United States v. Arnold

Opinions of the United
2003 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
6-10-2003
USA v. Arnold
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 02-2873
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Recommended Citation
"USA v. Arnold" (2003). 2003 Decisions. Paper 471.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 02-2873
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
MICHAEL ARNOLD,
Appellant.
___________
On Appeal from the Order of the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(No. 1:99-CR-060-1)
District Court Judge: The Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo
___________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
June 5, 2003
Before: BARRY, FUENTES, Circuit Judges, McLAUGHLIN,* District Judge
(Opinion Filed: June 10, 2003)
* The Honorable Mary A. McLaughlin of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
Defendant Michael Arnold (“Arnold”) appeals the twelve-month sentence imposed
by the District Court for his second violation of supervised release conditions. Although
there is no dispute that the District Court’s sentence was within the range of the policy
statement set forth in § 7B1.4(a) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“USSG”),
Arnold seeks remand for re-sentencing. The District Court’s imposition of a twelve-
month sentence was not plainly unreasonable, and we will affirm.
I.
Arnold’s most recent supervised release violation was his second, but it is worth
noting that this violation is part of multiple criminal offenses dating back several years.
In 1998, Arnold was convicted of a counterfeiting offense and sentenced to two months
of incarceration to be followed by a two-year period of supervised release. After his
release from prison, Arnold violated the conditions of his first supervised release term by
possessing firearms. He pleaded guilty, and the District Court sentenced him to eight
months of incarceration for the supervised release violation and twenty-seven months for
unlawful possession of firearms, to be followed by another two-year term of supervised
release.
After his subsequent release from prison, Arnold again violated the terms of his
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supervised release. Within months of his release, Arnold was charged in separate
incidents of speeding, criminal mischief, public drunkenness, and disorderly conduct--
charges that are classified as “Grade B” offenses pursuant to USSG § 7B1.1(a)(2).
Furthermore, Arnold failed to inform his Probation Officer promptly about these charges,
as required by the terms of his supervised release--a “Grade C” violation pursuant to
USSG § 7B1.1(a)(3). As a result of these recent offenses, the Government sought to
revoke Arnold’s second term of supervised release.
At the revocation hearing, Arnold agreed to admit to the Grade C offense of failing
to inform his Probation Officer about the charges, while the Government agreed to refrain
from introducing testimony as to the Grade B offenses. Arnold’s Grade C offense and his
criminal history category of IV resulted in a sentencing range of six to twelve months,
pursuant to the policy statement in USSG § 7B1.4(a). The District Court sentenced
Arnold to twelve months of incarceration.
II.
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).
We have jurisdiction over the final order imposing sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(4). In general, we will not disturb a District Court’s sentence for
a violation of supervised release pursuant to USSG § 7B1.4(a), unless the sentence was
“plainly unreasonable.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(4); see also United States v. Blackston, 940
F.2d 877, 894 (3d Cir. 1991).
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III.
Because they appear as “policy statements,” the sentencing ranges set forth in
USSG § 7B1.4(a) are not mandatory guidelines, but rather “advisory” ranges. United
States v. Schwegel, 126 F.3d 551, 552 (3d Cir. 1997). In the present case, the District
Court sentenced Arnold to a term within the applicable range in USSG § 7B1.4(a).
Furthermore, the Court carefully considered Arnold’s unique situation, including his
persistent problems with alcohol abuse and his record of criminal activity. Under the
circumstances, the Court’s sentence reflected both the seriousness of the offenses and the
need to provide “structured alcohol counseling.” App. at 69. Given its well reasoned
decision, we hold that the District Court’s imposition of the maximum sentence within the
applicable range in USSG § 7B1.4(a) was not plainly unreasonable.
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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______________________________
TO THE CLERK OF COURT:
Kindly file the foregoing opinion.
By the Court,
/s/ Julio M. Fuentes
Circuit Judge
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