United States v. David Johnson

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 10-1983
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
DAVID TROY JOHNSON,
Appellant.
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(Crim. No. 08-cr-297)
District Judge: Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel
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Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
May 23, 2011
BEFORE: FUENTES, FISHER and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: June 23, 2011)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
David Troy Johnson appeals the District Court‟s decision to deny his motion to
suppress a firearm and a magazine as “fruits of a poisonous tree,” in this case, an
unlawful seizure. For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm.
I.
We write only for the parties and therefore discuss only the facts necessary to
explain our decision. While out on patrol in the late hours of December 3, 2008, police
officer Ron Miko (“Miko”) stopped several pedestrians and recovered drug
paraphernalia. He then approached a house he suspected was involved in the distribution
of crack cocaine. Following a short conversation with a man in that house, Miko
observed him leave the residence, enter the passenger side of a gray Pontiac, and drive
off. The Pontiac was driven by appellant David Johnson.
Suspecting that the passenger was involved in drug activity, Miko entered his
marked police car and followed the Pontiac. After a short trip around the block, the
passenger exited the vehicle, leaving Miko a car‟s length away. At this point, Miko
noticed that the Pontiac‟s license plate displayed an expired registration tag. Miko then
radioed nearby police officer Chris Dinger (“Dinger”) that he would be making a stop of
the Pontiac.
After following the Pontiac for a block and a half, Miko activated his emergency
lights and siren. The Pontiac did not slow down but continued at a slightly higher speed.
Miko remained in pursuit as the Pontiac proceeded through stop signs and traffic lights,
at some points driving against the flow of traffic. The car chase culminated with Johnson
jumping out of the vehicle and running down a nearby alleyway. Miko left his police car
and chased Johnson on foot, yelling “stop, police, you are under arrest.” App. Br. at 31.
During the chase, Miko saw Johnson remove a black handgun from underneath his
jacket and throw it to his side. Dinger, who along with other officers had joined the foot
race, was notified of the dropped gun and recovered it.
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Meanwhile, the chase continued into the yard and onto the porch of a home in the
area. As Johnson struggled to enter the locked home, Miko took his gun out and ordered
Johnson several times to show his hands. Johnson was eventually arrested and a search
of his person revealed a magazine fitting the pistol recovered by Dinger.
Johnson was charged with being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He moved to suppress both the pistol and the
magazine, claiming they were both the result of an unlawful seizure. Relying on
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991), the District Court held that the Fourth
Amendment did not require the exclusion of the handgun because Johnson voluntarily
abandoned the weapon without ever being the subject of a “seizure.” United States v.
Johnson, No. 08-297, 2009 WL 1578040, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 2009). Additionally, the
District Court concluded that the magazine was found pursuant to a constitutionally
reasonable search incident to a lawful arrest. Id. at *4. Johnson filed a timely appeal.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and we have jurisdiction
over the District Court‟s final order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II.1
A.
The Fourth Amendment protects the right to be free from “unreasonable searches
and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. A seizure occurs when a police officer uses
1
In reviewing a district court‟s denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we exercise plenary review over questions
of law and accept a district court‟s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. See United States v. Allen, 618 F.3d
404, 406 (3d Cir. 2010).
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physical force to restrain a suspect or when a suspect submits to an assertion of authority.
Hodari, 499 U.S. at 626. A suspect submits to an assertion of authority when he
“manifests compliance with police orders.” United States v. Waterman, 569 F.3d 144,
146 n.3 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483 (3d Cir. 2006). While a
traffic stop may constitute a seizure of the person it is justified when based on articulable
and reasonable suspicion that either the vehicle or occupant has violated the law. E.g.,
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979); see also United Stated v. Delfin-Colina,
464 F.3d 392, 397 (3d Cir. 2006).
When property is voluntarily abandoned before a seizure and retrieved by the
police, it has been lawfully recovered and there can be no claim that it was the subject of
an unconstitutional seizure. Hodari, 499 U.S. at 624. After a seizure, the well-
established exception for searches incident to a lawful arrest allows the police to search
an arrestee‟s person and the areas from which “he might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence” without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment. Arizona v. Gant,
129 S. Ct. 1710, 1713, 1716 (2009) (internal Citations omitted).
B.
Johnson‟s sole argument on appeal is that the police lacked reasonable suspicion
to initiate a traffic stop. As such, “[e]verything that happened after Officer Miko
activated his lights and siren is causally connected to the initial invalid attempt to pull the
vehicle over” and should be suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful seizure. App. Br. at 9;
see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963) (stating that if evidence is
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obtained as a result of an unlawful seizure, it is to be excluded as “the „fruits‟ of the
[police officer‟s] unlawful action.”).
Johnson‟s argument is flawed because Miko‟s initiation of the traffic stop did not
constitute a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. After Miko activated his
lights and siren, Johnson increased his speed commencing a dangerous police chase. At
no point did Johnson “manifest compliance with police orders.” See Waterman, 569 F.3d
at 146 n.3. We agree with the District Court that although there was an attempted traffic
stop, Johnson never actually submitted to Miko‟s show of authority. See County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 n.7 (1998) (“Attempted seizures of a person are
beyond the scope of the Fourth Amendment.”).
Even as the chase transitioned from car to foot, Miko had still not seized Johnson.
When Miko shouted “stop, police, you are under arrest,” Johnson kept running down the
alleyway. As the Supreme Court stated in Hodari, the Fourth Amendment term seizure
does not apply to “the prospect of a policeman yelling „stop, in the name of the law.‟”
499 U.S. at 626. Due to Johnson‟s failure to submit to Miko‟s show of authority, we
agree with the District Court that Johnson was not seized while fleeing from Miko down
the alley. Because there was no seizure, Johnson‟s voluntary decision to abandon the
pistol was not the product of a Fourth Amendment violation and, therefore, was not fruit
of the poisonous tree. Id.The District Court correctly concluded that the first and only seizure occurred on
the porch of the home, and as such, we agree with the decision to allow the magazine into
evidence as it was the product of a search incident to a lawful arrest. See Gant, 129 S. Ct.
5at 1716. The scuffle on the porch was the first time physical force was used to subdue
and arrest Johnson. See Hodari, 499 U.S. at 626. This seizure was well within the
confines of the Fourth Amendment as Johnson‟s flight from police and subsequent
actions provided Miko with the requisite probable cause to arrest Johnson without a
warrant. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (“If an officer has
probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal
offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the
offender.”). After making a valid arrest, the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit Miko
from conducting a reasonable search of Johnson‟s person because this was an area from
which Johnson “might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.” Gant, 129
S. Ct. at 1713. Accordingly, the District Court properly denied Johnson‟s motion to
suppress the magazine.2
2
The District Court held in the alternative that “[e]ven if there was a prior illegal seizure,
evidence of the magazine will not be suppressed because the crimes Johnson committed
while fleeing from the police constituted independent grounds for a second, legitimate
arrest.” United States v. Johnson, No. 08-297, 2009 WL 1578040, at *4 n.2 (E.D. Pa.
2009). As the District Court points out, the Third Circuit has not directly ruled on this
issue. Id. It is worth noting that several circuits have come to the same conclusion. See,
e.g., United States v. Mattiex, 2006 WL 2741645 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2006); Marshall v.
White, 2006 WL 1791383 (E.D. Mich. June 27, 2006); United States v. Sprinkle, 106
F.3d 613 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Dawdy, 46 F.3d 1427, (8th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Waupekenay, 973 F.2d 1533, (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. King, 724 F.2d
253 (1st Cir. 1984); United States v. Bailey, 691 F.2d 1009 (11th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Garcia, 516 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Nooks, 446 F.2d 1283(5th Cir. 1971). However, because we have already decided that there was no seizure, and
that the motion to suppress was correctly denied, there is no reason for us to visit this
issue in the current case.
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III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court‟s decision to deny a
motion to suppress both the handgun and the magazine.
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