United States v. Surash Rampersad

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 08-3671
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
SURASH RAMPERSAD,
Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Virgin Islands
Division of St. Croix
(Crim. No. 1-07-CR-00051-002)
Visiting District Judge: Hon. Anne E. Thompson
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 4, 2009
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge,
FUENTES, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: May 19, 2010)
OPINION
McKEE, Chief Judge.
Appellant Surash Rampersad appeals the district court’s order denying his motion
for judgment of acquittal. For the reasons that follow, we reject each of his arguments,
and we will affirm.
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I.
We write primarily for the parties and therefore need not set forth the factual or
procedural history in detail. Furthermore, we briefly discussed the evidence underlying
Rampersad’s conviction when we rejected similar arguments made by his codefendant in
his appeal. See United States v. Rohan Providence, Appeal No. 08-3670 (3d Cir. 2010)
(non-precedential opinion). During the joint trial, the district court allowed Officer
Howell to give his lay opinion regarding the number of marijuana plants seized from the
defendants’ premises, as well as testimony about what constitutes a “plant.” J.A. 152-53.
The government’s expert, forensic chemist Scott Goodlin, also testified about plant
quantity and what constitutes a “plant” for forensic purposes. See J.A. 243-45.
Rampersad received pretrial notice of Goodlin’s expert testimony, but not of Officer
Howell’s lay testimony.
Rampersad now argues that the district court abused its discretion in allowing
Officer Howell to testify about plant quantity. He also contends that Officer Howell’s
testimony violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(G) because he did not
receive notice. Finally, like his codefendant before him, he argues that the evidence was
insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
II.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We usually review a district
court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion and the underlying legal conclusions de
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novo. See United States v. Serafini, 233 F.3d 758, 768 n.14 (3d Cir. 2000). However,
where a defendant has failed to preserve an objection for appeal, we review only for plain
error. See United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 257 (3d Cir. 2004). Under this
standard of review, we can correct an error only if it “affect[s] substantial rights.” United
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). An error “affects substantial rights” if it “affect[s] the outcome of the district
court proceedings,” id. at 734; otherwise, it is “harmless” and should “be disregarded,”
F ED. R. C RIM. P. 52(b).
In reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, we review all of the
evidence on the record “in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine
whether any rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt[] beyond a reasonable
doubt based on the available evidence.” United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 133 (3d
Cir. 2005) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Insufficient evidence claims
place “a very heavy burden” on an appellant. United States v. Gonzalez, 918 F.2d 1129,
1132 (3d Cir. 1990) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
III.
A.
Rampersad did not object to the absence of notice regarding Officer Howell’s
testimony under Rule 16(a)(1)(G), and he must therefore now establish plain error.1
1
Rule 16(a)(1)(G) states that “[a]t the defendant’s request, the government must give to the
defendant a written summary of any [expert] testimony that [it] . . . intends to use . . . during its
3
Under plain error review, we may afford relief only if an error affects substantial
rights. Even if we assume arguendo that the court erred in admitting Officer Howell’s
testimony, we would have to conclude that it did not affect Rampersad’s substantial
rights. Rampersad concedes that he did receive notice of Goodlin’s proposed expert
testimony that a seedling constitutes a plant so long as the seedling has an intact root
structure. He cannot, therefore, demonstrate prejudice from Officer Howell’s nearly
identical testimony.
Moreover, Officer Howell’s lay opinion was admissible under Federal Rule of
Evidence 701 based on his perception, personal knowledge, and experience. Officer
Howell did not, therefore, have to be treated as a scientific expert. Compare F ED. R.
E VID. 701 with F ED. R. E VID. 702.2 Given an adequate foundation, a lay person can offer
an opinion about what constitutes a marijuana plant. See, e.g., United States v. Eves, 932
F.2d 856, 859-60 (10th Cir. 1991).
The district court admitted Officer Howell’s testimony regarding plant quantity as
lay opinion based upon that witness’s everyday knowledge and experience. Doing so was
proper given the evidentiary foundation. Therefore, no notice was necessary under Rule
case-in-chief at trial.” FED . R. CRIM . P. 16(a)(1)(G).
2
The “modern trend,” recognizing a “liberalization of Rule 701,” favors the admission of
opinion testimony when based on “personal knowledge and susceptible to cross-examination.”
United States v. Paiva, 892 F.2d 148, 157 (1st Cir. 1989) (citations omitted); Teen-Ed, Inc. v.
Kimball Intern, Inc., 620 F.2d 399, 403-04 (3d Cir. 1980). The mere ability to qualify as an
expert should not disqualify a witness from providing lay opinion based on her/his personal
knowledge and perception. See Teen-Ed, 620 F.2d at 403-04.
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16(a)(1)(G).
B.
Rampersad also argues that there was insufficient evidence that he aided and
abetted the three underlying crimes, and that Counts I and II involved in excess of one
hundred marijuana plants. Although we are not bound by our nonprecedential opinion in
his codefendant’s appeal, we find that Rampersad’s challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence is no less frivolous than his codefendant’s challenge was, and we reject it for the
same reasons we set forth there. See United States v. Rohan Providence, Appeal No. 08-
3670 (3d Cir. 2010) (non-precedential opinion). Rampersad and Providence were
recorded brushing excess dirt from, watering, and otherwise “messing with” marijuana
plants over eleven days. He cannot now distance himself from his gardening chores by
arguing “mere presence.”
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district court’s order denying
Rampersad’s motion for judgment of acquittal.
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