Baker v. Hunter Douglas Inc.

Opinions of the United
2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
3-19-2008
Baker v. Hunter Douglas Inc
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 06-5149
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________
No: 06-5149
_______________
CAROL BAKER,
Appellant
v.
HUNTER DOUGLAS INC.
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 045-cv-02105)
District Judge: Honorable William H. Walls
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 7, 2008
Before: BARRY, JORDAN, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: March 19, 2008)
_______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________
JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
Carol Baker appeals from the District Court’s December 20, 2006 entry of final
judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), following a March 28, 2006
opinion and order granting summary judgment to Hunter Douglas, Inc. (“Hunter
Douglas”) on four of the five counts of Baker’s Complaint. For the reasons set forth
below, we will affirm.
I. Background
Because we write solely for the parties, we presume the reader’s familiarity with
the background of the case and recite only a limited version of the facts. Baker began
working in the Marketing Department of Hunter Douglas in March 1997. In June 2002,
she became a Senior Administrator for Cooperative Advertising, and was responsible for
processing cooperative (“co-op”) claims made by third-party dealers who incurred
advertising costs relating to Hunter Douglas products. Despite her best efforts, it soon
became impossible for Baker to keep up with her work. As a result, Hunter Douglas
contracted with a claim processing company in January 2003 for assistance with the co-op
claims. Baker transferred responsibility for the claims to that company while completing
work on unprocessed claims from 2002.
Unfortunately, the transfer was, in her words, a “complete disaster” and Baker
soon became overwhelmed by the amount of work, suffering what she described as a
“nervous breakdown.” (App. at A-6.) After seeing a physician, on June 5, 2003, Baker
sent an e-mail to her supervisors explaining her mental state and requested “2 months off
to get my head screwed back on so I can think straight again.” (Id. at A-7.) One of her
supervisors asked if she could finish the work week (June 5, 2003 was a Thursday) and
work one additional week so that the company could find a replacement. Baker then met
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with the Director of Payroll Benefits who provided her with a copy of Hunter Douglas’s
FMLA 1 policy. Baker was informed that her leave under FMLA was limited to 12 weeks.
Her FMLA leave began on June 16, 2003 and ended on September 5, 2003. She also
applied for and received short term disability benefits beginning at the same time as her
FMLA leave.2
On September 5, 2003, the last day of her FMLA leave, Baker returned to Hunter
Douglas to discuss with her supervisors the possibility of returning to work part-time.
She did not have the requisite certification from her doctor permitting her to return to full-
time work. Her supervisors were unavailable that day, so Baker left phone messages for
them. One of Baker’s supervisors returned her call on September 15, 2003 and referred
her to the Director of Payroll Benefits. On September 19, 2003, the Director of Payroll
Benefits informed Baker that there were no part-time or full-time positions available at
Hunter Douglas, and, when asked by Baker, told her that she was, in effect, being
terminated.
Baker filed a Complaint in the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey on May 5, 2004. The Complaint set forth claims that Hunter Douglas failed to
reinstate her in her previous job or a comparable one and interfered with her taking
advantage of federally available leave pursuant to FMLA (Counts One and Two), that, in
1
“FMLA” stands for the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.
2
As of March 27, 2006, Baker was also receiving long-term disability benefits.
3
violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12 (“NJLAD”),
Hunter Douglas discriminated against her because of her alleged disability and failed to
accommodate her disability (Counts Three and Four), and that Hunter Douglas was
equitably estopped from terminating her employment (Count Five). Hunter Douglas
moved for summary judgment on all counts. On March 28, 2006, the District Court
granted the motion as to Counts One, Three, Four and Five, but held that a material issue
of fact prevented summary judgment on Count Two. On December 20, 2006, the District
Court granted Baker’s motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) for final
judgment on the four claims she lost. This appeal followed.3
II. Discussion
Baker argues that Hunter Douglas violated FMLA by interfering with her rights
under that statute and failing to reinstate her to her previous position. She also argues that
the District Court erred in granting summary judgment against her on her claim under
NJLAD because factual issues existed as to whether Hunter Douglas could have provided
her with a reasonable accommodation and whether such an accommodation would have
constituted an undue hardship on the company. Finally, Baker argues that factual issues
existed as to whether Hunter Douglas was estopped from terminating her employment.
3
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over Baker’s FMLA claims pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and subject matter jurisdiction over her state law claims pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1367. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of
the District Court’s grant of summary judgment is plenary. Sarnowski v. Air Brooke
Limousine, Inc., 510 F.3d 398, 401 (3d Cir. 2007).
4
With respect to Count One, that Hunter Douglas violated FMLA by failing to
reinstate her in her job after she returned from FMLA leave, the District Court found that
the “primary issue” was whether Baker could perform the essential functions of her
former position upon the expiration of her FMLA leave, and it noted that “reasonable
accommodation is inapplicable in the context of an FMLA claim.” (App. at A-13 (citing
29 C.F.R. § 825.214(b) and Rinehimer v. Cemcolift, Inc., 292 F.3d 375, 384 (3d Cir.
2002)).
The District Court held that Baker had the burden to establish that she was able to
work on a full-time, rather than part-time, basis in order to demonstrate her ability to
perform the essential functions of her former job. See, e.g., Tardie v. Rehabilitation
Hosp., 168 F.3d 538, 544 (1st Cir. 1999) (plaintiff’s inability to work fifty to seventy
hours per week as hospital administrator constituted a failure to perform essential
function of the job); Hatchett v. Philander Smith College, 251 F.3d 670, 676-77 (8th Cir.
2001) (Under FMLA, “an employee who could not otherwise perform the essential
functions of her job, apart from the inability to work a full-time schedule, is not entitled to
intermittent or reduced schedule leave ... .”). The Court then found that Baker failed to
meet that burden because she never obtained a certification from her doctor that
confirmed her “current ability to resume the duties of [her] job,” as required by Hunter
Douglas’s FMLA policy. (App. at A-15 to A-16.) Further, as of September 2, 2003,
Baker on multiple occasions had indicated her desire to return to work on a part-time
5
basis only. Finally, the District Court found that Baker’s receipt of short-term disability
benefits judicially estopped her from asserting that she was able to perform the essential
functions of her job as of September 5, 2003.
The District Court found that, “[b]ecause the FMLA does not provide for a
reasonable accommodation and the record indicates that [Baker] was unable to return to
work full-time at the conclusion of her FMLA leave on September 5, 2003,” Hunter
Douglas was entitled to summary judgment on Count One of Baker’s Complaint. (App.
at A-19.) We agree with the Court’s reasoning and its conclusion that there were no
material issues of fact that precluded summary judgment on Baker’s claim that Hunter
Douglas violated FMLA by failing to reinstate her in her job after she returned from
leave. We will therefore affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on Count
One.
To the extent Baker’s arguments can be viewed as pertaining to Count Two, the
FMLA interference claim, we cannot review that aspect of them because the District
Court denied summary judgment on that claim and it has not yet proceeded to trial.
As to Count Three, alleging disability discrimination under NJLAD, it is difficult
to discern from Baker’s appellate brief whether she is still challenging the District Court’s
grant of summary judgment to Hunter Douglas.4 Assuming that she is, we agree with the
4
A plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discriminatory
discharge under the NJLAD by proving that (1) she is handicapped, (2) she was
performing her job satisfactorily, (3) she was dismissed from her position, and (4)
similarly situated individuals who were not handicapped were retained by defendant. See
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District Court’s conclusion that Baker could not perform her former job satisfactorily due
to her inability to return to work on a full-time basis. See Svarnas v. AT&T
Communications, 740 A.2d 662, 673 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1999) (“[E]ven an employee
whose job performance is more than adequate when she is working will not be considered
qualified for the job unless the employee is also willing and able to come to work on a
regular basis.”) (citations omitted). We will therefore affirm the District Court’s grant of
summary judgment to Hunter Douglas on Count Three.
Count Four claims that Hunter Douglas violated NJLAD by failing to reasonably
accommodate Baker by allowing her to work part-time or as part of a job share
arrangement. Hunter Douglas argued it was entitled to summary judgment because it is
per se unreasonable to require an employer to allow part-time work for a full-time
position. The District Court agreed, finding that Baker’s “inability to work a full-time
work schedule, which was a crucial part of the job’s requirements, precludes an
accommodation that would have sacrificed anything less than full-time work.” (App. at
A-23); see, e.g., Donahue v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 224 F.3d 226, 230 (3d Cir. 2000)
(providing a reasonable accommodation does not require creation of a new job); Muller v.
Exxon Research and Eng’g Co., 786 A.2d 143, 150 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2001) (under
NJLAD, “an indefinite part-time work schedule” is not a reasonable accommodation).
Maher v. N.J. Transit Rail Ops., Inc., 593 A.2d 750, 763 (N.J. 1991) (setting forth the
elements of discriminatory harassment, transfer, or discharge under New Jersey law).
The parties disputed only the second prong of this test.
7
The District Court also found that Baker’s request that Hunter Douglas allow her to share
her duties with another employee is not a reasonable accommodation under NJLAD.
The District Court recognized that, under the NJLAD, Hunter Douglas had a
“general duty ... to make a reasonable effort to determine appropriate accommodations,”
which is often referred to as the “interactive process.” (App. at A-26 to A-27.) An
employer must “‘make a good-faith effort to seek accommodations.’” (Id. at A-28
(quoting Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 317 (3d Cir. 1999).) The
District Court rejected Baker’s argument that Hunter Douglas acted in bad faith because
there was a two week delay between the time she approached her supervisors to ask them
about working part-time and when the Director of Payroll addressed her request. The
District Court found that there was no evidence that the delay was the result of bad faith
on Hunter Douglas’s part, and that, in any event, no other positions, either full-time or
part-time, were “available anywhere in [Hunter Douglas’s] New Jersey offices ... and this
fact was communicated to [Baker].” (App. at A-28 to A-29.) Finally, the District Court
referred to its prior analysis under FMLA pertaining to Count One of Baker’s complaint
and stated that Baker “cannot prove that she could perform the essential functions of the
job of overseeing the processing of co-op claims with or without a reasonable
accommodation, and therefore she cannot explain the inconsistent positions taken with
regard to her NJLAD claim [that she could return to work] and her receipt of short-term
disability benefits.” (App. at A-30.)
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Again, we agree with the District Court’s reasoning and conclusion that there were
no material issues of fact that would preclude summary judgment on Baker’s claim that
Hunter Douglas violated the NJLAD by failing to provide her with reasonable
accommodations. We will therefore affirm the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment on Count Four.
Finally, Baker’s arguments pertaining to Count Five, the equitable estoppel claim,
are unavailing. In order to succeed on a claim of equitable estoppel, Baker had to prove
that she detrimentally relied on representations made by her supervisors and that these
representations caused her not to return to work as required by Hunter Douglas’s FMLA
policy. Cf. Hooven v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 465 F.3d 566, 572 n.4 (3d Cir. 2006) (plaintiff
must establish detrimental reliance to sustain an equitable estoppel claim under ERISA);
see also Barone v. Leukemia Soc. of Am., 42 F. Supp. 2d 452, 464 (D.N.J. 1998)
(detrimental reliance is an essential element of a claim for equitable estoppel under New
Jersey law). The District Court found that Baker could not demonstrate detrimental
reliance because she “fail[ed] to establish that she was able to perform the essential
functions of her job, with or without an accommodation,” making it impossible for her to
prove that she “could have returned to work ... but didn’t because of [her supervisors’]
statements that caused her to believe that she did not need to return.” (App. A-37.) We
agree with the District Court’s conclusion that there was no issue of material fact with
9
regard to Baker’s inability to return to work full-time following her FMLA leave, and we
will therefore affirm the grant of summary judgment to Hunter Douglas on Count Five.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s March 28, 2006 opinion and order
and December 20, 2006 entry of final judgment will be affirmed.
10