United States v. James Hogeland

CLD-021 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 22-2777
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JAMES HOGELAND,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 2-05-cr-00162-001)
District Judge: Honorable Paul S. Diamond
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Submitted on Appellee’s Motion for Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
November 3, 2022
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., MATEY, AND MCKEE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: December 15, 2022)
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OPINION *
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PER CURIAM
James Hogeland, a federal prisoner at FCI-Fairton, appeals an order of the District
Court denying his motion for compassionate release. The Government has filed a timely
motion for summary affirmance, and to be relieved of the obligation to file a brief. For
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
the following reasons, we will grant the motion and summarily affirm. See 3d Cir.
L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
In 2007, Hogeland was convicted of possession with intent to distribute
methamphetamine and multiple related firearms offenses. Hogeland was sentenced to an
aggregate term of 600 months in prison, which, by statute, was the mandatory minimum
sentence that the Court was required to impose. His earliest anticipated release date is
February 2047.
In October 2020, after exhausting his administrative remedies, Hogeland filed a
motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1)(A)(i), as amended
by the First Step Act, which authorizes criminal defendants to seek reductions of their
sentences by demonstrating “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances. In that
motion, coupled with his July 2021 supplemental motion, Hogeland argued for
compassionate release based upon a combination of harsh prison conditions resulting
from the COVID-19 pandemic, 1 his “extraordinary” rehabilitation efforts, and
unwarranted sentencing disparities resulting from changes in federal sentencing laws and
his election to proceed to trial rather than plead guilty. See D.Ct. ECF Nos. 210, 219.
The District Court denied the motion, finding that “[e]ven when viewed in combination,
the ‘harsh prison conditions,’ Hogeland’s good prison record, and any purported
1
Hogeland initially argued that various health conditions placed him at increased risk of
illness from COVID-19. However, in his supplemental motion, Hogeland acknowledged
he is now vaccinated and therefore “withdraws his COVID-19 argument as it relates to
him being at great risk.” D.Ct. ECF No. 219 at 9.
2
sentencing disparity do not make out an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting
compassionate release.” D.Ct. ECF No. 226 at 4. 2 Hogeland appeals that denial.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the denial of a motion
for compassionate release for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Pawlowski, 967
F.3d 327, 329-30 (3d Cir. 2020). “[W]e will not disturb the District Court’s decision
unless there is a definite and firm conviction that it committed a clear error of judgment
in the conclusion it reached.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). We may take
summary action if the appeal presents no substantial question. See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d
Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
We agree with the Government that the appeal does not present a substantial
question. There is no indication that the District Court “committed a clear error of
judgment” when it concluded that the circumstances presented by Hogeland, either
individually or in combination, did not amount to extraordinary and compelling reasons
that justify release. First, with respect to Hogeland’s concerns regarding COVID-related
prison conditions, Hogeland did not describe any circumstances setting him apart from
other incarcerated individuals. His general concerns, including limitations on visitation
and the inability to participate in educational and vocational programs, are insufficient to
constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons to justify release. See generally United
States v. Raia, 954 F.3d 594, 597 (3d Cir. 2020) (explaining that “the mere existence of
2
Because the District Court found no extraordinary or compelling reasons warranting
relief, it did not address the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
3
COVID-19 in society and the possibility that it may spread to a particular prison alone
cannot justify compassionate release”).
Second, while Hogeland presented ample evidence of his rehabilitation efforts,
which are commendable, the District Court correctly concluded, and the statute is clear,
that rehabilitation alone cannot constitute extraordinary and compelling grounds under §
3582. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). In addition, the District Court correctly concluded that
nonretroactive changes to mandatory minimums do not support a finding of extraordinary
or compelling reasons for release. See United States v. Andrews, 12 F.4th 255, 261 (3d
Cir. 2021) (reasoning that “the imposition of a sentence that was not only permissible but
statutorily required at the time is neither an extraordinary nor a compelling reason to now
reduce that same sentence” (citation omitted)). Further, although Hogeland received a
harsher sentence than he would have had he entered into an offered plea agreement, the
prosecution acted within its discretion in filing an enhancement notice under 21 U.S.C. §
851(a). The District Court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the increased
sentence resulting from the enhancement is not an extraordinary and compelling reason
warranting compassionate release. See Andrews, 12 F.4th at 261 (“[C]onsidering the
length of a statutorily mandated sentence as a reason for modifying a sentence would
infringe on Congress’s authority to set penalties.”). Nor did the District Court abuse its
discretion in determining that all of these factors, taken in combination, failed to present
extraordinary or compelling circumstances warranting relief.
4
Based on the foregoing, we grant the Government’s motion and will summarily
affirm the District Court’s judgment.
5