United States v. Lawrence Rooks

BLD-158 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 22-1332
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
LAWRENCE ROOKS,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal Action Nos. 2:21-cr-00038-001 & 2:21-cr-00043-001)
District Judge: Honorable Chad F. Kenney
____________________________________
Submitted on Appellee’s Motion for Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
May 26, 2022
Before: McKEE, GREENAWAY, JR. and PORTER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 27, 2022)
_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM
Federal prisoner Lawrence Rooks appeals pro se from the District Court’s decision
denying his motion for compassionate release filed under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
The Government has moved to summarily affirm. For the reasons that follow, we grant
the Government’s motion and will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.
I.
In July 2021, the District Court sentenced Rooks to 92 months in prison and four
years of supervised release after he pleaded guilty to drug related-offenses in Case No.
2:21-cr-00038-001 and firearm-related offenses in Case No. 2:21-cr-00043-001. About
three months later, after exhausting his administrative remedies, he filed in the District
Court a pro se motion for compassionate release. In that motion, which the Government
opposed, Rooks sought early release so that he could serve as the sole caregiver for his
two-year-old son, who was born prematurely and suffers from one or more medical
conditions. Rooks’s motion also mentioned, in passing, the COVID-19 pandemic.
On January 28, 2022, the District Court denied Rooks’s motion, concluding that
he had failed to present “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for a sentence reduction.
The District Court explained that the record indicated that Porsha Williams (Rooks’s ex-
wife and the mother of his child) was caring for the child, and that “[i]n the event that
Ms. Williams has already or subsequently does abandon responsibility for the child,”1
“Rooks has several family members who he has also failed to establish are unable to
1
Rooks alleged that Williams was unemployed, and that at some point in time, (1) she
was enrolled in a drug-treatment program and (2) the Child Community Umbrella
Agency determined that it was in the child’s best interests for Rooks to be awarded sole
custody. Rooks further alleged that Williams “left the care of the [child] to other
relatives.” Compassionate-Release Mot. 7.
2
provide care for the child.” Dist. Ct. Mem. entered Jan. 28, 2022, at 12 [hereinafter Dist.
Ct. Mem.]. The District Court further explained “that the threat of COVID-19, in
conjunction with [Rooks’s] otherwise unqualifying circumstances, do not so compound
his circumstances to the point where they are ‘extraordinary and compelling.’” Id. at 14.2
This timely appeal followed.3
II.
A district court may grant compassionate release if it finds, inter alia, that
“extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant a reduction. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A); United States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 329 (3d Cir. 2020). We
review a district court’s denial of compassionate release for abuse of discretion. See
United States v. Andrews, 12 F.4th 255, 259 (3d Cir. 2021). Under this standard, “we
will not disturb the [district] court’s determination unless we are left with a definite and
firm conviction that [it] committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it
reached.” Id. (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). We may
summarily affirm a district court’s decision if the appeal fails to present a substantial
question. See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
2
The District Court noted that “Rooks contracted COVID-19 in November of 2020,
while in custody . . ., but remained asymptomatic and quarantined without any further
complications.” Dist. Ct. Mem. 14.
3
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
3
In this case, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rooks’s
compassionate-release motion for failure to show “extraordinary and compelling reasons”
for a sentence reduction. Even if we were to assume for the sake of argument that
Williams is unable to care for her and Rooks’s child, we would find no error in the
District Court’s conclusion that Rooks’s motion cannot prevail because he has failed to
establish that certain family members, including his grandmother, his mother, and some
of his siblings, are unable to serve as a caregiver for the child.4 We also find no error in
the District Court’s determination “that the threat of COVID-19, in conjunction with
[Rooks’s] otherwise unqualifying circumstances, do not so compound his circumstances
to the point where they are ‘extraordinary and compelling.’” Dist. Ct. Mem. 14; see also
United States v. Raia, 954 F.3d 594, 597 (3d Cir. 2020) (explaining that the “mere
existence of COVID-19 in society” is not enough to warrant compassionate release).
Because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we grant the
Government’s motion to summarily affirm, and we will summarily affirm the District
Court’s judgment.5
4
While Rooks has not filed a response to the Government’s motion for summary
affirmance, we note that he appears to argue in his brief that the District Court should
have contacted his family members to determine their ability to serve as caregivers for his
child. But this argument ignores the fact that it was Rooks’s burden to show that he was
entitled to compassionate release. See, e.g., United States v. Barbee, 25 F.4th 531, 532
(7th Cir. 2022); United States v. Jones, 17 F.4th 371, 375 (2d Cir. 2021) (per curiam).
5
We also grant the Government’s (1) request for leave to file its motion for summary
affirmance and (2) request to be excused from filing a brief.
4