Palmer v. Attorney General of the United States

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 09-3290
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MARLON GERARDO PALMER
a/k/a MARLON GERARDO PALMER-SAMPSON,
Petitioner,
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent.
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On Petition for Review of an Order of the
United States Department of Justice
Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA 1:A017-556-268)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Walter A. Durling
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 9, 2011
Before: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR. and WEIS, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: April 5, 2011)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
Marlon Palmer petitions this Court to review a decision by the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”) affirming the decision of an Immigration Judge
(“IJ”) denying his applications for a waiver of deportation under Immigration and
Naturalization Act (“INA”) § 212(c). Palmer also asserts that the BIA erred by
dismissing his claim that his former counsel provided him ineffective assistance. For the
reasons discussed below, we will deny the petition for review.
I. Background
Palmer is a native of Costa Rica and was admitted to the United States as a lawful
permanent resident in December of 1967. On April 1, 1996, Palmer made a threatening
phone call to a Pennsylvania judge who had incarcerated Palmer for failing to pay certain
fines. Palmer was subsequently arrested, tried, and convicted for making terroristic
threats, harassment, and retaliation for past official action. On February 5, 1997, he was
sentenced to a period of probation for the threats and harassment convictions and a period
of incarceration for the retaliation conviction. On December 17, 2002, Palmer was
resentenced to a period of one to five years’ incarceration with a credit of sixty-nine days
served for violating the conditions of his probation related to his terroristic threats
conviction and to a period of sixty-nine days to one year for violating the conditions of
his probation related to his harassment conviction. Palmer was released from jail on
October 10, 2008, and subsequently charged with removability pursuant to INA
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as an alien convicted of an aggravated
felony.
On March 11, 2009, an IJ found Palmer to be removable after holding that his
terroristic threats conviction under Pennsylvania law constituted a conviction for an
aggravated felony. Applying the law in effect at the time of Palmer’s arrest, the IJ further
2
held that Palmer was ineligible for a waiver of deportability under INA § 212(c) since he
was incarcerated for at least five years as a result of his terroristic threats conviction.
Palmer appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA. He argued that he was prejudiced by
ineffective assistance of counsel and that he was eligible for § 212(c) relief because it
was error to count the time he spent in jail for violating probation as time he was
incarcerated for his terroristic threats conviction.1 The Board dismissed his appeal. It
held that Palmer failed to meet his burden on his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, and it agreed with the IJ that Palmer had served at least five years’ incarceration
as a result of his terroristic threats conviction due to his resentencing for violating his
probation.
Palmer’s timely petition for review is now before us.
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
We have jurisdiction to review the final decision of the BIA under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(D). We must sustain the BIA’s decision if it is supported by substantial
evidence. Jarbough v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 483 F.3d 184, 191-92 (3d Cir. 2007). We
look to the decision and reasoning of the IJ, to the extent the BIA deferred to or adopted
it; otherwise, we look to the decision of the BIA. See Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d
508, 515 (3d Cir. 2006); Li v. Att’y Gen., 400 F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 2005). The BIA’s
decision “must be upheld unless the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but
compels it.” Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483-84 (3d Cir. 2001).
1
Palmer did not challenge his removability on appeal.
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III. Discussion
The record does not compel us to overturn the BIA’s dismissal of Palmer’s appeal.
Palmer’s conviction for making terroristic threats constitutes a conviction for an
aggravated felony under the INA. See INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F)
(defining an aggravated felony to include “a crime of violence … for which the term of
imprisonment [is] at least one year”); Bovkun v. Ashcroft, 283 F.3d 166, 169-70 (3d Cir.
2002) (holding that, under Pennsylvania law, a terroristic threats violation is a crime of
violence for immigration purposes). Therefore, Palmer is removable unless he qualifies
for a waiver under former § 212(c). INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Under the version of § 212(c) that was in force on the day of
Palmer’s arrest,2 Palmer would not qualify for a waiver if he was convicted of an
aggravated felony and served a term of imprisonment of five years or greater. INA §
212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (effective until April 24, 1996) (subsequently amended)
(stating that waiver is unavailable “to an alien who has been convicted of one or more
aggravated felonies and has served for such felony or felonies a term of imprisonment of
at least 5 years”). Substantial evidence in the record before us supports the BIA’s
conclusion that Palmer served at least five years in jail for violating the terms of his
2
We reference the date of Palmer’s arrest only to demonstrate that even under the
more forgiving version of § 212(c) in effect on the date of Palmer’s first interaction with
the justice system with regard to his terroristic threats conviction, Palmer would not
qualify for a waiver of deportation. We do not reach or comment on whether changes to
§ 212(c) that occurred after Palmer’s arrest or conviction may apply to him. See Atkinson
v. Att’y Gen., 479 F.3d 222 (3d. Cir. 2007) (discussing retroactivity of amendments to
§ 212(c)).
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probation relating to his terroristic threats conviction.3 That five-year period of
incarceration properly relates back to Palmer’s original terroristic threats conviction. See
Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700-01 (2000) (holding that penalties associated
with revocation of parole are attributable to the original conviction). Therefore, Palmer
would not have qualified for a waiver under former § 212(c).4
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny Palmer’s petition for review.
3
Palmer was incarcerated from the day he was resentenced for his probation
violation, December 17, 2002, until October 10, 2008. Before he was resentenced for his
probation violation, Palmer had served sixty-nine days in jail – a time which was credited
against his term of imprisonment for violating his probation for his terroristic threats
conviction. That time of pre-sentencing incarceration is properly counted towards the
term Palmer served for his aggravated felony. See Moreno-Cebrero v. Gonzales, 485
F.3d 395, 398-400 (7th Cir. 2007) (time spent in pre-trial detention counts toward the
five-year incarceration term under § 212(c)); Spina v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 470 F.3d
116, 127-29 (2d Cir. 2006) (same). Therefore, Palmer served a total of six years in jail
for violating the terms of his probation, five years of which is attributable to his violation
of the terms of his probation relating to his terroristic threats conviction.
4
Because our conclusion regarding Palmer’s failure to qualify for a waiver under
former § 212(c) is dispositive, we do not reach the other issues raised by Palmer on
appeal. See Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 623 (3d Cir. 1996)
(holding it prudent not to decide issues unnecessary to the disposition of a case).
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