DocketNumber: No. 08-3266
Citation Numbers: 337 F. App'x 233
Judges: Barry, Dubois, Smith
Filed Date: 7/8/2009
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/5/2022
OPINION
Appellant Harry Quiah challenges his term of imprisonment on several grounds. Between August and September 2006, Quiah participated in two drug transactions involving cocaine base, also known as crack cocaine, and the sale of three weapons with ammunition. The Government charged
Quiah was sentenced on July 28, 2008. The District Court calculated his offense level as thirty-one
Quiah contends the District Court erred in several regards when it sentenced him.
Though Quiah’s constitutional challenge lacks merit, he also argues that the District Court should have applied the factors identified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to address the sentencing disparity between cocaine base and cocaine powder. This Court has “made clear that district courts [are] ‘under no obligation to impose a sentence below the applicable Guidelines range solely on the basis of the crack/powder cocaine differential,’ ” though a court would err if it failed to recognize that it could consider this differential as part of its consideration of the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 222 (3d Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 249 (3d Cir.2006)). As Quiah did not raise the disparity during the sentencing hearing before the District Court, the issue is waived. See United States v. King, 518 F.3d 571 (8th Cir.2008) (“At no time prior to this appeal did King raise the issue of the disparity created by the 100:1 crack to powder cocaine quantity ratio. Nor did King ask the district court to consider the disparity in determining his sentence. Thus, King cannot argue on appeal the district court erred by failing to consider that factor.”); United States v. Filipiak, 466 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir.2006) (stating that “a defendant cannot complain on appeal that [his] sentence should have been reduced based upon § 3553(a) factors that were never brought to the attention of the district court”).
Finally, Quiah argues that his sentence is unreasonable because various § 3553(a) factors warranted a reduced sentence.
In United States v. Coopeer, 437 F.3d 324 (3d Cir.2006), this Court stated that “a rote statement of the § 3553(a) factors should not suffice if at sentencing either the defendant or the prosecution properly raises ‘a ground of recognized legal merit.’ ” Id. at 329 (citation omitted). Nonetheless, the “court need not discuss every argument made by a litigant,” nor must it “discuss and make findings as to each of the § 3553(a) factors.” Id. Applying a deferential standard of review, this Court instead looks to whether the § 3553(a) factors “were reasonably applied to the circumstances of the case” and whether “the district judge imposed the sentence ... for reasons that are logical and consistent with the factors set forth in section 3553(a).” Id. at 330.
Before the District Court, Quiah’s counsel argued for a below-guideline sentence on the grounds that: (1) Quiah and the Government had agreed in a draft plea agreement to an offense level of twenty-nine; (2) Quiah cooperated with the Government; (3) Quiah faced harsh pre-sentence detainment conditions; and
Furthermore, Quiah’s term of imprisonment was not substantively unreasonable. “[I]f the district court’s sentence is procedurally sound, we will affirm it unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.” United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir.2009) (en banc). The District Court concluded that a 120-month term of imprisonment was reasonable, and we agree.
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the District Court’s decision.
. In his statement of facts, Quiah contends that his plea agreement contained a stipulation to an offense level of twenty-nine. Before this Court, however, Quiah has not argued that the District Court erroneously calculated his offense level of thirty-one or otherwise erred in the calculation of his Sentencing Guidelines range.
. The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)
. Quiah also argues his sentence is unreasonable because “the District Court appeared to agree with the parties that a level 29 was appropriate.” Because the sentencing range for an individual with an offense level of twenty-nine and criminal history category of II is 97-121 months, Quiah argues that Lis 120-month term of imprisonment is unreasonable because it docs not relied the District Court's "favorable reaction” to his § 3553(a) arguments. This argument fails for the reason stated above — the District Court clearly rejected Quiah's efforts to calculate his sentencing range on the basis of an offense level of twenty-nine.