Urey v. Grove Cty College

Opinions of the United
2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
4-14-2004
Urey v. Grove Cty College
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 03-2753
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 03-2753
ALICE UREY,
Appellant
v.
GROVE CITY COLLEGE
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 01-cv-02024)
District Judge: Honorable Joy F. Conti
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 13, 2004
Before: RENDELL, COWEN and LAY*, Circuit Judges.
(Filed : April 14, 2004)
OPINION OF THE COURT
*Honorable Donald P. Lay, Senior Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by
designation.
LAY, Circuit Judge.
Alice Urey appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
Grove City College on her claims of retaliatory discharge. We will affirm.
B ACKGROUND
From 1989 until her termination on April 5, 2001, Alice Urey worked as a
housekeeper for Grove City College (the “College”), a private college located in Western
Pennsylvania. Although Ms. Urey appears to have performed her job duties without
incident during her first ten years of employment, the record reveals several instances of
insubordination for which Ms. Urey was subjected to disciplinary action beginning in the
spring of 1999.
On May 12, 1999, Ms. Urey received a verbal warning from Thomas Gregg, the
Vice President of Operations for the College, stemming from a confrontation with her
immediate supervisor over a job performance evaluation. Gregg reassigned M s. Urey to
another supervisor and cautioned her not to make any attempt at retaliation against her
former supervisor.
On May 24, 2000, Ms. Urey received a written warning after she refused the
requests of her supervisor to leave her workspace and attend a meeting with Gregg.
Instead, Ms. Urey stressed that if Gregg wished to talk to her, he would have to come to
see her. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss complaints made by Ms. Urey’s
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immediate supervisor that Ms. Urey had recently yelled at her regarding work
assignments and the employee dress code.
On April 4, 2001, Ms. Urey walked out of a meeting with Gregg, despite being
told that the meeting was not over and that her refusal to remain would be viewed as
insubordination. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss a complaint made by
Ms. Urey’s immediate supervisor that Ms. Urey had openly accused her of being lazy
during a recent employee meeting. The following day, Ms. Urey was terminated.
Following her termination, Ms. Urey filed suit against the College, alleging claims
of retaliation under various statutory provisions 1 and the Pennsylvania common law.
Ms. Urey alleged that she was terminated because she engaged in the following activities:
(1) giving favorable deposition testimony on April 24, 2000, in support of a co-worker’s
claim of discrimination against the College; (2) filing her own external charge of
discrimination against the College in May of 2000; and (3) filing several claims seeking
workers’ compensation benefits due to injuries suffered on the job.
D ISCUSSION
We note at the outset that although Ms. Urey’s claims of retaliation are brought
1
Ms. Urey alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e, et seq.; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621,
et seq.; and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”), 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 951, et seq.
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under various sources, the analytical framework for each is identical. See Fogleman v.
Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 567 (3d Cir. 2002) (analysis for Title VII, ADEA, and
PHRA retaliation claims identical); Landmesser v. United Air Lines, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 2d
273, 277 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (analysis for common law and Title VII retaliation claims
identical). In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show:
(1) that he or she engaged in a protected activity; (2) that his or her employer took an
adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link between the two. See Fogleman, 283
F.3d at 567-68; Landmesser, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 277-78.
The College concedes that each of M s. Urey’s alleged activities were protected.
Similarly, the College concedes that its act of firing her constituted an adverse
employment action. The dispute between the parties concerns whether Ms. Urey has
adduced sufficient evidence to establish the requisite causal link between these two
instances, thus preventing the entry of summary judgment in favor of the College. One
method for establishing the causation necessary to make out a prima facie case of
retaliation is to demonstrate that the adverse employment action followed closely upon
the heels of a protected activity. See Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173,
177 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that such “temporal proximity” is “an obvious method by
which a plaintiff can proffer circumstantial evidence” of discriminatory intent).
Generally, it can be said that “if at least four months pass after the protected action
without employer reprisal, no inference of causation is created.” Woods v. Bentsen, 889
4
F. Supp 179, 187 (E.D. Pa. 2000); see also id. n.15 (collecting cases). Applying this
standard to the undisputed facts, we hold that Ms. Urey has failed to raise an inference of
causation. Her act of providing favorable deposition testimony in a co-worker’s suit
occurred on April 24, 2000–nearly one year before she was terminated. The same holds
true for her act of filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, which took place in
May of 2000. Finally, the last instance in which Ms. Urey filed a claim for workers’
compensation benefits occurred on October 4, 2000–six months before her termination.2
We hold such a temporal link is too attenuated to support any inference of improper
motive.
Temporal proximity, while certainly the most common, is not the exclusive method
of raising an inference of causation. As this court stated in Kachmar, “circumstantial
evidence of a ‘pattern of antagonism’ following the protected conduct can also give rise
to the inference.” Kachmar, 109 F.3d at 177 (citation omitted). Ms. Urey argues that she
has demonstrated such a pattern, alleging that following her protected activities, her
supervisors increasingly began to nitpick her work, subject her to unreasonable deadlines,
and criticize her appearance. However, the record shows the conduct of which Ms. Urey
2
We agree with the District Court that under Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420 (3d
Cir. 2001), Gregg’s verbal and written warnings to Ms. Urey did not amount to an
adverse employment action. The record demonstrates that Ms. Urey did not have her
hours or type of work changed, nor did she receive a decrease in wages. Therefore, these
warnings did not “effect a material change in the terms or conditions of [her]
employment.” Id. at 431.
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now complains was taken in response to her own acts of insubordination, including her
failure to adhere to the College’s dress code and demonstrate respect for her supervisors.
We hold the conduct “did not portend any future retaliation,” but instead amounted to
“discrete responses to particular occurrences.” Weston, 251 F.3d at 432.
C ONCLUSION
The judgment of the District Court will be AFFIRMED.
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