Valdez v. Atty Gen USA

Opinions of the United
2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
10-21-2004
Valdez v. Atty Gen USA
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 03-2167
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No. 03-2167
__________
GABRIEL VALDEZ
Petitioner,
v.
JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
and BUREAU OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES
(BCIS) DISTRICT DIRECTOR
Respondents.
__________
On Petition for Review from the Board
of Immigration Appeals
U.S. Department of Justice
(BIA No. A75-873-257)
__________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
September 28, 2004
___________
Before: ROTH, BARRY, and GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: October 21, 2004)
__________
OPINION
__________
Garth, Circuit Judge:
Gabriel Valdez petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”). That order affirmed, without opinion, the decision of the Immigration
Judge (“IJ”), which had denied Valdez’s request for a continuance to allow for final
adjudication of his I-360 petition and which had granted voluntary departure to the
Dominican Republic. For the reasons given below, we will dismiss the Petition as moot.
I.
Because we write exclusively for the benefit of the parties who are well acquainted
with the facts and procedural posture of the present action, we will recount only those
matters relevant to the issues before us. Valdez, a native and citizen of the Dominican
Republic, entered the United States in December 1993 on a B1/B2 visa. On November
18, 1994, Valdez married a United States citizen, Ms. Juana Ortiz. Ms. Ortiz filed an I-
130 immediate relative petition on Valdez’s behalf, which she subsequently withdrew,
claiming that her marriage to Valdez was not a “bona fide marital relationship.” As a
result, Valdez’s I-130 petition was never granted.
On November 27, 1998, the INS filed a Notice to Appear, charging Valdez with
removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as an alien in the United States who had
not been admitted or paroled. At the May 4, 2000 merits hearing before the IJ, Valdez
conceded removability, but sought an adjustment of his status pursuant to an I-360
petition (entitled “Petition for Amerasian, Widow, or Special Immigrant”) and voluntary
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removal. Valdez had previously filed the I-360 petition in June 1999, and the petition
was subsequently denied on April 10, 2000. He thus requested a continuance from the IJ
to pursue an appeal of the I-360 denial to the Administrative Appeals Unit (“AAU”). On
May 4, 2000, the IJ denied the request for a continuance, found Valdez removable as
charged and granted his request for voluntary removal. On March 26, 2003, the BIA
affirmed, without opinion, the IJ’s decision.
On April 24, 2003, Valdez filed a timely appeal with this court pursuant to 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a). Thereafter, the AAU denied Valdez’s appeal of his I-360 petition.
II.
The brief of the government argues that Valdez’s Petition is moot, stating that
inasmuch as it is predicated upon the denial of his request for a continuance to pursue an
appeal of his I-360 petition, which has since been decided by the AAU, there is no relief
this court can grant. We agree.
The Constitution limits this court’s jurisdiction to the adjudication of actual cases
and controversies. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 315-16
(1974) (per curiam). “[A] case is moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or
the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Powell v. McCormack, 395
U.S. 486, 496 (1969). The court’s ability to grant effective relief lies at the heart of the
mootness doctrine. County of Morris v. Nationalist Mvmt., 273 F.3d 527, 533 (3d Cir.
2001). That is, “[i]f developments occur during the course of adjudication that eliminate
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a plaintiff’s personal stake in the outcome of a suit or prevent a court from being able to
grant the requested relief, the case must be dismissed as moot.” Blanciak v. Allegheny
Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698-99 (3d Cir. 1996). This requirement that a case or
controversy be “actual [and] ongoing” extends throughout all stages of federal judicial
proceedings, including appellate review. Khodara Envtl., Inc. v. Beckman, 237 F.3d 186,
193 (3d Cir.2001); see also New Jersey Tpk. Auth. v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light, 772
F.2d 25, 31 (3d Cir. 1985).
Here, as we have indicated, prior to our review there has been final adjudication of
Valdez’s I-360 petition by the AAU, thereby divesting this court of the ability to grant
effective relief. We must therefore dismiss this Petition for want of jurisdiction.1
1
In light of our holding that Valdez’s Petition is moot, we need not reach the merits of the
other issues raised by Valdez in his brief, including his complaint that the BIA violated his due
process rights by affirming the IJ’s decision without opinion. See Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228(3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (upholding the constitutionality of the BIA’s summary affirmance
procedure).
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