 Here, a
warrant for Noone was generated after a computer retrieved the wrong “James Noone” out
6
In Berg, a warrant for “Berg” was generated after a clerk mistakenly entered the
criminal complaint number of “Banks,” the person whose arrest was actually sought. 219
F.3d at 266. Consequently, Berg was mistakenly arrested for Banks's alleged misdeed. Id.
at 267-68. As a result of his mistaken arrest, Berg brought suit, pursuant to § 1983, against
the county and various state officials alleging, inter alia, violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 268. The district court concluded there was no Fourth Amendment
violation because the erroneously issued warrant supplied probable cause to arrest. Id. We
disagreed and held that an improperly issued warrant cannot provide probable cause for an
arrest. Id.
6
of the Police Department record system. Noone's arrest violated his Fourth Amendment
rights because it was executed pursuant to an erroneously issued warrant.
A. Defendants Warren, Trostle, and Spencer
The District Court granted Warren and Trostle qualified immunity, holding that a
reasonable police officer, under these circumstances, would believe there was probable
cause for Noone's arrest. Where an officer executes an arrest based on an objectively
reasonable belief that there is a valid warrant, he may be entitled to qualified immunity.
Berg, 219 F.3d at 272. It is usually reasonable for an officer to believe a warrant was
issued for probable cause. Id. Furthermore, an arresting officer is not required to make an
independent investigation for every suspect who claims innocence, provided the officer's
reliance on an arrest warrant is reasonable in light of the relevant circumstances. Id. at
272-73.
Noone was arrested based on a warrant containing his name and date of birth.
Although Noone proclaimed his innocence, it was not unreasonable for Warren and Trostle
to conclude that Noone was the proper individual sought. Furthermore, because the warrant
was issued for failure to appear in court, it was not unreasonable for the officers to refuse
Noone's request to resolve the matter at a later date. For these reasons, we will affirm the
grant of summary judgment with respect to Warren and Trostle.
With respect to defendant Spencer, Noone contends there was a genuine issue of
material fact whether Spencer was liable under § 1983 on the basis of deliberate
indifference. In Berg, we left open the question whether liability under these
7
circumstances should be analyzed as a Fourth Amendment violation or as due process
“deliberate indifference.”7 219 F.3d at 274. We need not resolve that here because under
either theory, Spencer is entitled to summary judgment.
As for a possible Fourth Amendment violation, the District Court held: “[T]here is
no evidence before the Court that Spencer intentionally caused the arrest of plaintiff.
Indeed, the warrant for plaintiff’s arrest was issued by the municipal court for failure to
appear before the municipal court judge. There is no evidence which implicates Spencer in
this decision.” We agree.8 There can be no § 1983 liability here under the Fourth
Amendment.
Under a due process theory, the District Court held:
7
In Berg we said:
Where a defendant does not intentionally cause the plaintiff to be seized, but
is nonetheless responsible for the seizure, it may be that a due process
“deliberate indifference” rather than a Fourth Amendment analysis is
appropriate. . . . We need not decide that here, however, because Berg has not
alleged anything more than mere negligence on Demko’s part.
219 F.3d at 274.
8
In his deposition, Spencer stated that he did not fill in a date of birth or social security
number because Noone III “gave [him] no information.” He “attempted to contact the court
on at least two prior occasions to let them know there was confusion between a James
Noone, the father, and a James Noone, the son.” When asked why he did not try to identify
more specifically the James Noone to which he was referring, Spencer said, “The system is
not set up to do that and I tried to get that rectified with the court.” When asked if he could
have done more, Spencer said, “Yes, I’m sure I could have, but I don’t normally do that
because I was a shift commander.” He did not assign to one of his subordinate officers the
task of tracking down more information because Noone III “was totally uncooperative at
that time. There was nothing to indicate to me [Spencer] that he would be more cooperative
at another time.” Spencer did not run a DMV check on James Noone using the address he
had because he was not capable of doing that for a Pennsylvania license.
8
There were no reasonably available measures to reduce or eliminate a serious
risk which Spencer could have taken in this case. Indeed, the entire incident
could have been avoided in its entirety i[f] plaintiff’s son [had] provided a
modicum of cooperation with Spencer during the stolen car investigation.
Spencer did not arrest plaintiff; and there is no evidence of deliberate
indifference on the part of Spencer. Accordingly, there can be no liability.
Knowing of two people by the name “James Noone” on the date the summons issued
and aware of potential confusion, Spencer “attempted to contact the court on at least two
prior occasions to let them know there was confusion between a James Noone, the father,
and James Noone, the son.” The reason the summons lacked a date of birth, social security
number, and proper address was “because Mr. Noone didn’t give it to me [Spencer] and
that’s why he was charged with obstructing justice.” Spencer also testified that the reason
he did not have the information was “because he [Noone III] was totally uncooperative at
that time. There was nothing to indicate to me [Spencer] that he would be more cooperative
at another time.”
In hindsight, it is possible that Spencer could have done more at a later time to try to
ascertain the correct date of birth, social security number, and address. But the failure to
do so would merely amount to negligence, not deliberate indifference. Therefore, under
either a Fourth Amendment or due process claim, Spencer was entitled to summary
judgment.
B. Municipal Defendants
A municipal unit may be sued for damages under § 1983 for its employee’s
unconstitutional action if the “action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or
9
executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and
promulgated by that body's officers.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690
(1978). There can be liability only if: (1) plaintiff's rights were violated by a policy or
custom of the municipality, and (2) the municipality's deliberate indifference was the
moving force behind plaintiff's alleged injury. See Berg, 219 F.3d at 275-76. Failure to
properly train an employee will be considered deliberate indifference only where that
failure causes a pattern of violations. Id. at 276.
In Berg, we reversed a grant of summary judgement in favor of a municipality so that
the factfinder could address whether the municipality acted with deliberate indifference.
Id. at 277. Specifically, we found the record lacked evidence of procedures guarding
against mistakenly issued warrants where the municipality “employed a design where the
slip of a finger could result in wrongful arrest and imprisonment.” Id. at 267, 277. We
concluded that the municipality failed to provide protective measures and failsafes against
erroneously issued warrants and said, “When such a simple mistake can so obviously lead to
a constitutional violation, we cannot hold that the municipality was not deliberately
indifferent to the risk as a matter of law.” Id.Unlike Berg, Municipal Defendants here did not employ a design where “the slip of
the finger could result in wrongful arrest and imprisonment.” No reasonable safeguards
have been identified that Municipal Defendants could have instituted to protect against the
type of error that occurred here. The form of summons provided for a defendant’s name,
address, social security number, and date of birth. This was not a situation “where such a
10
simple mistake [could] so easily lead to a constitutional violation.” Thus, we find no basis
upon which to hold Municipal Defendants liable. We will affirm the grant of summary
judgment.
IV. 1998 Incident
Noone challenges the District Court’s finding of qualified immunity with respect to
Individual Defendants and lack of liability with respect to Municipal Defendants for their
roles in the 1998 Incident.
A. Individual Defendants
The District Court found Individual Defendants entitled to qualified immunity
without identifying whether a constitutional violation occurred. But qualified immunity
analysis begins with determining whether there was a constitutional violation. Curley, 298
F.3d at 277 (citing Layne, 526 U.S. 603). Our independent review of the record reveals no
violation. Therefore, we do not reach qualified immunity and will affirm the grant of
summary judgment on Noone’s § 1983 claims with respect to Individual Defendants.
Under the Fourth Amendment, a warrantless entry into a private home is
“presumptively unreasonable.” United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1514 (6th Cir.
1996) (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980)). “Exigent circumstances,”
however, may justify a warrantless entry into a home if the governmental interest outweighs
the private individual's interest in remaining free from governmental intrusions. Rohrig, 98
F.3d at 1522. For example, in Rohrig, the Sixth Circuit found exigent circumstances
justified police officers' warrantless entry into plaintiff's home in response to a noise
11
ordinance complaint. Id. at 1523. The court said there was no Fourth Amendment violation
because the governmental interest in immediately abating an ongoing nuisance by quelling
loud and disruptive noise in a residential neighborhood justified the warrantless intrusion.
Id. at 1522.
Like Rohrig, the record here shows exigent circumstances justified a warrantless
entry into Noone's property during the 1998 Incident. Individual Defendants observed what
they believed to be underage drinking and violation of a noise ordinance. The governmental
interest in abating these illegal activities justified warrantless entry into Noone’s property.
Accordingly, summary judgment for Individual Defendants was proper.
B. Municipal Defendants
A municipality may be liable for the unconstitutional actions of its officials only
where a plaintiff’s rights were violated by a policy or custom of the municipality. Monell,
436 U.S. at 690-91. We recently articulated guiding principles for deciding whether an
official's act permits an inference of government policy:
First, . . . municipalities may be held liable under § 1983 only for acts for
which the municipality itself is actually responsible, “that is, acts which the
municipality has officially sanctioned or ordered.” Second, only those
municipal officials who have “final policymaking authority” may by their
actions subject the government to § 1983 liability. Third, whether a particular
official has “final policymaking authority” is a question of state law. Fourth,
the challenged action must have been taken pursuant to a policy adopted by the
official or officials responsible under state law for making policy in that area
of the city's business.
Nawrocki v. Township of Coolbaugh, 34 Fed. Appx. 832, 837 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986)) (other citations omitted).
12
In Nawrocki, a plaintiff appealed a grant of summary judgment in favor of a township
on § 1983 claims for due process violations based on, inter alia, malicious prosecution.
34 Fed. Appx. at 834, 836. We affirmed. Id. at 839. In that case, the plaintiff argued that
an unconstitutional government policy could be inferred from a government official's
isolated act. Id. at 836-37. We held that “[a]lthough there may have been some
inadequacies in the way in which municipal policies were followed . . . an official's failure
to adhere strictly to municipal policies does not itself support an inference of a policy that
can subject the Township to liability.” Id. at 837. Thus, we held that the plaintiff failed to
establish liability under § 1983. Id.
Here, Noone asserts that the police officers were police department policymakers
whose actions constituted municipal policy, even though they occurred only once. Thus,
Noone argues that Municipal Defendants are liable for the police officers’ action. We
disagree. As we stated in Nawrocki, where an official fails to adhere strictly to municipal
policies, we will not infer that a policy exists to subject the municipality to liability under §
1983. The police officers’ actions in the 1998 Incident were part of an isolated incident
that was neither officially sanctioned nor ordered by Municipal Defendants. Thus, we will
affirm the grant of summary judgment.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
13
TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing opinion.
/s/ Anthony J. Scirica
Circuit Judge