Sean Collins v. Warden Canaan FPC

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 21-2878
__________
SEAN COLLINS,
Appellant
v.
WARDEN CANAAN FPC
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3:20-cv-02230)
District Judge: Honorable Malachy E. Mannion
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 8, 2022
Before: KRAUSE, BIBAS and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 14, 2022)
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OPINION*
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*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
PER CURIAM
Sean Collins, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court’s
dismissal of his habeas petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the following
reasons, we will affirm.
Collins was convicted of drug offenses, see 21 U.S.C. § 846, and is serving a 120-
month sentence at the Minimum Security Satellite Camp adjacent to the Canaan United
States Penitentiary. According to the Government, Collins’s projected release date is
March 16, 2028. In August 2020, his Unit Team determined that he qualified to be
placed in home confinement based on changes to 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(2) made by the
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act. See Pub. L. 116-136,
§ 12003(b)(2), 134 Stat. 281, 516 (2020). According to Collins, the Warden approved
placement in home confinement. (ECF 2, at 5, 43.) But the Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
overruled the warden’s approval on the ground that Collins had not met the “time served
thresholds.” Kerr Decl. ¶ 3 (ECF No. 12-1, at 3).
Collins next filed a § 2241 petition in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania. He asserted that “the BOP has usurped the role of
Congress by adding an additional gatekeeper to the home confinement process…. The
statute governing home confinement has no requirement for appeal [to the] BOP Central
Office after or before the Warden’s approval.” (ECF 1, at ¶ 13.) Collins asked the
District Court to “order [the warden] to honor its prior approval for home confinement
and release [him] pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3624.” (Id. at ¶ 15.)
2
The District Court dismissed the petition, holding that Collins failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies. In the alternative, the District Court held that it lacked authority
to order the BOP to release Collins to home confinement and that the BOP did not abuse
its discretion in denying Collins’ request for home confinement. (ECF 15 & 16.) The
District Court also dismissed as moot Collins’s motions for appointment of counsel and
class certification.1 (Id.) Collins timely appealed.2 (ECF 17.)
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(2), the Director of the BOP may place a prisoner in
home confinement for the shorter of ten percent of his or her term of imprisonment or six
months. The CARES Act authorized the Director to extend the period of home
confinement in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. See Pub. L. No. 116-136,
§ 12003(b)(2), 134 Stat. 281 (2020). As these statutes make clear, the BOP has exclusive
control over an inmate’s placement in home confinement. See Tapia v. United States,
1
Collins does not challenge the dismissal of those motions on appeal. See M.S. by &
through Hall v. Susquehanna Twp. Sch. Dist., 969 F.3d 120, 124 n.2 (3d Cir. 2020)
(holding that claims were forfeited where appellant failed to raise them in her opening
brief).
2
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and may affirm on any basis
supported by the record. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per
curiam). Because we conclude that Collins’ underlying claims lack merit, we will not
conclusively rule on the District Court’s determination that he failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies. It appears, however, that the District Court may have erred
because “a prisoner need not exhaust administrative remedies where the issue presented
involves only statutory construction[.]” Vasquez v. Strada, 684 F.3d 431, 433-34 (3d Cir.
2012). We read Collins’ request for an order directing the warden to honor its prior
approval of home confinement as part of his argument that the statute places the authority
to make home confinement determinations exclusive with the warden.
3
564 U.S. 319, 331 (2011) (“When a court sentences a federal offender, the BOP has
plenary control, subject to statutory constraints, over the place of the prisoner’s
imprisonment and the treatment programs (if any) in which he may participate.” (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, to the extent that Collins challenges
the District Court’s conclusion that it lacked authority under the CARES Act to order that
he be placed in home confinement, the claim lacks merit. See United States v. Houck, 2
F.4th 1082, 1085 (8th Cir. 2021); United States v. Saunders, 986 F.3d 1076, 1078 (7th
Cir. 2021).
Moreover, assuming that the absence of authority to order home confinement does
not prohibit a court from reviewing in a § 2241 petition the BOP’s denial of home
confinement, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion.3 In
explaining why Collins was not selected for home confinement, the BOP stated that,
among other things, Collins did not meet the “time served thresholds.” Kerr Decl. ¶ 3
(ECF No. 12-1, at 3). Those thresholds apparently refer to BOP memoranda addressing
home confinement in the wake of the CARES Act, which indicated that the BOP was
prioritizing for consideration those inmates who either (1) have served 50% or more of
their sentences, or (2) have 18 months or less remaining in their sentences and have
3
See Vasquez, 684 F.3d at 434 (reviewing for abuse of discretion the BOP’s decision to
limit a petitioner’s pre-release placement under § 3624(c)(6)(C)); see also Woodall v.
Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating that “the criteria for
determining [a prisoner’s] placement are instrumental in determining how a sentence will
be ‘executed’”).
4
served 25% or more of their sentences. Kerr Decl. ¶ 5 (ECF No. 12-1, at 4). At the time
that Collins was considered, he had served less than 15% of his term. Kerr Decl. ¶ 7
(ECF No. 12-1, at 4). Collins argues that the BOP impermissibly relied on the time
remaining on his sentence because that factor “only relates to the order in which each
inmate’s case file will be reviewed for home confinement consideration.” Appellant’s
Br. at 13. According to Collins, the home confinement determination instead should have
been based on the factors outlined in the relevant statutes and in memoranda issued by
the Attorney General regarding home confinement and the COVID-19 pandemic. Id. at
10-14. The BOP did consider those factors, however, explaining that Collins “was
individually and comprehensively reviewed under the five factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b),
18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(2), the [CARES] Act and Attorney General Barr memorand[a] and
determined to not be appropriate for home confinement because he does not meet the
time served thresholds.” Kerr Decl, ¶ 5 (ECF No. 12-1, at 3). Thus, the BOP followed
the Attorney General’s direction to consider “the totality of the circumstances for each
individual inmate, the statutory factors for home confinement, and [a] non-exhaustive list
of discretionary factors….” Id. at ¶ 4 (citing Attorney General Memorandum of Mar. 26,
2020) (ECF 12-1, at 3). Because the BOP gave “individual review” to Collins’ case,
Vasquez, 684 F.3d at 434, and given the discretion afforded to the BOP’s home
confinement determinations, we cannot say that there was any abuse of discretion here.
Finally, Collins asserts that Congress “expressly mandated that the decision
whether to grant or deny a petition for prerelease custody be made by the warden of the
5
institution, and that the decision be based on the three enumerated and determinative
factors” in § 3624(g)(1)(D)(i)(II). Appellant’s Br., 16-17. The BOP violated that
mandate, according to Collins, by overruling the warden’s home confinement approval.
Collins’ interpretation of the statute is misplaced. The portion of the statute that Collins
cites allows prerelease custody or supervised release of participants in a “risk and needs
assessment system” when the warden determines that “the prisoner would not be a danger
to society if transferred[,]” “the prisoner has made a good faith effort to lower their
recidivism risk through participation in recidivism reduction programs or productive
activities[,]” and “the prisoner is unlikely to recidivate.” § 3624(g)(1)(D)(i)(II); see also
Bottinelli v. Salazar, 929 F.3d 1196, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 2019) (describing the
“establish[ment of] a ‘risk and needs assessment system’ to, broadly speaking, review
each prisoner’s recidivism risk level, award earned time credit as an incentive for
participation in recidivism reduction programming, and ‘determine when a prisoner is
ready to transfer into prerelease custody or supervised release in accordance with section
3624’” (quoting First Step Act of 2018, § 102(b), Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194,
5196-97)). Collins, however, was not considered for release under the risk and needs
assessment system. Instead, he claimed that the warden approved home confinement
under the CARES Act (ECF 2, at 5, 43), which, as explained above, provides exclusive
authority to the BOP to transfer an inmate to home confinement. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3621(b) & 3624(c)(2); § 12003(b)(2) of the CARES Act.
6
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.4
4
Collins’ motions for “judgment on submissions” (Doc. 13 & 15), which seek to vacate
the District Court’s order, are denied.
7