Kerins v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Opinions of the United
2006 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
4-4-2006
Kerins v. Comm Social Security
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 05-2272
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 05-2272
ANDREW KERINS,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
District Court No. 03-cv-02931
District Judge: Honorable Faith S. Hochberg
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 12, 2006
Before: ROTH, FUENTES and ROSENN*, Circuit Judges
(Filed: April 4, 2006)
OPINION
*This case was submitted to the panel of Judges Roth, Fuentes and Rosenn. Judge
Rosenn died after submissions, but before the filing of the opinion. The decision is filed
by a quorum of the panel. 28 U.S.C. §46(d).
ROTH, Circuit Judge:
Andrew Kerins appeals the District Court’s final order affirming the decision of
the Commissioner of Social Security to deny his claim for Social Security Disability
Insurance Benefits (SSDIB). The Commissioner determined that Kerins had not
established the existence of an impairment of the requisite severity and duration prior to
the expiration of his insured status. Because we conclude that substantial evidence
supports this determination, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
I. Facts
Because the parties are familiar with the facts and procedural posture, we will
provide only a brief synopsis of the events leading up to the appeal.
On April 23, 1999, Kerins applied for SSDIB alleging disability due to work-
related trauma since April 11, 1972. Kerins last met the Social Security Act’s special
earnings requirements, and was therefore last eligible for insurance, on June 30, 1972. To
be eligible for benefits now, he must establish that he was disabled before that date.
This application was denied on May 7, 1999, and denied on reconsideration, on
August 23, 1999. Kerins filed a petition for de novo review before an Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ). On July 28, 2000, a decision was issued by ALJ Farley, finding that
Kerins was ineligible for benefits because he was not disabled before his insured status
expired on June 30, 1972. On appeal, the Appeals Council remanded. On August 27,
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2002, the same ALJ issued another decision finding that Kerins was not entitled to
benefits. Upon appeal, the Appeals Council again remanded. On the second remand, a
different ALJ, Judge Noorigian issued a decision on January 8, 2003, finding that Kerins
was not disabled. The Appeals Council denied Kerins’ request to review ALJ
Noorigian’s decision. Kerins then commenced a civil action in District Court seeking
review of the Commissioner’s final decision. The District Court affirmed, concluding
that substantial evidence supported the Commissioner’s decision that Kerins was not
disabled within the meaning of the Act. A Notice of Appeal was timely filed on April 22,
2005.
Kerins was a police officer for the city of Newark, New Jersey, from 1967 to 1972
and, for short periods of time in 1973 and 1974. On July 24, 1972, Kerins was given a
psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Kuvin, a psychiatrist. Dr. Kuvin noted that Kerins had a
“thinking disorder” and that his reality testing function, insight and judgment were
impaired. Dr. Kuvin diagnosed Kerins’ condition as paranoid schizophrenia. He noted
that although there was a poor prognosis for a cure, with appropriate treatment, a good
remission would be anticipated. When Dr. Kuvin next examined Kerins, on August 21,
1972, he reported that Kerins manifested no psychosis and appeared to have reality-
oriented thinking. Dr. Kuvin thus changed his diagnosis to “schizophrenia, residual
type,” a category of schizophrenia for individuals showing signs of schizophrenia, but
who, following a psychotic schizophrenia episode, are no longer psychotic. Dr. Kuvin
recommended that it would be in Kerins’ best interest to pursue a less stressful work area
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than law enforcement.
On March 16, 1973, Dr. O’Connor, a police and fire department surgeon,
examined Kerins and found Kerins unable to do responsible employment or carry a gun
and in need of psychiatric care, with no possibility of improving to do regular work.
On April 23, 1973, Dr. Howard examined Kerins. Dr. Howard evaluated Kerins
and reported no finding of psychosis. He noted that Kerins’ judgment was “somewhat
impaired,” and that Kerins perhaps exhibited mild paranoid ideational content and was
somewhat depressed. Dr. Howard recommended that Kerins’ application for ordinary
disability retirement be granted because his illness prevented him from performing his
routine duties and responsibilities of a police officer.
Nonetheless, in 1973 and 1974, Kerins briefly returned to work as a police officer
for the city of Newark. From 1997 to 1999, Kerins was treated for a variety of
complaints. In 1999, after Kerins filed for SSDIB, Dr. Snyder, a state agency medical
consultant, reviewed the medical evidence in the record. Dr. Snyder stated that the
medical evidence relevant to Kerins’ psychiatric impairment and its severity at the time of
his alleged onset date is not sufficient to make a retrospective determination and noted
that there was no current medical evidence of record with regard to the possible presence
of mental impairment. Snyder’s determination that evidence which Kerins presented was
not sufficient to find him disabled prior to June 30, 1972, was affirmed by Dr. Ernest
Kopstein and Dr. Samuel Blumenfeld, who are also state agency medical consultants.
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
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We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise
plenary review over the order of the district court and must review whether the
Commissioner’s determination is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Newell v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 347 F.3d 541, 545 (3d Cir. 2003) (citations
omitted). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be less
than a preponderance,” and is evidence which “a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. Where evidence in the record is susceptible to
more than one rational interpretation, the Court must endorse the Commissioner’s
conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citations omitted).
III. Discussion
To establish a claim for disability, an individual must show an “inability to engage
in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable . . . mental
impairment which has lasted or . . . can be expected to last for a continuous period not
less than 12 months[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Such disability will be found “only if
his . . . mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable
to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience,
engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy
. . ..” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). A disabling impairment is an impairment resulting from
“psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical
and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).
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The Commissioner uses a five-step analysis to determine whether an individual is
disabled. First, the Commissioner determines if an individual is doing substantial gainful
activity; if so, the individual is not disabled for SSDIB purposes, regardless of their
medical condition. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i) and 404.1520(a)(5)(b). Second, if the
individual is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner must
determine whether the individual has had a “severe medically determinable . . . mental
impairment [that has lasted or can be expected to last for 12 months];” if not, the claim
will be denied 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) and 404.1509. Because the
Commissioner found that Kerins did not have a severe medically determinable mental
impairment at step two, and the analysis stopped there, we need not summarize the
remaining three steps. The claimant bears the burden of production and persuasion in
these first two steps. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987).
In reaching the determination that Kerins was not entitled to disability benefits,
ALJ Noorigian concluded that even if Kerins suffered from schizophrenia, Kerins did not
suffer from a severe impairment at any time through June 30, 1972. Therefore, Kerins’
claim was denied under step two of the analysis. “An impairment is not severe if it does
not significantly limit [the claimant’s] physical ability to do basic work activities,” which
are “abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521(a) and (b).
An applicant need only demonstrate something beyond a “slight abnormality or a
combination of slight abnormalities which would have no more than a minimal effect on
an individual’s ability to work.” Newell, 347 F.3d at 546 (citations omitted). If a judge
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can clearly determine the effect of an impairment on the individual’s ability to do basic
work activities, the analysis should end with the severe impairment step. See Newell,
347, F.3d at 547 n.5 (citations omitted). “[T]he step-two inquiry is a de minimis
screening device to dispose of groundless claims.” Id. at 546.
ALJ Noorigian supported his finding that Kerins’ impairment was not severe with
Kerins’ testimony that during the spring of 1972, he took 15 college credits and had a 2.9
grade point average, was able to concentrate for 5 minutes at a time, drive a car for 15
minutes, did not have problems with his daily living, and got along with everybody. ALJ
Noorigian found that these factors contradicted any limitation. ALJ Noorigian also noted
the Kerins worked for the police department “periodically” during 1973, and carried his
service pistol during these times, which ALJ Noorigian found to be inconsistent with a
person suffering from disabling schizophrenia. Kerins, however, argues that there was
not substantial evidence to show that his impairment was not severe, and to the contrary,
undisputed medical evidence was presented to show that his impairment was severe.
Reviewing the medical evidence presented, there is substantial evidence from
doctors’ reports to support the conclusion that Kerins’ impairment was not severe. First,
it must be noted that upon review of the previous medical reports, Dr. Snyder found the
medical evidence relevant to the severity of Kerins’ impairment to be insufficient to make
a retrospective determination. Also, Dr. Kuvins ultimately found that, while Kerins
suffered from schizophrenia, he was not psychotic. Further, while Dr. Kuvins
recommended that Kerins pursue a less stressful line of work than that of a police officer,
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he did not indicate that Kerins was unable to work at other types of jobs. Thus,
substantial evidence supported the Commissioner’s final determination.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the judgment of the District Court,
affirming the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security.
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