United States v. Daniel Charles

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 10-2599
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
DANIEL CHARLES,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 06-cr-00526-3)
District Judge: Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 20, 2011
Before: HARDIMAN and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
and RESTANI * Judge.
(Filed: June 22, 2011)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
*
The Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge of the United States Court of International
Trade, sitting by designation.
Daniel Charles appeals his judgment of conviction after a jury found him guilty of
six counts arising from the purchase and subsequent use of a firearm in a commercial
robbery. Charles challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as well as the District Court‟s
denial of his motions to sever and to exclude physical evidence. We will affirm.
I
Because we write for the parties, we recount only those facts necessary to our
decision. We view the facts in the light most favorable to the Government as the verdict
winner. United States v. Abbott, 574 F.3d 203, 204 n.1 (3d Cir. 2009).
On January 6, 2006, Tasha Betancourt purchased two Ruger 9mm handguns from
a federally licensed firearms dealer in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and certified in writing
that she was the actual purchaser of the guns. Betancourt later testified that she was paid
$1,000 to buy the guns for Daniel Charles and Aaron St. Jean.
On January 25, 2006, three men armed with handguns and wearing ski masks
robbed the Rite Aid store at 6600 North Broad Street in Philadelphia, where both Charles
and St. Jean had been employed. While two robbers stayed near the front of the store, the
third robber took the assistant manager, Ernesto Elefante, to the back office and forced
him at gunpoint to open and empty two safes. The robber stole approximately $2,300 in
cash, including a box containing $500 in rolled quarters. Elefante, who knew Charles
from his employment at Rite Aid, testified at trial that the robber was taller than Charles
and that he did not recognize the robber‟s voice.
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During the robbery, an employee fled the store and alerted two Philadelphia police
officers. As the officers approached, they witnessed the two other robbers exiting the
store and gave chase. The two robbers were apprehended and identified as St. Jean and
another former Rite Aid employee, Walter Carolina, Jr. The officers recovered firearms
from both men, and St. Jean‟s weapon was later identified as one of the Ruger 9mm
handguns that Betancourt purchased. The third robber was not apprehended at the scene.
The Rite Aid manager, Michael Anderson, arrived at the scene and identified St.
Jean and Carolina. Anderson also advised the officers that he suspected the third robber
was Charles because the three men were friendly while working at Rite Aid. In addition,
Elefante told police that he had seen Charles and St. Jean together in the store about an
hour before the robbery.
The police proceeded to Charles‟s residence, where they arrested him as he left the
building. Police obtained a search warrant for Charles‟s residence and executed it the
next morning. This search yielded a black ski mask, a box of quarters, and the other
Ruger 9mm handgun purchased by Betancourt. At trial, Elefante identified the box of
quarters as the same one that had been stolen from the Rite Aid. All three items were
recovered from a bedroom in the home that also contained a driver‟s license and other
documents belonging to Charles. At trial, Charles‟s brother testified that he shared the
room with Charles, that no one else placed items in their room, and that none of the
recovered items belonged to him.
3
On November 28, 2006, a grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
returned a superseding indictment charging Charles, St. Jean, and Carolina with robbery
and firearms offenses.1 Carolina pleaded guilty while Charles and St. Jean went to trial.
During jury selection, the District Court severed the trials of Charles and St. Jean, and
both were convicted on all counts by separate juries.
Prior to trial, Charles moved to sever the straw purchase, felon-in-possession, and
robbery counts. He also moved to exclude evidence of the gun and ammunition
recovered from his home from the trial of the robbery counts. Charles argued that there
was no direct evidence to link him or the gun recovered from his room to the robbery. He
contended that allowing the separate counts to be tried together or admitting evidence of
the gun would unfairly prejudice the jury‟s view of the robbery counts. The District
Court agreed with Charles as to the felon-in-possession count, but refused to sever the
other counts or to exclude the gun, finding that the offenses arose out of the same pattern
of activity and the evidence of the gun was closely related to the robbery offense.
1
Charles was charged with six counts: conspiring to make and making false
statements to a federal firearms dealer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371, and
924(a)(1)(A) (Counts 1 and 2, the straw purchase offenses); conspiracy to interfere and
interference with interstate commerce by robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and
1951(a), and using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 2 and 924(c)(1) (Counts 3, 4, and 5, the robbery offenses); and being a felon in
possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count 6, the felon in
possession offense). St. Jean was charged with the same counts as Charles, except for the
§ 922(g) felon in possession charge. Carolina was charged only with the robbery and §
924(c)(1) offenses.
4
After trial was concluded, Charles timely moved to set aside the jury verdict for
insufficient evidence. He argued that a reasonable jury could not find beyond a
reasonable doubt that he was guilty of the robbery offenses when no direct evidence
showed that he participated in the robbery and Elefante‟s testimony suggested that
Charles was not the third robber. The District Court denied the motion.
II
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(a)(1). We exercise plenary review over the joinder of counts under Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 8(a), United States v. Irizarry, 341 F.3d 273, 287 (3d Cir. 2003),
and review the District Court‟s decision not to sever under Rule 14(a) for abuse of
discretion, United States v. Lore, 430 F.3d 190, 205 (3d Cir. 2005). We review the
District Court‟s decision to admit or exclude evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence
403 for abuse of discretion, reversing only if the decision was arbitrary or irrational.
United States v. Universal Rehab. Servs. (PA), Inc., 205 F.3d 657, 665 (3d Cir. 2000) (en
banc). Finally, “[i]n reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we „must
determine whether, viewing the evidence most favorably to the [G]overnment, there is
substantial evidence to support the jury‟s guilty verdict.‟” United States v. Urban, 404
F.3d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Idowu, 157 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir.
1998)).
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A
Charles argues that the District Court erred in refusing to sever the straw purchase
charges from the robbery charges under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14(a)
because they were not properly joined in the indictment under Rule 8(a) and because the
joinder prejudiced the jury against him. Rule 8(a) allows counts to be joined in a single
indictment when they “are of the same or similar character, or are based on the same act
or transaction, or are connected with or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan.”
FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a). However, under Rule 14(a), the court may sever properly joined
counts for trial if joinder “appears to prejudice a defendant or the government.” FED. R.
CRIM. P. 14(a). In determining whether a Rule 14 ruling was an abuse of discretion,
“[t]he proper question on appeal is whether the jury could have been reasonably expected
to compartmentalize the allegedly prejudicial evidence in light of the quantity and limited
admissibility of the evidence.” United States v. De Peri, 778 F.2d 963, 984 (3d Cir.
1985).
The indictment in this case sufficiently alleged that the straw purchase and robbery
charges were “connected with or constitute[d] parts of a common scheme or plan”
because it alleged that Charles and St. Jean intended to use the guns purchased by
Betancourt to commit the robbery. Given this allegation, the short time period between
the straw purchase and the robbery, and the fact that one of the guns was recovered from
St. Jean at the robbery, it was not error for these counts to be joined in the same
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indictment. See United States v. Weber, 437 F.2d 327, 331 (3d Cir. 1970).
The crux of Charles‟s argument for severance under Rule 14 is that, because the
jury heard evidence that he was involved with the straw purchase of a gun used in the
crime (St. Jean‟s gun), the jury ignored the lack of direct evidence tying Charles to the
robbery. Charles has the burden of showing that he was prejudiced by the joint trial, De
Peri, 778 F.2d at 983, but he provides no evidence as to why the jury would be unable to
compartmentalize the evidence as to the separate counts. Thus, his argument for
supposed prejudice amounts to no more than “the same potential for prejudice that every
criminal defendant faces when multiple counts are tried together,” i.e., insufficient
prejudice to warrant severance. United States v. Joshua, 976 F.2d 844, 848 (3d Cir.
1992), abrogated on other grounds by Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993).
Moreover, because the evidence of the straw purchase would be admissible in a trial of
the robbery offenses to show Charles‟s ownership of the handgun and relationship with
St. Jean, severing the trials would have had little effect on the information available to the
jury. See United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 571 (3d Cir. 1991) (severance not
warranted when evidence would be admissible in both trials). Accordingly, the District
Court did not abuse its discretion by denying Charles‟s motion to sever.
B
Charles also argues that the District Court erred by denying his motion under Rule
403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to exclude the Ruger 9mm handgun and
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ammunition recovered from his home from the trial on the robbery counts. Rule 403
provides that otherwise admissible “evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury . . . .” Charles argues that the evidence was not probative of the
robbery because there was no direct evidence linking it to the robbery and its prejudicial
effect was significant because it allowed the jury to make the “logical leap” that the gun
was the one used by Charles in committing the robbery.
Charles understates the probative value and overstates the prejudicial effect of the
evidence because his argument rests on the false premise that a jury cannot make logical
inferences or base its decision on circumstantial evidence. In actuality, “[a] jury may use
circumstantial evidence to support reasonable inferences of facts.” United States v.
Silveus, 542 F.3d 993, 1004 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. McNeill, 887 F.2d 448,
450 (3d Cir. 1989) (“Inferences from established facts are accepted methods of proof
when no direct evidence is available so long as there exists a logical and convincing
connection between the facts established and the conclusion inferred.”)). An abundance
of such circumstantial evidence—that Charles and St. Jean arranged the straw purchase
together, that St. Jean used one of the handguns in the robbery, and that the other handgun
was recovered from Charles‟s room along with a ski mask and proceeds from the
robbery—makes the inference that Charles used the handgun recovered from his room in
the robbery eminently reasonable. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in
8
refusing to exclude this evidence.
C
Charles argues that the District Court erred by not granting his Rule 29 motion to
set aside the jury verdict for insufficient evidence. In ruling on a Rule 29 motion, “[w]e
will sustain the verdict if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, a claim of insufficiency of the evidence
places a very heavy burden on an appellant.” Urban, 404 F.3d at 762-63 (quoting United
States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted). We
must be “ever vigilant . . . not to usurp the role of the jury by weighing credibility and
assigning weight to the evidence, or by substituting [our] judgment for that of the jury.”
United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 133 (3d Cir. 2005).
Although Charles argues that a reasonable jury could not have concluded that he
participated in the robbery of the Rite Aid based on the evidence presented, we have little
difficulty in finding that it could. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Government,
the sum of the evidence—including, inter alia, the straw purchase of the handguns, the
testimony that Charles and St. Jean were together in the store before the robbery, and the
physical evidence recovered from Charles‟s home—renders reasonable the conclusion
that Charles participated in the robbery. The fact that Elefante did not recognize the
disguised robber who held him at gunpoint, even though he knew Charles, does not
obviate the rationality of that conclusion. Charles presented that argument to the jury, and
9
the jury found it unpersuasive, perhaps concluding that Elefante was mistaken due to fear
or confusion. Likewise, we are unpersuaded by Charles‟s attempt to challenge the
physical evidence recovered from his home by arguing that the gun, ski mask, and box of
rolled quarters were not conclusively identified as being connected to the robbery.
Although the jury was not required to do so, it was permitted to conclude that those items
evidenced Charles‟s participation in the robbery. Because the evidence presented could
reasonably support the jury‟s finding of guilt, it was not error for the District Court to
deny Charles‟s motion to set aside the jury verdict.
III
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court‟s judgment of
conviction.
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