United States v. Keith Bolt

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 09-2756
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
KEITH BOLT,
Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
District Court No. 3-92-cr-00460-001
District Judge: The Honorable Anne E. Thompson
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
March 11, 2010
Before: AMBRO, SMITH, and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Filed: April 27, 2010)
OPINION
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
On April 2, 1993, Keith Bolt pleaded guilty to possessing crack cocaine
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with the intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The District
Court sentenced him to 84 months of imprisonment, the minimum sentence under
the applicable 84 to 105 months Sentencing Guidelines range, followed by four
years of supervised release. His supervised release term commenced on January
31, 2001.
In May of 2009, the Government filed a third petition for revocation of
supervised release based on four violations: (1) Bolt’s failure to register as a sex
offender in New Jersey, as required by Megan’s Law; (2) his attempt to cash a
fraudulent cashier’s check; (3) his failure to truthfully answer all of his probation
officer’s inquiries; and (4) his failure to report to his probation officer. Pursuant
to a plea agreement, the Government agreed to dismiss the other three charges if
Bolt pleaded guilty to failing to report to his probation officer. On June 8, 2009,
Bolt appeared before the District Court and admitted that he had failed to report to
his probation officer. The Court revoked his supervised release. After
determining that the applicable Guidelines range was 7 to 13 months of
imprisonment, the District Court sentenced Bolt to 10 months, to be followed by
an additional year of supervised release.
Bolt appeals from that sentence, arguing that the District Court’s sentence
was procedurally unreasonable. We will affirm the judgment of the District
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Court.1
We review Bolt’s sentence for reasonableness. United States v. Bungar,
478 F.3d 540, 542 (3d Cir. 2007). A revocation of supervised release is
procedurally reasonable when the record demonstrates that the sentencing court
gave meaningful consideration to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors referenced in 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e). Bungar, 478 F.3d at 543-44. A district court need not discuss a
defendant’s clearly nonmeritorious arguments, or otherwise “discuss and make
findings as to each of the § 3553(a) factors if the record makes clear the court took
the factors into account in sentencing.” Id. at 543 (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted); see also United States v. Jackson, 467 F.3d 834, 841 (3d Cir.
2006) (noting that the record must show “a true, considered exercise of discretion
on the part of a district court, including a recognition of, and response to, the
parties’ non-frivolous arguments”).
Bolt argues that the sentence imposed following the third revocation of
supervised release was procedurally unreasonable because the District Court failed
to meaningfully consider the fact that his original, 84-month sentence of
imprisonment was allegedly 14 months longer than necessary in light of the
Sentencing Commission’s 2008 amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines for crack
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The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). This
Court has jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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cocaine offenses. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c); U.S.S.G. Supp. to App. C 226-31
(2008) (Amendment 706). He claims that the District Court was required to
recognize this additional 14 months of imprisonment in considering the § 3553(a)
factors when sentencing him on his third revocation of supervised release. We
disagree.
Bolt’s argument that the District Court should have considered the
retroactivity of the amendments for crack cocaine offenses clearly lacks merit as it
is expressly foreclosed by Application Note 4(A) of U.S.S.G § 1B1.10. That
Application Note clarifies that “[o]nly a term of imprisonment imposed as part of
the original sentence is authorized to be reduced under [U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10.]” The
Application Note specifically states that retroactive application of an amendment
to the Sentencing Guidelines “does not authorize a reduction in the term of
imprisonment imposed upon revocation of supervised release.” U.S.S.G. §
1B1.10; see also United States v. Forman, 553 F.3d 585, 588-89 (7th Cir. 2009)
(rejecting argument that Amendment 706 entitled defendant, who had already
served his full term of imprisonment, to a reduced sentence for violating
supervised release).
Bolt’s argument that the District Court should have considered the
retroactivity of the amendments in considering his history and characteristics as
well as the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities is also flawed. The
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purpose of revocation of supervised release is to sanction the defendant’s “breach
of trust” for violating the conditions of supervised release. See United States v.
Dees, 467 F.3d 847, 853 (3d Cir. 2006). This objective is distinct and independent
from the purposes of the original sentence. Id.
Thus, the crack cocaine amendment has no application to the term of his
supervised release, which was revoked by a District Judge who was familiar with
Bolt’s case history and sentenced him for his breach of trust in violating the
conditions of his supervised release. After noting its familiarity with Bolt’s
history, particularly his original crime 16 years ago and his subsequent supervised
release violations, the District Court concluded that Bolt needed “to get his life
together.” The record, which demonstrates the District Court’s knowledge of
Bolt’s history, the arguments presented by Bolt’s attorney at the revocation
hearing, and the statements made by the District Court immediately before
pronouncing Bolt’s sentence, makes clear that the District Court took the relevant
§ 3553(a) factors into account in sentencing.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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