Atina Knowles v. Temple University

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 21-3131
__________
ATINA KNOWLES,
Appellant
v.
TEMPLE UNIVERSITY
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-20-cv-03513)
Magistrate Judge: Honorable Carol S. Wells
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
June 23, 2022
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., PORTER, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 2, 2022)
___________
OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant Atina Knowles is a former graduate student of Temple University.
Beginning in the fall of 2016, she attended Temple as a Ph.D. student in the Department
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
of Philosophy. In May 2019, Knowles was dismissed from the program because she
failed her preliminary examinations, a requirement for the degree. Knowles then filed a
complaint in state court asserting that Temple violated her procedural due process rights
in terminating her from the program.1 Temple removed the matter to the District Court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and the parties consented to proceed before a Magistrate
Judge. In October 2021, following numerous discovery disputes and pretrial
proceedings, the Magistrate Judge granted summary judgment in favor of Temple,
concluding that Temple had not committed any procedural due process violations.
Knowles appealed.2
I.
A.
Knowles first challenges the Magistrate Judge’s denial of her motion to amend the
complaint. In her proposed amended complaint, Knowles asserted that three professors
involved in her preliminary exams violated her rights to free speech, due process, and
equal protection, and engaged in a civil conspiracy by failing her because they disliked
her and disagreed with her political views. She also asserted that members of the Board
of Trustees acted with reckless indifference toward her clearly established constitutional
rights, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
1
Knowles also asserted breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims, but those
claims were dismissed, and Knowles does not challenge their dismissal on appeal.
Therefore, any such challenge is deemed abandoned. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d
176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993).
2
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2
We review the Magistrate Judge’s denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion
and review de novo her determination that amendment would be futile. United States ex
rel. Schumann v. AstraZeneca Pharms. L.P., 769 F.3d 837, 849 (3d Cir. 2014). While
leave should be freely granted to a party to amend its pleadings when justice so requires,
see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), the court may properly deny a party’s motion to amend when
amendment would be futile, see Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d
Cir. 2002).
The Magistrate Judge did not err in concluding that it would have been futile for
Knowles to amend her complaint. First, Knowles failed to state a claim against the three
professors. As the Magistrate Judge explained, although Knowles couched her claims in
terms of federal and state-law violations, all three proposed claims actually challenge the
academic judgment of her professors. The record reflects that the professors’ decisions to
fail Knowles and remove her from the graduate program were based upon the exercise of
professional judgment, and there is no indication that the professors deviated from
academic norms. See Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985)
(explaining that a court may not override the faculty’s academic decisions unless there is
evidence that the actors deviated substantially from accepted academic norms and “did
not actually exercise professional judgment”); Swartley v. Hoffner, 734 A.2d 915, 921
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (applying Ewing). Contrary to Knowles’s contention, the
Magistrate Judge did not improperly apply the Rule 12(b)(6) standard to her motion to
amend, as amendment is considered futile if the amended complaint would not survive a
3
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Budhun v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr.,
765 F.3d 245, 259 (3d Cir. 2014).
Second, Knowles failed to state a claim under § 1983 against the members of the
Board of Trustees, as she did not allege that any of them were personally involved in the
academic decision making that resulted in her dismissal. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845
F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). Accordingly, because amendment
would have been futile, the Magistrate Judge acted within her discretion in denying
Knowles leave to amend the complaint.
B.
Knowles next challenges the Magistrate Judge’s order denying her motion to
recuse. Knowles moved for recusal on the grounds that the Magistrate Judge made
comments during hearings revealing a “high degree of antagonism” toward her;
habitually spent only hours considering her motions; ignored her legal arguments; and
extended “questionable courtesies” to Temple. The Magistrate Judge denied the motion,
rejecting each of Knowles’s articulated bases for recusal.
We review the Magistrate Judge’s denial of the recusal motion for abuse of
discretion. See Blanche R.d Corp. v. Bensalem Twp., 57 F.3d 253, 265 (3d Cir.1995). A
judge is required to recuse where her impartiality “might reasonably be questioned,” 28
U.S.C. § 455(a), or if she “has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding,” id.§ 455(b)(1).
4
We have reviewed the record and see no indicia of partiality or bias in the
Magistrate Judge’s actions. As the Magistrate Judge noted, most of Knowles’s objections
amount to mere dissatisfaction with her legal rulings, and such dissatisfaction is not a
basis for recusal. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (“[J]udicial
rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.”);
Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000) (“We
have repeatedly stated that a party’s displeasure with legal rulings does not form an
adequate basis for recusal.”). To the extent that Knowles contends that the Magistrate
Judge exhibited antagonism toward her during various proceedings, we have reviewed
the disputed comments and note that recusal is not warranted when a judge shares her
knowledge and experience with a litigant. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 551, 554.
Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the Magistrate Judge’s denial of the
motion to recuse.
C.
Next, Knowles argues that during discovery, the Magistrate Judge improperly
ordered her to produce (a) a copy of her current curriculum vitae and (b) an authorization
for the release of her income tax returns. Knowles also argues that the Magistrate Judge
improperly advised her that if she refused to give Temple access to her medical records,
she would be precluded from seeking damages for physical, mental, or emotional injury.
We “review a district court’s discovery orders for abuse of discretion[] and will
not disturb such orders without a showing of actual and substantial prejudice.”
Cyberworld Enter. Techs., Inc. v. Napolitano, 602 F.3d 189, 200 (3d Cir. 2010).
5
We see no abuse of discretion here. The Magistrate Judge carefully explained the
reasons for allowing this discovery, and we need not repeat her explanations here.
Furthermore, given that Knowles’s sole claim against Temple—that she was denied
procedural due process—failed at summary judgment, she has not shown how she was
prejudiced by these discovery rulings, all of which pertain to her alleged damages.
D.
Knowles also challenges the Magistrate Judge’s denial of her motion for sanctions
under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Knowles moved for sanctions
against Temple and its counsel for: (1) opposing her motion to amend her complaint; (2)
opposing her motion to revoke the assignment of the case to the Magistrate Judge; (3)
filing a motion to compel her to produce certain records; (4) filing a motion to sanction
her for discovery violations; (5) initiating an alleged ex parte communication with the
Magistrate Judge; (6) attempting to improperly influence the Magistrate Judge’s
decisions; and (7) filing a motion to dismiss the complaint in Knowles’s related federal
court action.
We review a ruling on a motion for Rule 11 sanctions for abuse of discretion. See
Gary v. The Braddock Cemetery, 517 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2008). “Sanctions are to be
applied only in the exceptional circumstance where a claim or motion is patently
unmeritorious or frivolous.” Ario v. Underwriting Members of Syndicate 53 at Lloyds
for 1998 Year of Acct., 618 F.3d 277, 297 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted).
The Magistrate Judge acted well within her discretion in denying the Rule 11
motion. As the Magistrate Judge explained, Rule 11 does not apply to discovery motions
6
practice, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(d); Temple reasonably opposed Knowles’s motions to
amend and to revoke the assignment to the Magistrate Judge; Temple’s communications
with the Magistrate Judge were not inappropriate; and the Magistrate Judge could not
sanction Temple for motions it filed in a different case.
E.
Finally, the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that Temple was entitled to
summary judgment with respect to Knowles’s procedural due process claim.
We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s summary-judgment order.
See Camp v. Brennan, 219 F.3d 279, 280 (3d Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is proper if
“the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We “view the facts in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in
that party’s favor.” S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 256
(3d Cir. 2013).
The essence of a procedural due process claim is notice and an opportunity to be
heard. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985). We have
explained that when, as in this case, a student is discharged for academic reasons, all that
is required to satisfy procedural due process is “an informal faculty evaluation with the
student.” Mauriello v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry, 781 F.2d 46, 51 (1986).
It is undisputed that after Knowles failed the first attempt to pass her second
preliminary examinations, she filed a grievance with the Philosophy Department and
appealed the denial of that grievance to the College of Liberal Arts Graduate Committee.
7
She followed the same process when she failed the second attempt to pass her second
preliminary examinations. After she was dismissed from the program, the Graduate
Board Student Appeals Committee held a hearing at which she presented evidence and
personally addressed the committee. Given these procedures, the Magistrate Judge
correctly concluded that the procedure provided to Knowles was constitutionally
sufficient. See, e.g., id. at 52 (concluding that a graduate student’s procedural due
process rights had been satisfied because “[she] was informed of her academic
deficiencies, was given an opportunity to rectify them during a probationary period
before being dismissed, and was allowed to present her grievance to the graduate
committee”).
II.
We have considered Knowles’s remaining arguments on appeal and conclude that
they are meritless. Accordingly, we will affirm.
8