Tucker v. Secretary HHS

Opinions of the United
2007 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
9-6-2007
Tucker v. Secretary HHS
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 07-2596
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"Tucker v. Secretary HHS" (2007). 2007 Decisions. Paper 466.
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CLD-342 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 07-2596
________________
KAREN E. TUCKER,
Appellant
v.
MICHAEL O. LEAVITT
Secretary of Health and Human Services
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 07-cv-02230)
District Judge: Honorable Robert B. Kugler
_______________________________________
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action
Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
August 16, 2007
BEFORE: RENDELL, SMITH and JORDAN, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed: September 6, 2007)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Karen E. Tucker appeals pro se from the order of the United States District Court
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for the District of New Jersey denying her application for leave to proceed with her
complaint in forma pauperis (“IFP”), without prepayment of fees, under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915. We will reverse the District Court’s order and remand for further proceedings.
The procedural history of this matter is straightforward. On May 9, 2007, Tucker
submitted her complaint along with her IFP application. In her IFP affidavit, she stated
that she was unemployed, but between December 2005 and April 2007, she earned
$400.00 in wages. She further stated she had no other sources of income, no cash and no
bank accounts, no real estate, and no other items of value. By order entered May 22,
2007, the District Court entered an order denying Tucker’s IFP application, directing the
Clerk to close the matter and allowing Tucker to pay the $350 filing fee within thirty days
to reopen the case. Rather than pay to reopen the case, Tucker filed this appeal. In her
notice of appeal she reiterated that she did not earn more than $400 during the seventeen
months between December 2005 and April 2007, and that she remains unemployed, has
no assets, and has no other sources of income.1
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, see Redmond v. Gill, 352 F.3d 801,
803 (3d Cir. 2003), and we review the District Court’s ruling for abuse of discretion, see
United States v. Holiday, 436 F.2d 1079, 1079 (3d Cir. 1971). IFP determinations are to
be made solely on the basis of indigence, without regard to the potential merit of a
complaint. See Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1084 n.5 (3d Cir. 1995); Roman
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Tucker also completed an application and affidavit of poverty to pursue her appeal
with IFP status. This Court granted her IFP application on July 6, 2007.
2
v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 194 n.1 (3d Cir. 1990). However, we have noted that “extreme
circumstances” might justify denying IFP status to an otherwise financially qualified
applicant, although we have not defined the circumstances for which such action would
be appropriate. See Deutsch, 67 F.3d at 1084 n.5.
Here, the District Court denied the IFP application solely because Tucker “earns
sufficient income.” Based on the information averred in Tucker’s IFP application filed in
District Court, we disagree. There is no indication in the record that the District Court
believed that some other factor constituted an “extreme circumstance” warranting the
denial of IFP status for non-financial reasons. We conclude that the District Court’s
determination constitutes an abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, we will summarily reverse the District Court’s judgment and remand
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We express no view as to the
possible merit of Tucker’s claim.
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