United States v. Vega

Opinions of the United
2006 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
6-19-2006
USA v. Vega
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 05-2389
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 05-2389
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
PEDRO VEGA,
Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands
Division of St. Thomas
(D.C. No. 03-cr-00040-3)
District Judge: Honorable Stanley S. Brotman
____________
Argued May 9, 2006
Before: FISHER, COWEN and ROTH,* Circuit Judges.
(Filed June 19, 2006)
Darwin K. Carr (Argued)
P.O. Box 1723
Christiansted, St. Croix
USVI 00821
Attorney for Appellant
*
The Honorable Jane R. Roth assumed senior status on May 31, 2006.
Kim L. Chisholm
Office of United States Attorney
United States Courthouse, Suite 260
5500 Veterans Building
Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas
USVI 00802-6924
Attorney for Appellee
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Pedro Vega, an official of the United States Customs Service, was convicted by a
jury of conspiracy, wire fraud, document fraud, bribery, obstruction of justice, and
unlawful transportation of an alien. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment within
the range prescribed by the United States Sentencing Guidelines based, in part, on judicial
findings of fact made by a preponderance of the evidence. He now appeals from the
judgment of conviction and sentence, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to
support the convictions, that the prosecution charged only a single conspiracy but proved
two, and that the facts supporting his sentence should have been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. We will affirm.
I.
Because the background of this case is fully recounted in our opinion in the related
case of United States v. Veras do los Santos, No. 05-3387 (3d Cir. 2006), we will offer in
2
this discussion only a brief summary of the facts, emphasizing those that are most
relevant to Mr. Vega’s appeal.
A.
The alleged conspiracy in this case was manifested in two distinct schemes. In the
first, Mr. Vega conspired with his girlfriend, Ignacia Veras de los Santos, and her brother,
Agustin Veras de los Santos, to provide a fraudulent passport stamp reflecting legal
immigration status to one Jose Agustin Reyes Hilario. Mr. Hilario gave his passport and
a substantial cash payment to Mr. Veras, who forwarded it through Ms. Veras to Mr.
Vega. Mr. Vega affixed a stamp to the passport and returned it to Mr. Hilario. Mr. Vega
then ushered Mr. Hilario through the customs process and onto a plane bound for Puerto
Rico. Unfortunately for the conspirators, Mr. Hilario was arrested soon after he landed.
In the second scheme, Mr. Vega conspired with two acquaintances, Victor
Rodriguez and Ana Senieda Lora, to provide an I-94 – a document reflecting legal
immigration status – to one Altagracia Ramirez. Mr. Ramirez offered a substantial cash
payment to Mr. Rodriguez and Ms. Lora in exchange for Mr. Vega’s assistance in
securing a blank I-94. Ms. Lora helped Ms. Ramirez to complete the document, and Mr.
Vega made arrangements to shepard Ms. Ramirez through the customs process.
However, the trip was cancelled when Mr. Vega became concerned over a possible
law enforcement investigation. Ms. Lora was arrested shortly thereafter. She sought
advice from Mr. Vega, who told her – in a telephone conversation recorded by police – to
3
“fall on her ass with nothing.” An agent of the Department of Homeland Security
testified that this phrase meant that she should not cooperate with authorities.
B.
An indictment against Ms. Veras, Mr. Veras, and Mr. Vega was filed in the
District Court of the Virgin Islands. It charged them with conspiracy in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 371, wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, document fraud in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1546, and bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201. It also charged Mr. Vega
individually with illegal transportation of aliens in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1324 and
obstruction of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512.1
Trial commenced on August 24, 2004. Mr. Hilario and Ms. Ramirez recounted
their encounters with Mr. Vega and the other conspirators, and Ms. Lora confirmed that
she had conspired with Mr. Vega to obtain the I-94. Mr. Hilario’s mother, who had
1
Counts one through three of the indictment charged Ms. Veras, Mr. Veras, and
Mr. Vega with wire fraud arising from the scheme to provide a fraudulent passport stamp;
count four charged Ms. Veras, Mr. Veras, and Mr. Vega with conspiracy arising from the
scheme to provide a fraudulent passport stamp; count five charged Ms. Veras, Mr. Veras,
and Mr. Vega with document fraud arising from the scheme to provide a fraudulent
passport stamp; count six charged Ms. Veras, Mr. Veras, and Mr. Vega with bribery
arising from the scheme to provide a fraudulent passport stamp; count seven charged Mr.
Vega with bribery arising from the scheme to provide a fraudulent I-94; counts eight and
nine charged Mr. Vega with obstruction of justice arising from the scheme to provide a
fraudulent I-94; count ten charged Mr. Vega with document fraud arising from the
scheme to provide a fraudulent I-94; count eleven charged Mr. Vega with illegal
transportation of aliens arising from the scheme to provide a fraudulent I-94; and counts
twelve through fourteen charged Mr. Vega with wire fraud arising from the scheme to
provide a fraudulent I-94.
4
provided the money for her son to obtain the passport stamp, testified that Ms. Veras and
Mr. Vega had personally returned a portion of the fee to her after Mr. Hilario’s arrest.
Several witnesses from telephone companies stated that calls made by and to Mr. Vega,
allegedly in furtherance of the schemes, were routed across territorial boundaries.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts on September 8, 2004. A post-
trial motion for judgment of acquittal was denied by the District Court.2
A sentencing hearing for Mr. Vega was held in April 2005. The District Court
adopted the presentence report and, over objection by defense counsel, found by a
preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Vega had held a “high-level decision-making”
position when he committed the offenses, resulting in an eight-level enhancement in the
recommended sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines § 2C1.7(b)(1) (2002). It then imposed a term of imprisonment of
forty-three months, within the Guidelines range and well within the statutory maximum
twenty-year term of imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
This timely appeal followed. An appeal by Mr. Veras was resolved in United
States v. Veras de los Santos, 163 Fed. Appx. 132 (3d Cir. 2006), and we address the
appeal by Ms. Veras in a separate opinion issued today, see United States v. Veras do los
Santos, No. 05-3387 (3d Cir. 2006).
2
The District Court did, however, grant one part of the motion. It held that the
record was inadequate to support Mr. Vega’s conviction of document fraud under count
ten of the indictment, relating to the scheme to provide Ms. Ramirez with a false I-94.
5
II.
Mr. Vega raises several challenges to the judgment of conviction and sentence.
Foremost, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish the elements of the
crimes with which he was charged. He also argues that the prosecution created an
impermissible variance by proving two conspiracies when only one was alleged in the
indictment and that the District Court erred in sentencing him based on facts not proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. These issues will be addressed in turn.
A.
Mr. Vega was convicted of multiple offenses: one count of conspiracy, six counts
of wire fraud, one count of document fraud, two counts of bribery, two counts of
obstruction of justice, and one count of unlawful transportation of an alien. He now
challenges the sufficiency of the record as to each.
1.
A criminal conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, is established by proof that
“two or more persons conspire[d] . . . to commit any offense against the United States . . .
and [that] one or more of such persons d[id] any act to effect the object of the
conspiracy.” Id. We have interpreted this provision to encompass three elements: (1) an
agreement between two or more persons to commit a federal crime, (2) knowledge of the
purpose of the conspiracy and a deliberate decision to join in that purpose, and
6
(3) commission of an “overt act” by one of the participants in furtherance of the
conspiracy. United States v. Conley, 37 F.3d 970, 976-77 (3d Cir. 1994).
These elements are satisfied in this case. As discussed in greater detail in the
related appeal by Ms. Veras, see Veras de los Santos, No. 05-3387, slip op. at 11-13, the
circumstances surrounding the scheme to obtain a passport stamp for Mr. Hilario give rise
to an inference that the participants understood that the stamp was fraudulent. See United
States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 134 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The elements of conspiracy . . . can
be proven entirely by circumstantial evidence.”). The transaction took place at a private
residence, involved an alien who was in the country illegally, was conducted for a large
sum of money, and required the personal intervention of a government official outside
normal channels. These facts reasonably demonstrate that the conspirators knew that the
product of their efforts, the passport stamp, was unlawful and yet took steps to achieve
that goal. See id. (“[W]e do not view the government’s evidence in isolation, but rather,
in conjunction and as a whole.”); see also United States v. Ytem, 255 F.3d 394, 396-97
(7th Cir. 2001). The conviction of conspiracy under count four of the indictment will be
upheld.
2.
Wire fraud is defined under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 as the use of interstate
communications in furtherance of a “scheme or artifice to defraud.” Id. To sustain a
conviction for wire fraud, the record must show that the defendant (1) knowingly and
7
willfully participated in a scheme or artifice to defraud, (2) possessed a specific intent to
defraud, and (3) used wire communications in interstate commerce, or reasonably foresaw
that such wires would be used, in furtherance of the scheme. United States v. Antico, 275
F.3d 245, 261 (3d Cir. 2001).
The record satisfies these elements. The two plots in which Mr. Vega participated
required him to disregard his official duties and assist illegal aliens to obtain fraudulent
travel documentation. See Veras de los Santos, No. 05-3387, slip op. at 14. These acts
deprived the public of its “intangible right to honest service” and constituted “scheme[s]
or artifice[s] to defraud.” See 18 U.S.C. § 1346. And, because these schemes were
facilitated by telephone communications routed outside of the Virgin Islands,3 they
support the convictions for wire fraud under counts one, two, three, twelve, thirteen, and
fourteen of the indictment.
3.
Production or possession of fraudulent immigration papers is defined as a federal
offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1546. That section provides that “[w]hoever knowingly
forges, counterfeits, alters, or falsely makes any . . . document prescribed by statute or
regulation for entry into or as evidence of authorized stay or employment in the United
3
That Mr. Vega did not reasonably foresee the interstate nature of these
communications is irrelevant to this analysis, for the reasons explained in the related
appeal of Ms. Veras. See Veras de los Santos, No. 05-3387, slip op. at 14-17.
8
States, or . . . possesses . . . any such . . . document[,] . . . knowing it to be . . . procured by
fraud or unlawfully obtained” is guilty of a crime. Id. § 1546(a).
The record supports a finding that Mr. Vega knowingly produced a passport with a
fraudulent passport stamp. Despite the lack of direct evidence on the point, the
government offered a substantial quantum of circumstantial proof suggesting that the
document was false. See United States v. Singh, 222 F.3d 6, 9-10 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting
that circumstantial evidence may suffice to demonstrate forgery in document). The stamp
was obtained under extremely suspicious circumstances, outside of normal channels, and
for a large sum of money. It was provided to an alien who had entered the country
illegally. Mr. Hilario was instructed to depart the territory at a particular time, wearing
particular clothes, and in the presence of a particular official, Mr. Vega. He was allowed
to board the plane with Mr. Vega’s intervention, but was not allowed to travel elsewhere
in the United States using the passport. And, soon after Mr. Hilario was arrested, Ms.
Veras and Mr. Vega spoke personally with Mr. Hilario’s mother – in a private setting –
and returned a substantial portion of the fee that they had taken. It may be inferred from
these facts that the document was fraudulent and that Mr. Vega was involved in its
production and distribution. See Veras de los Santos, No. 05-3387, slip op. at 18-19. Mr.
Vega’s conviction of document fraud under count five of the indictment will be upheld.
9
4.
Federal law prohibits the giving or accepting of money to influence official
actions. A “public official” commits the offense of bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)
when he or she “corruptly . . . accepts . . . anything of value personally or for any other
person . . . in return for . . . being influenced in the performance of any official act[,] . . .
being influenced to commit or aid in committing . . . any fraud . . . on the United States[,]
or . . . being induced to do or omit to do any act in violation of the official duty of such
official.” Id.
Mr. Vega was charged with two counts of bribery: count six related to the scheme
to provide a false passport stamp; count seven related to the scheme to provide a false
I-94.
The record is sufficient to support the conviction under count six. Mr. Hilario
testified that he paid a substantial sum of money to Mr. Veras and Ms. Veras on the
understanding that Mr. Vega would provide a passport stamp.4 The passport was later
returned to him, with a stamp affixed, and Mr. Vega personally assisted him through the
customs process. After Mr. Hilario was arrested, Mr. Vega visited Mr. Hilario’s mother
4
Defense counsel suggests obliquely that we may not rely on Mr. Hilario’s
testimony without independent corroboration. This argument is meritless. Independent
corroboration is not generally required to support admission of a witness’s testimony;
rather, it is required, in limited circumstances under the corpus delicti doctrine, only when
the witness is also a defendant. See Government of Virgin Islands v. Harris, 938 F.2d
401, 409 & n.6 (3d Cir. 1991). Mr. Hilario is not a defendant in this case, and
independent corroboration of his testimony was unnecessary.
10
and returned some of the money to her. A reasonable juror could infer from these
circumstances that Mr. Vega received a bribe in exchange for securing a fraudulent
passport stamp.5
A closer question is presented with respect to count seven. Testimony at trial
suggested that a blank I-94, of the type forwarded to Ms. Ramirez, is available at any
commercial airline counter, meaning that Mr. Vega’s act of sending the form to Ms.
Ramirez did not violate any legal duty. Moreover, defense counsel asserts that there is
insufficient evidence to establish that Mr. Vega was paid for assisting in the scheme.
These arguments do not cast doubt on the conviction. It is immaterial that a blank
I-94 may be obtained at any airline counter. Although these documents may be procured
at other locations, they cannot be used to travel within the United States unless they have
been approved by a customs official. Mr. Vega not only assisted Ms. Ramirez in securing
the document; he also agreed to usher her through the customs process when she was
preparing to leave. Although this plan was never carried to fruition, due to Mr. Vega’s
subsequent arrest, it is clear that he promised to perform the act. This promise, even
without actual performance, is sufficient to sustain a conviction for bribery. United States
v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 404-05 (1999) (holding that conviction
under 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) requires proof of an exchange of money in return for a promise
5
There is no doubt that Mr. Vega, as a customs supervisor, was a “public official”
under the statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(1) (“[T]he term ‘public official’ means . . . [an]
employee . . . [of any] . . . agency or branch of Government . . . .”).
11
of an official act); cf. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 333 (1966) (rejecting factual
impossibility as a defense to charge of endeavoring to bribe a juror), cited with approval
in United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 610-11 (1995).
The record also permits an inference that Mr. Vega received payments in exchange
for this promise. Ms. Lora testified that Mr. Vega had told her during a previous
transaction that it would cost $1,500 to assist an illegal alien in exiting the country. It
may reasonably be assumed that the same practice was followed during the transaction
involving Ms. Ramirez, particularly in light of Ms. Lora’s testimony that she received the
same amount of money – $1,500 – from Ms. Ramirez to secure the I-94 and passage into
the United States. This evidence provides an adequate basis on which the jury could infer
that Mr. Vega received the money in exchange for his assistance in the scheme.
The evidence was sufficient to prove that Mr. Vega accepted bribes for
participating in the illegal schemes to obtain a fraudulent passport stamp and a false I-94.
The convictions under counts six and seven will be sustained.
5.
The federal witness tampering statute makes it unlawful for any person to
“corruptly persuade[ ] another person . . . with intent to . . . hinder, delay, or prevent the
communication to a law enforcement officer . . . of the United States of information
relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512(b)(3); see also Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 703-06
12
(2005). We held in United States v. Farrell, 126 F.3d 484 (3d Cir. 1997), that, to be
“corrupt,” the persuasion at issue must be accompanied by inappropriate coercive
enticement or tainted by other illegality. Id. at 487-90. It is not enough that the defendant
merely advises a coconspirator to exercise his or her constitutional right to remain silent,
even if the defendant acts with the “improper purpose” of hindering a pending criminal
investigation. Id. The defendant must go beyond simple advocacy of a lawful course of
action and either exert some form of wrongful coercive pressure, such as offering a bribe
or employing misrepresentations, or request that the person engage in illegal conduct. Id.
Mr. Vega was charged with two counts of witness tampering: count eight alleged
that he had “instruct[ed another] person to destroy all evidence of a fraudulent I-94 from
law enforcement detection”; count nine alleged that he had “instruct[ed another] person to
withhold information from law enforcement.”
The record supports the conviction under count eight. Testimony at trial indicated
that, following the arrest of Ms. Ramirez and Ms. Lora, Mr. Vega instructed Ms. Ramirez
to “break” the “document[].” This statement could reasonably be construed as advising
Ms. Ramirez to destroy the I-94 that she had received from Mr. Vega. This document
was relevant to a pending criminal investigation, and its destruction would have violated
federal law. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (prohibiting destruction of records in federal
investigations). Therefore, Mr. Vega’s advice could be deemed “corrupt” persuasion for
purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3). See Farrell, 126 F.3d at 487-90.
13
Defense counsel protests that the advice to Ms. Ramirez was “noncoercive.” This
is unavailing. Farrell did not base its definition of “corrupt” solely on whether the
conduct at issue was coercive or noncoercive. See 126 F.3d at 487-90. Rather, it
recognized that noncoercive statements may constitute corrupt persuasion if they advocate
illegal behavior. Id.; see United States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 231, 250 (3d Cir.) (holding that
defendant’s noncoercive suggestion to kill a witness constituted corrupt persuasion under
18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3)), amended by 197 F.3d 662 (3d Cir. 1999); see also United States
v. Khatami, 280 F.3d 907, 912-13 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that “[o]ther circuits . . .
have . . . concluded that § 1512(b) encompasses non-coercive attempts to tamper with
witnesses” and citing, among others, Farrell and Davis). Mr. Vega’s statement, even if
“noncoercive,” advised Ms. Ramirez to take unlawful action and is therefore properly
considered corrupt persuasion. The conviction under count eight will be upheld.
The record also supports the conviction under count nine, based on Mr. Vega’s
advice to Ms. Lora to “fall on her ass with nothing.” We believe that this phrase could be
interpreted to advocate illegal action. It plausibly suggests that Ms. Lora should not only
refrain from speaking with investigators, but should destroy or withhold any incriminating
evidence. Indeed, in light of Mr. Vega’s explicit advice to Ms. Ramirez to “break” the
I-94, the jury could reasonably conclude that Mr. Vega was similarly urging Ms. Lora to
eliminate or conceal any records or materials that inculpated her and Mr. Vega. These
actions would have violated federal law, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1519, and thus Mr. Vega’s
14
statement constitutes “corrupt persuasion” under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3). The conviction
under count nine will be upheld.
6.
Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) of Title 8 of the United States Code criminalizes an
attempt to transport an illegal alien within the United States:
Any person who . . . knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an
alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of
law, transports, or moves or attempts to transport or move such alien within
the United States . . . in furtherance of such violation of law . . . [is guilty of
unlawful transportation of an alien.]
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii). To sustain a conviction under this section, the government
must prove that (1) the defendant transported or attempted to transport an alien within the
United States, (2) the alien was in the United States illegally, (3) the defendant knew of or
recklessly disregarded the fact that the alien was in the United States illegally, and (4) the
defendant acted willfully in furtherance of the alien’s violation of the law. See United
States v. Williams, 132 F.3d 1055, 1059 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Parmelee, 42
F.3d 387, 391 & n.5 (7th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Barajas-Chavez, 162 F.3d
1285, 1288 (10th Cir. 1999).
The record is more than sufficient to support the conclusion that Mr. Vega
knowingly attempted to transport Ms. Ramirez illegally through the United States.6 Ms.
6
For reasons that are not clear, Mr. Vega was not charged with unlawful
transportation of an alien with respect to the scheme to assist Mr. Hilario.
15
Ramirez testified that she was here unlawfully, and Ms. Lora confirmed that Ms. Ramirez
had sought assistance to obtain a fraudulent I-94. Mr. Vega had previously agreed to help
illegal aliens to travel within the United States, and had reason to know from Ms. Lora
that Ms. Ramirez was in the country illegally. He nevertheless made arrangements to
provide Ms. Ramirez with an I-94 and to usher her through the customs process to ensure
that she could travel into the United States. The conviction for transportation of an illegal
alien will be upheld.
B.
Mr. Vega next argues that the government created an impermissible “variance” by
proving two conspiracies when only one was alleged. The prosecution is not permitted to
allege a single conspiracy in an indictment and then offer evidence of multiple,
independently operating conspiracies at trial. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750,
765 (1946); see also United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 345 (3d Cir. 2002). Such a
variance between the pleadings and the proof betrays a misjoinder of defendants and
carries the possibility that an individual who is not involved in the larger scheme will
nevertheless be convicted thereof. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765-74, cited in United States
v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446-47 (1986). A defendant who can establish both a variance and
substantial prejudice arising therefrom is entitled to relief from conviction. United States
v. Padilla, 982 F.2d 110, 114-16 (3d Cir. 1992).
16
We need not determine whether a variance occurred in this case because, even if
established, it did not prejudice Mr. Vega. There was no chance that the jury would
impute the guilt of an unaffiliated conspirator to Mr. Vega or unfairly convict him of a
conspiracy in which he was not involved,7 for the reason that Mr. Vega was undoubtedly
involved in both of the schemes in this case. No matter whether the government proved
one or two conspiracies, Mr. Vega was criminally responsible for each and evidence
relating to each was fully admissible against him. The alleged variance in this case could
not have resulted in an imputation of guilt that was not otherwise warranted or the
introduction of damaging evidence that was not otherwise admissible. See, e.g., United
States v. Ghant, 339 F.3d 660, 664 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[The] ‘prejudicial spillover effect’
from one conspiracy to another[,] . . . if the defendant is a member of both
conspiracies[,] . . . is minimal, if not nonexistent.”) (quoting United States v. Scott, 511
F.2d 15, 20 (8th Cir. 1975)). The challenge to the judgment of conviction on this ground
will be rejected.
C.
Mr. Vega also argues that the District Court erred under United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220 (2005), in finding facts relevant to the United States Sentencing Guidelines
by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than beyond a reasonable doubt. This
7
See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 774 (warning of “[t]he dangers of transference of guilt
from one to another across the line separating conspiracies”).
17
objection may be quickly rejected. We stated in United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324
(3d Cir. 2006), and confirmed in United States v. Grier, No. 05-1698, 2006 WL 1530009
(3d Cir. June 6, 2006), that these facts “do not implicate the constitutional right to proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at *1, 6-7 (citing Cooper, 437 F.3d at 330). The District
Court did not err in making these findings by a preponderance of the evidence, see id. at
*8-9, and Mr. Vega suffered no infringement of his rights under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, as construed in Booker. His challenge to the sentence on these grounds
will be rejected.8
III.
The proceedings in this case were constitutionally adequate. The evidence
presented at trial supported the convictions of conspiracy, wire fraud, document fraud,
bribery, obstruction of justice, and unlawful transportation of an alien. The alleged
variance could not have prejudiced Mr. Vega since he was involved in both conspiracies
and was not at risk of an unfair imputation of guilt by association. The facts properly
found by the District Court by a preponderance of the evidence supported enhancements
for obstruction of justice, multiple bribes, and abuse of a high-level position.
For these reasons, the judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.
8
Mr. Vega does not challenge the reasonableness of his sentence.
18