Panichelli v. General Electric Co.

Opinions of the United
2005 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
8-22-2005
Panichelli v. General Elec Co
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 04-2247
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"Panichelli v. General Elec Co" (2005). 2005 Decisions. Paper 670.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 04-2247
________________
MICHAEL A. PANICHELLI,
Appellant
v.
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 04-cv-00461)
District Judge: Honorable Marvin Katz
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 19, 2005
Before: VAN ANTWERPEN, GREENBERG and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Filed: August 22, 2005)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Appellant, Michael Panichelli, appeals from an order dismissing his complaint for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies and an order denying his motion for
reconsideration of that order. For the reasons set forth below, we will vacate and remand
for further proceedings.
Panichelli was employed, as a refrigerator compressor charger and eventually an
appliance technician, by General Electric Company (“GE”) from 1988 until March 2002.
On February 26, 2002, he was placed on “lack of work” status. In March 2002, he
received a letter, dated March 5, 2002, that notified him that his employment was
terminated effective March 13, 2002. On December 30, 2002, he submitted a Charge
Questionnaire to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). A formal
Charge of Discrimination was filed by the EEOC on January 31, 2003.
After receiving a “right to sue letter” from the EEOC, Panichelli filed the
underlying complaint in the District Court alleging disability discrimination in violation
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., based on the
termination of his employment in March 2002. He also filed a motion for appointment of
counsel, which was denied the day it was filed. The District Court granted GE’s motion
to dismiss the complaint. Panichelli filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.
He then filed this timely appeal.
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary
review over an order granting a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
See Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996). We review an order denying a motion
for reconsideration for abuse of discretion. Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909
(3d Cir. 1985).
2
With his motion for reconsideration, which was filed with the assistance of
counsel, Panichelli submitted his Charge Questionnaire to show that he had timely
exhausted his administrative remedies. He claimed that he received notice of the
discriminatory act when he was terminated from his employment on March 13, 2002; that
the Charge Questionnaire, which is date-stamped December 30, 2002, is sufficient to
constitute a charge pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12; and that, therefore, he timely filed a
charge with the EEOC within the 300-day statutory period. See Philbin v. Gen. Elec.
Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 929 F.2d 321, 323 (7th Cir. 1991). The District Court denied
the motion for reconsideration.
A motion for reconsideration may be granted to prevent manifest injustice. Max’s
Seafood Cafe v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). When he
filed his complaint, Panichelli also filed a motion for appointment of counsel, which was
denied. He proceeded pro se in this case until he filed his post-judgment motion with the
assistance of counsel. He obtained a copy of the Charge Questionnaire only after his
attorney helped him to exercise his rights under the Freedom of Information Act. In an
affidavit filed in this Court, Panichelli explains that he thought the Charge of
Discrimination was sufficient evidence that he had filed a timely claim with the EEOC,
especially since the EEOC did not dismiss his complaint. Based on the circumstances
presented in this case, the District Court should have exercised its discretion to grant the
motion for reconsideration and consider whether the Charge Questionnaire was adequate
to constitute a charge.
3
Based on the foregoing, we will reverse the District Court’s order denying
Panichelli’s motion for reconsideration, vacate the District Court’s order granting GE’s
motion to dismiss, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
4