Barbara Curran v. Howmedica Osteonics

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 10-1242
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BARBARA CURRAN,
Appellant
v.
HOWMEDICA OSTEONICS; STRYKER CORP;
STRYKER INSTRUMENTS; STRYKER
ORTHOPEDICS INC; STRYKER HOWMEDICA
OSTEONICS CORP
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 08-cv-00006)
District Judge: Honorable Petrese B. Tucker
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 26, 2011
Before: BARRY, HARDIMAN and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Filed: April 26, 2011)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Barbara Curran appeals a judgment of the District Court denying her motion for
relief pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). We will affirm.
I
Because we write for the parties, we recite only the essential facts and procedural
history.
In May 2004, Curran had bilateral artificial hip prostheses surgically implanted.
According to Curran, after the surgery the prostheses failed, resulting in pain and limited
motion in her hip joints. In December 2007, Curran sued Howmedica Osteonics Corp.,1
the manufacturer of the prostheses, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
asserting product liability and negligence claims. Howmedica removed Curran‟s suit to
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Howmedica
gave notice of the removal to Curran‟s counsel, Michael J. Flanagan, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1446(d).
Four years before the case was removed, in January 2004, Flanagan registered with
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania‟s electronic case filing (ECF) system and consented
to receive electronic filings pursuant to Local Rule 5.1.2(8). On September 3, 2008,
Howmedica filed a motion to dismiss Curran‟s complaint. Service of the motion was
1
In her complaint, Curran listed Howmedica Osteonics Corp.; Stryker Corp.;
Stryker Instruments; Stryker Orthopaedics; and Stryker Howmedica Osteonics Corp. as
separate defendants. According to Stryker‟s corporate disclosure statement, Howmedica
Osteonics Corp. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Stryker Corporation. Stryker
Instruments and Stryker Orthopaedics are not separate corporate entities, but rather are
operating divisions within Stryker Corp. and Howmedica, respectively. For ease of
exposition, we will refer to the defendants collectively as Howmedica.
2
properly made on Flanagan via the ECF system. Because Flanagan failed to respond to
Howmedica‟s motion, the District Court dismissed Curran‟s complaint with prejudice on
October 9, 2008.
According to Flanagan, on October 20, 2008, he went to the Clerk‟s Office to
inquire about the status of the action and discovered that the complaint had been
dismissed. Flanagan contacted Kim Catullo, Howmedica‟s counsel, and claimed that he
had not received notice of Howmedica‟s motion to dismiss. Catullo responded that
Howmedica‟s motion had been filed electronically and that court records indicated that
Flanagan had received notice of the motion via e-mail on the day it was filed.
Flanagan took no further action until October 8, 2009—364 days after Curran‟s
complaint had been dismissed—at which time he filed a motion for relief from dismissal
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1). Therein, Flanagan averred that he
had not received notice of Howmedica‟s motion to dismiss and argued that this
“technological failure” constituted excusable neglect sufficient for relief pursuant to Rule
60(b)(1). The District Court denied the motion for relief, reasoning that Rule 60(b)
motions must be filed within a “reasonable time,” and that Flanagan had not provided any
explanation for the 364-day delay between dismissal of Curran‟s suit and the motion for
relief. Alternatively, the Court held that Curran failed to demonstrate the exceptional
3
circumstances necessary for relief. This appeal followed.2
II
“We review a district court‟s denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of
discretion.” Reform Party of Allegheny Cnty. v. Allegheny Cnty. Dept. of Elections, 174
F.3d 305, 311 (3d Cir. 1999). “An abuse of discretion may be found when „the district
court‟s decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law
or an improper application of law to fact.‟” Id. (quoting Int’l Union, UAW v. Mack
Trucks, Inc., 820 F.2d 91, 95 (3d Cir. 1987)).
III
“Rule 60(b) allows a party to seek relief from a final judgment, and request
reopening of his case, under a limited set of circumstances including fraud, mistake, and
newly discovered evidence.” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 528 (2005). “The
general purpose of Rule 60 . . . is to strike a proper balance between the conflicting
principles that litigation must be brought to an end and that justice must be done.”
Boughner v. Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 572 F.2d 976, 977 (3d Cir. 1978).
Because parties have a strong interest in the finality of judgments, “[t]his Court has . . .
cautioned that relief from a judgment under Rule 60 should be granted only in exceptional
circumstances.” Id.
2
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
4
On appeal, Flanagan essentially repeats the arguments he presented to the District
Court. His principal argument emphasizes the alleged inequity of the District Court‟s
decision to dismiss Curran‟s complaint with prejudice. This argument contravenes the
rule that “an appeal from denial of Rule 60(b) relief does not bring up the underlying
judgment for review.” Browder v. Dir. Dep’t of Corrs. of Ill., 434 U.S. 257, 263 n.7
(1978). Moreover, appellant‟s brief fails entirely to address the District Court‟s primary
reason for denying the motion for relief, i.e., the extensive delay between the time
Flanagan learned of the dismissal of Curran‟s complaint and the filing of his Rule 60(b)
motion.
As the District Court correctly noted, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require
motions for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) to be made within a reasonable time not to
exceed one year after judgment. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c)(1) (“A motion under Rule
60(b) must be made within a reasonable time--and . . . no more than a year after the entry
of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.”). The one-year limitation serves
as an outer bound, and establishes that motions filed within one year are ipso facto
reasonable. Here, according to Flanagan, 353 days passed between the day he first
learned of the dismissal of Curran‟s complaint and the day he filed the motion for relief.
On appeal, Flanagan neither offers any explanation for his dilatory conduct, nor even
acknowledges that this delay formed the basis for the District Court‟s holding. His failure
to do so is, unfortunately for Curran, fatal to her appeal. Accordingly, we will affirm.
5