United States v. Julien

Opinions of the United
2007 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
12-20-2007
USA v. Julien
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 07-2872
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Recommended Citation
"USA v. Julien" (2007). 2007 Decisions. Paper 20.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Case No: 07-2872
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
RONALD JULIEN,
Appellant
On Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands
District Court No. 06-CR-21
District Judge: The Honorable Curtis V. Gomez
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
December 10, 2007
Before: SMITH, NYGAARD, and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: December 20, 2007 )
OPINION
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Ronald Julien was charged in an indictment with aiding and abetting
another in knowingly and intentionally possessing cocaine base with the intent to
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distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. A jury found
Julien guilty of the offense charged. The District Court of the Virgin Islands
sentenced Julien to 41 months of imprisonment. Julien appealed.1 He contends
that the District Court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. See
Fed. R. Crim. P. 29. We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
The record reveals that Detective Angel Castro contacted Julien, a taxi
driver in St. Croix, to arrange for transportation from the airport. During the taxi
ride, Castro inquired about purchasing crack cocaine. Julien agreed to contact his
supplier. The following day, Castro contacted Julien by telephone to determine if
Julien had spoken with his supplier. As a result of this conversation, Julien agreed
to meet Castro at the Christiansted Fort. Although Julien tried to convince Castro
to leave the Fort and to meet his supplier at the supplier’s house, Castro prevailed
upon Julien to bring his supplier to the Fort.
Shortly thereafter, Julien arrived in his taxi at the Fort with Burnel Iles, also
known as Bonz. The meeting between Bonz and Castro resulted in Bonz leaving
the Fort to obtain the crack cocaine. As Castro waited in front of the Fort for Bonz
to return, Julien stopped in his taxi to ascertain if Castro had met with Bonz.
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The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 3231 and 48
U.S.C. § 1612. We exercise appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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Castro acknowledged that he had. Subsequently, Bonz returned to the Fort and
tendered 32 grams of crack cocaine to Castro in exchange for $750.00.
Julien asserts that the District Court erred by denying his motion for
judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence to establish each
element of the offense charged. He also submits that the prosecution failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not entrapped by Detective Castro.
In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979), the Supreme Court instructed
that the critical inquiry in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence “is whether,
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” If so, the verdict must be sustained. Id.; see also Burks v.
United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16 (1978). Similarly, “[w]hen a jury has rejected the
entrapment defense, we ‘must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, and . . . Viewing the evidence in this light, [we] must uphold the
jury’s verdict unless no reasonable jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant was predisposed to commit the offense for which he was
convicted.’” United States v. Lakhani, 480 F.3d 171, 179 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting
United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 597 (3d Cir. 1982)(en banc)).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we
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conclude that the District Court did not err in denying Julien’s motion for
judgment of acquittal. The evidence we recited above is sufficient to establish that
Julien aided and abetted the commission by Bonz of the violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1). See United States v. Lacy, 446 F.3d 448, 454 (3d Cir. 2006) (observing
that the elements of § 841(a)(1) “are (1) knowing or intentional (2) possession (3)
with intent to distribute (4) a controlled substance”). Inasmuch as the evidence
shows that Julien contacted his supplier, transported Bonz to meet with Castro,
and stopped to see if the meeting was satisfactory in Castro’s view, we conclude
that the jury’s rejection of Julien’s defense of entrapment is supported by the
evidence. See Lakhani, 480 F.3d at 179 (noting that evidence that shows the
accused readily responded to a solicitation by the government is sufficient to
prove predisposition). Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District
Court.
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