United States v. Little

Opinions of the United
2007 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
12-3-2007
USA v. Little
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 06-3646
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"USA v. Little" (2007). 2007 Decisions. Paper 145.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No. 06-3646
__________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
vs.
LARRY LITTLE,
Appellant.
__________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(Crim. No. 01-cr-00249)
District Judge: Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh
__________
Submitted on November 28, 2007
___________
Before: BARRY, FUENTES and GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: December 3, 2007)
___________
OPINION
__________
GARTH, Circuit Judge:
Larry Little (“Little”) appeals from the final judgment entered by the District Court
on July 26, 2006. Little argues that the District Court’s revocation of his supervised
release was unreasonable and therefore should be reversed. The Government initially
responded that the applicable standard of review is whether the revocation was “plainly
unreasonable.” In a subsequent submission, however, the Government acknowledged
that this issue was decided by another panel of this Circuit in United States v. Bungar,
478 F.3d 540 (3d Cir. 2007) (Barry, J.), while this appeal has been pending. Bungar held
that the standard of review is “reasonableness.” We are controlled by Bungar and find
that the District Court was reasonable in imposing a 32-month sentence after revoking
Little’s supervised release.
I.
In April 2002, Little pled guilty to a one-count indictment charging him with
conspiracy to distribute narcotics in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and was sentenced on
February 3, 2003 to 55 months of imprisonment and 5 years of supervised release. This
sentence was significantly below the 130-162 month range under the Sentencing
Guidelines and the 60-month statutory mandatory minimum because the District Court
granted the Government’s motion for a downward departure pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
3553(e) and Section 5K1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (for Little’s cooperation
with the Government). Little’s period of supervised release began on July 6, 2005.
In December 2005, the U.S. Office of Probation filed a petition alleging that Little
was in violation of his supervised release because he had been arrested the prior month
by the Passaic Police Department for drug-related offenses and failed to report the arrest
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to his probation officer within 72 hours of the arrest. In March 2006, Little was
convicted in state court of third-degree possession of a controlled substance. On July 11,
2006, Little pled guilty in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey to the
first alleged violation of supervised release. As a result of his guilty plea, the second
claim (failure to report) was dismissed. The range set by the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines Manual (Chapter 7) was 30 to 37 months, but the statutory maximum was 36
months.
The District Court imposed a 32-month prison term and requested that Little seek
and receive drug treatment. The District Court’s judgment was entered on July 26, 2006.
Having filed a timely appeal, Little argues that the 32-month sentence was unreasonable.
II.
We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1), which provides appellate
jurisdiction over sentences imposed in violation of law, and under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
which provides appellate jurisdiction from all final decisions of U.S. district courts. The
District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, which
confers jurisdiction over all offenses against federal law, and pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
3583(e)(3), which authorizes revocations of supervised releases.
In reviewing revocations of sentences for reasonableness, we apply the factors set
forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261-62 (2005);
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Bungar, 478 F.3d at 542. A sentence is reasonable if the record demonstrates that the
sentencing court gave meaningful consideration to the Section 3553(a) factors. See
Bungar, 478 F.3d at 543; United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2006).
The party challenging the sentence bears the burden in establishing its unreasonableness.
See United States v. King, 454 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 2006).
III.
Given that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)(1) requires a district court to revoke a defendant’s
supervised release if the defendant is found in possession of a controlled substance, the
question in this case is whether the District Court was reasonable in imposing a 32-
month prison term.
Little had obtained, upon the Government’s motion, a substantial downward
departure from the Sentencing Guidelines in his original sentence (55 months compared
to the 130-162 month range). In addition, the Government argues that the District Court
was required to revoke the sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)(1) and had the
discretion to impose a sentence up to the 3-year statutory maximum under 18 U.S.C. §
3583(e)(3). Finally, the Government argues that the District Court was reasonable in
imposing some level of punishment for Little’s violation of his supervised release.
We agree that the District Court was reasonable in its sentencing after it was
statutorily required to revoke Little’s supervised release. In its initial sentencing, the
District Court showed leniency in imprisoning Little to only 55 months, while the
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Sentencing Guidelines provided for a 130-162 month range and the statutory mandatory
minimum was 60 months. The District Court was reasonable in choosing 32 months as
the appropriate punishment from the applicable, though non-binding, Chapter 7 range of
30 to 37 months (statutorily capped at 36 months).
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s final judgment entered
on July 26, 2006.
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