United States v. Paris Carney

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 09-1199
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
PARIS LAMONT CARNEY,
Appellant
On Appeal From the United States
District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Action No. 2-07-cr-00068-001)
District Judge: Hon. Stewart Dalzell
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 28, 2010
BEFORE: McKEE, Chief Judge, RENDELL and
STAPLETON, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: June 3, 2010)
OPINION OF THE COURT
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:
Paris Lamont Carney appeals his convictions for bank robbery in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2113(d) and using a firearm in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c). His attorney has moved to withdraw his representation under Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967). We will grant the
motion to withdraw and will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
This Court’s rules provide that “[w]here, upon review of the district court record,
trial counsel is persuaded that the appeal presents no issue of even arguable merit, counsel
may file a motion to withdraw and supporting brief pursuant to Anders.” 3d Cir. LAR
109.2(a). If we concur with trial counsel’s assessment, we “will grant [the] Anders
motion, and dispose of the appeal without appointing new counsel.” Id. Accordingly, our
“inquiry when counsel submits an Anders brief is thus twofold . . .: (1) whether counsel
adequately fulfilled the rule’s requirements; and (2) whether an independent review of the
record presents any nonfrivolous issues.” United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d
Cir. 2001).
Our review of the record has convinced us that trial counsel’s Anders brief is
adequate and that there are no nonfrivolous grounds on which to challenge the judgment
of conviction.
2
The District Court properly denied Carney’s motion for acquittal on the ground
that the government had failed to prove that the credit union that was robbed was
federally insured. At trial, a credit union employee testified that the deposits of the credit
union were federally insured through the National Credit Association on the date of the
robbery. The government also introduced, without objection, a self-authenticating
Certificate of Insurance dated only two months after the robbery evidencing that the credit
union’s accounts were federally insured beginning in 1971 and remained insured as of the
date of the Certificate. This evidence was sufficient to carry the government’s burden.
See, e.g., United States v. McIntosh, 463 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v.
Abuhouran, 162 F.3d 230, 243 (3d Cir. 1998) (existence of federal insurance was proven
by testimony of bank employee and FDIC representative where juror would reasonably
have understood the witnesses to refer to the time of the offenses charged); United States
v. Rusan, 460 F.3d 989, 994 (8th Cir. 2006) (photocopy of FDIC plaque and testimony of
bank employee proved existence of federal insurance coverage); United States v. Hicks,
217 F.3d 1038, 1044-45 (9th Cir. 2000) (testimony of bank employee that bank was
federally insured on the date false statements were made to it and corroborated by
certificates of insurance were sufficient to prove the bank was federally insured); United
States v. Harris, 165 F.3d 1062, 1066 (6th Cir. 1999) (testimony of bank’s fraud
investigator who also displayed a certificate of insurance was sufficient to prove the
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existence of federal insurance).1
Because our independent review of the record fails to reveal any nonfrivolous
grounds for appeal, we will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and will affirm the
judgment of the District Court. In addition, we certify that the issues presented in this
appeal lack legal merit and thus that counsel is not required to file a petition for writ of
certiorari with the Supreme Court. 3d Cir. LAR 109.2(b).
1
In the course of our independent review, we have also considered whether the District
Court’s denial of Carney’s Rule 33 motion for a new trial presents a nonfrivolous issue.
We conclude that it does not. What Carney characterizes as “new evidence” was not only
known to him at the time of trial but was also introduced as evidence, and argued by
counsel, at trial.
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